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Abstract 
As a developing country, the Sultanate of Oman finds it relatively challenging to balance 
foreign investment protection whilst safeguarding its national sovereignty and interests; 
however, it recognizes the importance of providing the necessary legal protection for 
foreign investors. This is the first study to examine foreign investment protection in 
Oman. It identifies existing guarantees and weaknesses in protecting foreign investment 
within the Omani legal system and establishes how this level of protection could be 
enhanced from a legal perspective. It examines the extent of Oman’s existing legal 
obligations under the terms of the multilateral and bilateral investment agreements to 
which it is a signatory, to examine the role they play in safeguarding foreign investors’ 
rights.  
It also investigates the effectiveness of Oman’s dispute settlement mechanisms for 
resolving foreign investment disputes. Oman’s administrative policies and practices 
relating to foreign investment are analysed in order to pinpoint any shortcomings in the 
current system for enforcing foreign investment legislation. Based on these findings, 
policy recommendations are made which are intended to improve the protection offered 
to foreign investment in Oman whilst allowing Oman the necessary degree of protection 
to its own public policy space. 
This study concludes that Oman have taken the approach to provide adequate legal 
protection for foreign investment. In addition, in the context of the development of 
international investment law, the Al-Tamimi case in particular illustrates the need for 
Omani legislation and legal practice to strike a balance between protecting foreign 
investors' rights and safeguarding national interests. Moreover, Oman cannot reduce any 
guarantees in its international agreements, particularly with regard to seeking 
international dispute resolution, unless it can guarantee an efficient national legal system 
and dispute resolution mechanism.  
Whilst improved legal protection plays an important role in attracting foreign 
investment, this needs to be part of a broader strategy aimed at making the Sultanate a 
desirable destination for overseas investors. Thus, this study recommends that in order to 
enhance protection for current foreign investors and attract future investment Oman 
needs to establish a specialised investment council with a unified policy, making it easy 
to do business in the Sultanate. This initiative needs to be supported by a new national 
arbitration centre in Oman and training to upskill the Omani judges and workforce.       
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1 
0.1 Introduction 
A new era started in Oman in 1970 when Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said became its 
new ruler but the country was not able to focus on developing foreign investment until 
the war in the south of the country ended in 1975.1 At that time, Omani policies and 
practices concerning foreign investment were a real concern for overseas investors and 
needed to be evaluated. As Subedi notes, the need to balance providing protection for 
foreign investors with the regulatory powers of states poses particular challenges for 
those dealing with the Law of Foreign Investment.2  
However, since the beginning of the 1990s, the Sultanate of Oman has considerably 
changed its position toward foreign investment and has developed a new policy to 
attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) that relies on four key elements. These are: 
devising a new legal framework, facilitating business for foreign investors, liberalizing 
its economy, and promoting the country as a suitable destination for foreign 
investment.3 Omani decision makers adopted this attitude as a result of the widespread 
notion among developing countries that FDI would enhance the national economy, 
provide jobs for their nationals and help with the transfer of the latest technology and 
knowledge, taking into consideration the sharp fall in oil prices, which in 1998 caused 
the problem of a national deficit of 122 million Omani Riyals (OMR). Consequently, 
the Omani government was convinced that the only way to attract FDI was by providing 
the right conditions for foreign investors.4  
It is clear that the new legal business framework forms the cornerstone of this 
development that is intended to support FDI by modernizing Oman’s investment-related 
framework to make it more liberal and open.5 This governmental approach is reflected 
in the provisions of a number of laws and amendments to these since the early 1990s. 
The most relevant legislation includes the Foreign Capital Investment Law (FCIL), 
issued in 1994 by Royal Decree 102/94 and then followed by several amendments; the 
new Income Tax Law, promulgated in 2009 by Royal Decree 28/2009, and the new 
                                                           
1 The Dhofar war was in the south part of Oman (1970-1975) during the Sultan Qaboos era. See Calvin 
Allen and W Lynn Rigsbee, Oman Under Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996 (Frank Cass 
2000) 
2 Surya P Subedi, ‘The Challenge of Reconciling the Competing Principles within the Law of Foreign 
Investment with Special Reference to the Recent Trend in the Interpretation of the Term 
"Expropriation"’(2006) 40 Intl Law 121,125 
3 K Mellahi, C Guermat, J G Frynas and H Al-Bortmani, ‘Motives for Foreign Direct Investment in 
Oman’ (2003) 45 Thunderbird Intl Bus Rev 431, 433  
4 Ibid 433 
5 Ibid 433 
2 
Omani Labour Law by Royal Decree 35/2003, amended in 2011 by Royal Decree 
113/2011. 
Oman has also signed many multilateral and bilateral agreements focusing mainly or 
partly on foreign investment, the most significant being the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) Agreement signed in 2001 and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the 
United States which entered into force on January 1, 2009.6 The principle underpinning 
the protection of foreign investment in customary international law is the classic notion 
of diplomatic protection and the treatment of aliens.7 Bilateral treaties have played a 
significant role in the creation of customary principles of international law8 concerning 
the protection of foreign investment, but whether the absence of a comprehensive 
international treaty has had a negative impact on the development and protection of 
foreign investment remains a controversial issue. 
In terms of attracting foreign investment, Oman still appears to be lagging behind its 
regional neighbours, despite its strategic location. In 2012, for example, the number of 
FDI projects in the UAE was 328, whereas Oman had succeeded in attracting just 48 in 
total.9 Taking into account the anticipated depletion of the Sultanate’s relatively modest 
oil reserves, attracting and protecting FDI needs to be a priority for Oman.  
Since there is an undeniable need for both developing and developed countries to attract 
foreign investment, the legal aspects of foreign investment cannot be ignored or 
underestimated.10 Therefore, the title of this thesis is ‘Foreign Investment in the 
Sultanate of Oman: The Legal Guarantees and Weaknesses of Providing Investment 
Protection’ and it represents the first comprehensive legal study to examine the current 
weaknesses in Omani legislation regarding foreign investment and to review these laws 
in the context of international law. It aims to determine whether these new legal 
developments will be effective at achieving the goal of attracting foreign investment to 
Oman and protecting it.  
 
                                                           
6 Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR), ‘Oman Free Trade Agreement’ <www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta> accessed 25 April 2016 
7 Surya P Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (3rd edn, Hart 
Publishing 2016) 78  
8 M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, CUP 2011) 232-233  
9 FTB, The FDI Report 2012: Global Greenfield Investment Trends <http://ftbsitessvr01 
ft.com/forms/fDi/report2012/files/The_fDi_Report_2012.pdf> accessed 25 April 2016 
10 Richard J Hunter, Robert E Shapiro and Leo V Ryan, ‘Legal Considerations in Foreign Direct 
Investment’ (2003) 28 Oklahoma City ULRev 851, 872 
3 
0.2 Research Aim and Objectives  
The main aim of this research is to identify the guarantees and weaknesses in the 
existing Omani legal system regarding the protection of foreign investment and to 
establish how the level of protection offered to foreign investors could be enhanced 
from a legal perspective.  Appropriate national legal instruments play a crucial role in 
ensuring that a safe and well-regulated environment is provided for all investment 
partners, including foreign investors. Therefore, all Omani legislation addressing the 
issue of foreign investment, especially its FCIL, will be scrutinised.  
Attention will also be paid to assessing the functions of some key multilateral and 
bilateral investment agreements to which Oman is a party, in order to determine the 
extent of its obligations under these treaties and the role that they play in safeguarding 
the rights of foreign investors. Therefore, Oman’s commitments under international 
agreements, such as the terms of the multilateral WTO agreements, The Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) Economic Agreement, Oman’s bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) and its FTA with the United States, will be examined.  
In addition, Oman’s administrative policies and practices relating to foreign investment 
will also be investigated in order to pinpoint any shortcomings in the current system and 
any failures in enforcing foreign investment legislation in Oman.  
The dispute settlement mechanism that currently operates in Oman for dealing with 
foreign investment cases will be investigated by analysing the approach taken towards 
foreign investment cases by both the Omani courts and independent dispute settlement 
bodies. This analysis will provide a clear picture of the legal guarantees that are 
currently in place for foreign investors in Oman and the challenges that remain to be 
tackled.  
Finally, legal findings and policy recommendations where it is necceasry will be made 
which are intended to boast foreign investors' confidence and improve the legal 
protection of foreign investment in Oman. The current legal system governing foreign 
investment in Oman will be analysed in order to identify any policy reforms needed in 
existing regulations and practices.  
0.3 Research Questions  
In order to pursue the main aim of identifying the strengths and weaknesses in the 
current Omani legal framework regarding the protection of foreign investment in order 
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to establish how the level of protection offered to foreign investors could be enhanced 
from a legal perspective, this thesis addresses the following research questions:  
1. What are the recent trends in international investment law and what degree of 
protection does this law afford foreign investment? 
2. How did Oman's foreign investment law and policies evolve?  
3. What international and regional obligations does Oman have to protect foreign 
investment and do these provide adequate safeguards? 
4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current Omani legal framework? 
5. To what extent can Oman’s dispute settlement mechanism be relied upon for 
resolving foreign investment disputes?  
6. How can Oman protect its public policy space while extending protection to 
foreign investors? In other words, what policy can and should Oman 
undertake to improve the country's economic development by attracting and 
protecting foreign investment whilest simultaneously enhancing its 
sovereignty?  
  
0.4 Research Methodology  
In order to achieve the aims and objectives of this study and to address the research 
questions concerning protection for foreign investment in Oman, the main approach 
involved conducting a thorough documentary research, including literature review and 
analysis of relevant cases. In addition, interviews with various concerned parties were 
used to gather data on the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the current legislation 
on foreign investment and existing practices in this area. 
0.4.1 Documentary research 
There is currently an absence of literature dealing with foreign investment in Oman 
from a legal point of view, with studies to date having tackled this issue solely from an 
economic perspective. A number of different areas of literature were examined to 
provide the background for a theoretical analysis of the questions posed by the research. 
Both primary sources and secondary sources were scrutinized, beginning with existing 
Omani legislation including the FCIL, the Companies Law, Labour Law, and other 
related legislation. 
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In addition, the potential role of general international law and the treatment of aliens 
and the principles of international minimum standards of customary law including the 
concept of fair and equitable treatment are considered in relation to the case of Oman. 
The regional and international agreements (bilateral and multilateral) and conventions to 
which the Sultanate is party are also scrutinized in accordance with the rules and 
principles of general international law. 
An analytical approach will be adopted to investigating Omani dispute settlement 
mechanisms and the procedures and approaches applied in the litigation and arbitration 
systems in Oman, regarding foreign investment issues. 
The practices applied by related organisations are identified and evaluated and 
information relating to the legal challenges faced by foreign investors gathered from 
reports issued by the Omani government and by other corporate bodies in order to gain 
an insight into difficulties created by current practices and policies. 
Secondary sources used include texts, specialist journal articles, national and regional 
newspapers, business magazines and relevant literature. Material was collected mainly 
from the Brotherton Library, University of Leeds, the Edward Boyle Library, University 
of Leeds, the Laidlaw Library, University of Leeds, the Omani Public Authority for 
Investment Promotion and Export Development (PAIPED), Omani Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MoCI), Omani Ministry of National Economy, Omani 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
Relevant cases which were ruled on by the Omani Courts, international courts and 
arbitral cases are considered in order to examine the practice in national and 
international courts and tribunals in issues related to foreign investment. The cases 
issued by Omani courts are in Arabic, and mainly come from two judicial organs: the 
Omani Administrative Court and the Commercial circuit of the Omani courts. Adel A 
Hamadi Al-Tamimi v Sultanate of Oman (Al-Tamimi) is an example of the arbitral 
award to which Oman is a party. The case is subject to the rules of the Oman-USA FTA 
and was taken to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).11 It is analysed in order to examine the effectiveness and compatibility of the 
Omani judicial and legal system. This involves a comparative analysis of the key issues 
involved in this case. It is relevant because it is a recent case as the award was issued on 
                                                           
11 Adel A Hamadi Al-Tamimi v Sultanate of Oman (Award) 27 October 2015 ICSID Case No ARB/11/33  
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27 October 2015. The rulings of the Tribunal in this case are extensively referred to 
throughout the thesis, since it raises a number of different important issues related to the 
foreign investment environment in Oman.  
Finally, it is important to mention that although this research is not essentially 
comparative, limited comparative analysis is undertaken in the final chapter for legal 
and policy recommendations. This comparative perspective involves comparison with 
Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose experiences may provide 
lessons for the Omani legal system on foreign investment. The relevance of both 
countries is explained in Chapter Six. 
0.4.2 Interviews  
In order to understand the actual situation on the ground and address the objectives of 
the thesis, it is important to gather a variety of perspectives on the legal issues from 
concerned parties. In order to provide explanations and insights into the guarantees and 
weaknesses of the protection of foreign investment in Oman, a number of interviews 
were conducted with relevant professionals.  
0.4.2.1 Choice of participants 
Purposive sampling was adopted with regard to the identification and choice of 
participants. In purposive sampling, participants are selected on the assumption that 
they have the experience and knowledge needed to answer the questions.12 The 
researcher’s priority was the relevance of the selected sample group and their potential 
contributions to answering the thesis questions.13 The group of participants and the 
number of interviewees (16) were chosen for two reasons: first, the number of 
professionals dealing with foreign investment issues in Oman is limited; second, the 
analysis in the research relies largely on the documentary study.    
Following the above, the choice of interviewees was based on the roles played by them. 
Participants were selected from four groups engaged in foreign investment matters: 
foreign investors; lawyers representing foreign investors (lawyers); government 
agencies engaged in policy formulations and legal drafting (policymakers) and judges 
dealing with foreign investment cases (judges). They included four foreign investors, 
five policymakers (one minister, two from MoCI and two from PAIPED), four lawyers 
                                                           
12 Uwe Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (4th edn, SAGE 2009) 122 
13 S Sarantakos, Social Research (2nd edn, Palgrave 2005) 152 
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specialised in representing foreign investors before Omani courts and authorities, and 
three judges. 
0.4.2.2 Conduct of interviews 
Qualitative interviews took place from July to September 2014. Participants mainly 
were contacted by phone inviting them to participate in the interviews. Some of them 
were identified before the fieldwork and others were referred to by others. Prior to the 
interview, participants received the research questions, information about the study and 
the consent form. Most participants communicated their willingness to participate in the 
interviews by contacting the researcher by telephone. All the interviews were carried 
out in Oman, in the workplace or offices of the participants or in a place they chose, 
such as their home.  
While some interview questions covered broad issues relevant to all participants, a few 
specific questions were developed for each group, i.e., foreign investors, lawyers, 
judges or policymakers. The aim of so doing was to elicit as much information as 
possible from the targeted group. The questions were framed in open-ended language in 
order to allow participants freedom in their responses. In addition, the format contained 
no leading questions, to avoid pre-empting answers from the participants.  
0.5 Research Ethics- Informed Consent and Data Protection 
Based on the University’s code of ethical conduct, ethical approval was sought and 
obtained before the commencement of the fieldwork. The Faculty of Education, Social 
Sciences and Law, Environment and LUBS (AREA) Faculty Research Ethics 
Committee evaluated and approved the application, which contained a summary of the 
research, the letters to be sent to the participants, an information sheet and the consent 
form.
14  
All participants were above 18 years old and not related to any vulnerable individuals. 
All participants were able to give their consent voluntarily by signing the consent form. 
In addition, the researcher informed all participants about the interview process and 
their right to withdraw.  
No risk was identified of mental or psychological distress to any of the participants. No 
conflicts of personal, financial or professional interests were anticipated, and nor 
accrued. The participants, in their professional capacity, provided information of their 
                                                           
14 The application was approved on 25 April 2014, Ethics reference: AREA 13-058. 
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own free will without any financial or other inducements. They were told that if they so 
wished, transcripts of their respective interviews would be made available to them. 
All personal and identifying information elicited during the interviews was kept in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act and the University of Leeds Code of Conduct 
on Data Protection. Interview transcripts and related notes were kept securely in a 
locked drawer. In writing up the thesis, all data was anonymised and information by 
which participants' might be identified was removed. The collected data will be 
destroyed after the completion of this research. 
0.6 Data Analysis  
Typed transcripts of the recorded interviews were prepared. Before proceeding to 
analysis, familiarity with the data was gained by repeatedly listening to the recordings 
and reading the transcripts. In order to label words, statements or paragraphs with their 
assigned meanings, and to generate interpretations of the data, thematic analysis was 
applied. Thematic analysis was selected because it is a flexible approach, and one which 
is relatively quick and easy to learn.15 Moreover, the relatively small volume of data 
involved, and the purpose of using interviews in this research (to illustrate and support 
the theoretical analysis, rather than as a boss for theory greater in itself) rendered certain 
more complex data analysis procedures such as inductive analysis16 or grounded 
theory17 less appropriate for this research. The analysis involved three main steps. First, 
the data were labelled with keywords in order to label the interview data. This 
procedure employed both deductive and inductive coding. Deductive is a top-down 
process whereby codes are decided in advance, based in the research questions or the 
literature, while inductive coding is botton-up, with codes derived from the data.18  
Secondly, codes and categories were further analysed for differences and similarities. 
The final stage of the analysis involved identifying concepts and ideas from the 
common themes. This process, known as theoretical coding, entails interpretation of the 
data by connecting codes or core categories to the literature, in order to gain deeper 
insight into the theoretical significance of the data. For example, in the light of the 
research question, two broad themes of strengths and weaknesses were established, and 
within each, a number a priori codes (e.g. Judiciary, administrative procedures, 
                                                           
15 Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research in 
Psychology, 3 (2) 77-101. http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/11735 accessed 16 June 2016 
16 See Flick (n 12) 406 
17 K. Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis (SAGE, 
2006) 
18 Braun and Clarke (n 15) 
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Omanisation, taxes, money transfer) were assigned based on prior literature on FDI. At 
the same time, to maintain openness to the data, flexibility was retained to remove or 
combine codes. The codes were subsequently graped into categories, reflecting the 
themes of individual chapters of the thesis, such as FDI policy, international obligations, 
dispute settlement and so on.    
In order to eliminate bias from prior assumptions or personal opinions, the researcher 
treated data consistently and uniformly. The researcher was aware of his responsibility 
to address the interpretation and analysis of the data provided by the interviewees in an 
objective manner, and to keep an open mind on the findings.19 In order to provide better 
understanding of the data, the findings from the interviews are integrated into various 
chapters of the thesis, instead of being discussed in a separate chapter.   
0.7 Originality of the Work and Expected Contribution to Knowledge  
Whilst researching the topic of this thesis, no detailed study was found that defines the 
legal strengths or weaknesses involved in providing investment protection in the 
Sultanate of Oman, although a small number of papers and articles discuss the issue 
from the economic and commercial points of view. This study is therefore the first 
comprehensive scholarly analysis to present the problem of guarantees and weaknesses 
in providing foreign investment protection in Oman from the legal perspective. 
Several studies of the legislation of Arab countries exist, but none relate to the Sultanate 
specifically, making this research an innovative legal study. It follows that it will be the 
first that considers the legal guarantees and weaknesses in providing foreign investment 
protection in Oman. This thesis also is the first one which presents an analysis of the Al-
Tamimi case decided by an ICSID tribunal which has wide ramifications for the 
investment law and policy in Oman. This is the first case against Oman that was 
referred to ICSID. 
In addition, this study is expected to be very valuable for Omani policymakers since it 
will enable the Omani government as the host country to address the weaknesses in 
their legal system. It will also help foreign investors to clearly understand the legal 
guarantees available and challenges they may face in Oman.  
                                                           
19 Flick (n 12) 318.   
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Overall, this study will contribute to the area of international investment law by 
conducting a comprehensive study of the legal framework governing foreign investment 
in the Sultanate of Oman, filling the current gap in knowledge in this field.  
0.8 Outline of the Thesis  
To address the research questions, the thesis is divided into six chapters, in addition to 
this introduction.   
Chapter 1 The Protection of Foreign Investment in International Law 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first of these analyses the evolution of 
international investment law, taking into account how laws have responded to changes 
in the political and economic context and examines four eras of legislative 
developments: the pre-colonial, the colonial, the post-colonial and the global.  
This is followed by a discussion of the important role of customary international law in 
protecting foreign investment. The idea that there should be legal protection of foreign 
investors under customary international law has always been controversial20 since the 
enforcement of the protection provided by this law has always relied largely on 
diplomatic and military action by the home country of the investor.21 Attention is also 
paid to the key principle of an international minimum standard of treatment, which has 
been developed to provide protection for foreign investors.22 
The third section of this chapter analyses the protection of foreign investment under 
BITs. Although BITs are intended to encourage and protect investment between 
contracting states, it has been argued that such agreements may have a detrimental 
effect on economic development in those countries. This section attempts to determine 
the exact nature of the role of BITs in the development of foreign investment, in 
particular, the impact of BITs on the development of customary international law in this 
area, the relationship between BITs and the attraction of foreign investment among 
signatory countries and the role of BITs in protecting foreign investment.  
The absence of comprehensive international treaties dealing with all issues of foreign 
investment law has meant that international courts and tribunals have different 
                                                           
20 Patrick Dumberry, ‘Are BITs Representing the “New” Customary International Law in International 
Investment Law?’ (2010) 28 PSILR 675, 676  
21 Jan Wouters, Philip de Man and Leen Chanet, ‘The Long and Winding Road of International 
Investment Agreements: Toward a Coherent Framework for Reconciling the Interests of Developed and 
Developing Countries?’ (2009) 3 Hum Rts & Intl Legal Discourse 263, 264-265 
22 Subedi (n 7) 79 
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understandings and interpretations of international customary law.23 Thus, the final 
section of Chapter 1 assesses the extent to which the absence of a comprehensive 
international treaty in the protection of foreign investment has led to uncertainty and 
confusion in this area.  
Chapter 2. Foreign Investment Law and Policy in Oman  
This chapter focuses on presenting the evolvement of foreign investment laws and 
policies in the Sultanate of Oman and begins by tracing the development of the Omani 
legal system since 1970 in order to facilitate understanding of the general legal 
environment in Oman. It shows how Omani foreign investment law has evolved with 
the aim of providing better protection for foreign investment, and begins by discussing 
the previous foreign investment regime, especially the 1974 Law and its subsequent 
amendments. Finally, the new features of the 1994 FCIL are analysed.  
Chapter 3. Legal Guarantees and Weaknesses under Oman’s International and 
Regional Obligations 
This chapter provides an analysis of Oman's international investment and investment-
related agreements, including those with the GCC, the WTO Agreements, its FTA with 
the USA, Oman's BITs and GCC-Singapore FTA. In addition, it investigates the 
obligations provided by international treatment standards included in Oman's 
agreements, particularly three kinds of treatment standards: national treatment, most 
favoured nation (MFN) treatment, and minimum standards treatment. Then, the risk of 
expropriation in Oman’s treaties is examined. Furthermore, Oman’s international 
obligations with regard to three issues; taxes, custom duties and money transfer are 
analysed. The guarantees and weaknesses of dispute settlement under these treaties are 
investigated, including the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), Oman’s BITs, the Oman-USA FTA dispute 
settlement provisions, and ICSID. In addition, the impact of the Al-Tamimi case on 
Oman's foreign investment law and policy is analysed.  
Chapter 4. Guarantees and Weaknesses in the Omani Legal Framework 
This chapter focuses on four key areas. It analyses the Omani national legal system that 
deals with the foreign investment risk of expropriation, focusing on the following 
issues: the legal protection from expropriation provided under the Omani system, 
                                                           
23 See Subedi (n 7) 122; Stephan W Schill, ‘Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: 
Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach’ (2011) 52 Vancouver J Intl 
L 57, 90-91  
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concerns caused by indirect expropriation, the value of the guarantee, guarantees of 
compensation in Omani legislation on property and intellectual property rights 
protection, the role of consumer protection, and the associated challenges. 
The second part analyses guarantees of non-discriminatory treatment. This done by 
examining the legal basis for non-discriminatory treatment in Omani law, the incentive 
of taxation and customs duties, the role of tax incentives, the guarantees provided by 
Free Zones (FZs), Duqm Special Economic Zone (DSEZ) and Knowledge Oasis Muscat 
(KOM), the guarantees of transferring money and finally activities in which investors 
cannot invest.  
The third part examines the laws relating to industrial regulations. It considers trade 
union regulations in Oman, the guarantees for companies wishing to bring workers to 
Oman, the challenge to employment regulations and the challenges posed by the 
Omanisation policy and the minimum salary for Omanis. 
Finally, the guarantees of political stability are analysed by examining the basis of 
political stability associated with the concerns behind the handover of power in the 
Sultanate. 
Chapter 5. Guarantees and Weaknesses in the Omani Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism with regard to Foreign Investment Disputes  
Dispute Settlement is an important consideration for any country intending to create an 
attractive environment for foreign investment. The chapter begins, therefore, by 
examining the Omani litigation system covering foreign investment. It investigates the 
reform of the Omani judiciary, the basis for its independence, Omani court practice and 
the levels of confidence in the Omani national court system. 
Then, the chapter analyses whether the Arbitration Law and mechanism in Oman 
provide an appropriate environment for the resolution of disputes concerning foreign 
investment. Therefore, it analyses the following issues: the extent to which arbitration is 
supported by the Omani courts, how arbitral awards are enforced in Oman, and finally, 
whether the interpretation of public policy in arbitration cases adopted by Omani courts 
is a narrow or broad one. 
Chapter 6. Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion 
This chapter presents the research findings and a series of policy recommendations 
which are intended to enhance legal protection for foreign investment in Oman. The 
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main arguments and findings in the thesis that underpin the overall argument are 
reiterated. These include the steadiness and consistency in greater foreign investment 
protection, the contribution of Omani law and practice to the development of 
international investment law, and the importance of the efficiency of national 
regulations and practice. The chapter concludes with specific recommendations for 
providing a better environment to protect and attract foreign investment, drawing on a 
comparison between Oman's experience and those of Singapore and UAE, especially 
the Emirate of Dubai.  They include a specialised investment council with a unified 
policy, making it easy to do business in Oman, the need for training and the need for a 
national arbitration centre in Oman.  
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Chapter 1: The Protection of Foreign Investment in International 
Law 
1.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to assess and evaluate the legal basis for the protection 
of foreign investment under international law. A clear understanding of the actual legal 
protection offered by international law is needed before investigating the protection 
available at the Oman national level. In the context of foreign investment it should be 
clarified that international law is mainly concerned with three issues: (1) the host 
country’s treatment of the foreign investor’s property; (2) the state’s responsibility when 
a state act violates international law; and (3) the practice of diplomatic protection by the 
investor’s home country.24  Therefore, the issue of protecting foreign investment can be 
approached from two perspectives: that of the exporting countries and that of the host 
states. The former focus mainly on the interests of their nationals in securing and 
protecting their investment, whilst the latter are more interested in maintaining their 
sovereignty over their national territory and economy.25 
It has been observed that the current international investment framework is the result of 
“a long and complicated process”26 and this chapter traces the evolution of international 
investment law over the course of four historical periods: the pre-colonial era, the 
colonial era, the post-colonial era and, finally, the global era. It then considers the extent 
to which customary international law provides protection for foreign investment, by 
examining two fundamental principles of customary law, which apply to international 
investment law. The first of these is the availability of the protection offered to aliens 
under customary international law and the second, the principle of international 
minimum standards. 
In addition, the chapter investigates the role of BITs, which were developed for the 
purposes of regulating investment and have come to dominate the development of 
international investment law. Three areas are investigated in this context: (1) the impact 
of BITs on the development of customary international law in foreign investment; (2) 
the role which BITs play in protecting foreign investment; and (3) the role of BITs in 
attracting foreign investment.  
                                                           
24 Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘The Multilateralization of International Investment Law’ (2009) 35 NCJ Intl L & 
Com Reg 33, 52-53 
25 See Gerhard Loibl and Malcolm D Evans (eds), International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 742  
26 Wouters, de Man and Chanet (n 21) 263 
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Finally, the impact of the current lack of comprehensive global treaties on the protection 
offered to foreign investors is explored in order to provide further insights into the area 
of protection of foreign investment under international law. 
1.2 Overview of the Evolution of International Investment Law 
This section traces the evolution of international investment law, taking into 
consideration how it has responded to changes in political and economic circumstances, 
since it has been observed that the political context from which international investment 
law emerged has “determined its core character”.27 On this basis, the development of 
this law can be divided into four eras. 
1.2.1 The pre-colonial era 
Various forms of foreign investment between nations began long before international 
law was codified. Evidence of this has been found in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, 
Africa and other parts of the world.28 Hundreds of years ago, European manufacturers 
and traders went to Asia, Africa and Latin America to trade with and later invest in local 
communities.29 Chinese, Indian and Arab traders all invested abroad together with 
Europeans as foreign investors in some parts of the world. For example, in the fifteenth 
century, the Portuguese traded and invested in some parts of East Asia, such as 
Singapore.30 Similar cases of foreign investment can be found in various locations in 
East Asia, China, India, Latin America, Europe and the Middle East. 
Some of the current principles applied in international investment law were already in 
existence among nations hundreds of years ago. For example, the principle of Most-
Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment can be found in a treaty concluded in 1417 between 
King Henry IV of England and Duke John of Burgundy in Amiens, which granted 
English vessels the right to use the harbours of Flanders in the same way as “French, 
Dutch, Sealanders and Scots”.31 Nevertheless, although during this era there was a 
practice of foreign investment and emergence of the MFN principle, foreign investment 
law was still far from emerging. 
                                                           
27 Kate Miles, ‘International Investment Law: Origins, Imperialism and Conceptualizing the 
Environment’ (2010) 21 Colo J Intl Envtl L& Policy 1, 1  
28 Sornarajah (n 8) 19 
29 Subedi (n 7) 22 
30 Helen Hughes and You Poh Seng, Foreign Investment and Industrialisation in Singapore (University 
of Wisconsin Press 1969) 1  
31 Subedi (n 7) 91 
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1.2.2 The colonial era 
From the late eighteenth century until the end of the Second World War, European 
colonial powers controlled large parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America. 32 As a result, 
European investors in these colonies were in less need of protection from international 
law governing foreign investment.33 International investment law can be seen as the 
product of the worldwide growth of European trade and investment during the 
seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.34 It was established as part of the 
international legal system and was intended to serve as an instrument for protecting the 
interests of capital-exporting countries.35 Its principal aim was to prevent the risk of the 
property of European traders being expropriated or nationalised by the host country, 
where as imperial powers they applied the legal systems of their home countries.36 The 
mid-nineteenth century witnessed the widespread application of international 
investment principles, which were largely supportive of protection of foreign 
investment and obliged capital-importing countries to ease trade and investment 
restrictions.37 
During this era, the issue of FDI continued to be subject to national law. International 
law was applied to foreign investment issues in exceptional cases, because the original 
focus of classical international law, when it evolved in the nineteenth century, was 
solely on “allocating jurisdiction among States”.38 Therefore, cases involving the host 
country and foreign investors were dealt with under national law or colonialist power's 
national law. 
In this era there were no known special treaties covering foreign investment. However, 
most international trade agreements between countries included some provisions 
dealing with the protection of assets of nationals of one party in the territory of the 
other. For example, the United States started to “conclude bilateral treaties of 
“Friendship, Commerce and Navigation” (FCN)” in the early eighteenth century.39 
Another example can be found in the agreement concluded in 1861 between the British 
Government and the Sheikhdom of Bahrain, 40 which stated in Article 4, that: 
                                                           
32 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ (2005) 12 UC Davis 
J Intl L & Policy157, 158 
33 Subedi (n 7) 7; Sornarajah (n 8) 19 
34 Miles (n 27) 1 
35 Ibid 2 
36 Subedi (n 7) 22 
37 Ibid 2 
38 Leal-Arcas (n 24) 52-53 
39 Vandevelde (n 32) 158 
40 Subedi (n 7) 23 
17 
The British subjects and dependants in Bahrain shall receive the treatment and 
consideration of the most favoured people. […] All offences which they may commit or 
which may be committed against them shall be reserved for the decision of the British 
Resident, provided the British agent of Bahrain shall fail to adjust them satisfactorily.41  
During this era and before the principle of diplomatic protection was applied, the main 
trading countries in Europe tended to respond to complaints from influential citizens 
and companies about trading issues by sending a small fleet of warships to blockade the 
coast of the host country until compensation had been made for damage incurred by 
foreign investors. For example, in 1902, the governments of Great Britain, Germany 
and Italy sent warships to the Venezuelan coast demanding compensation for the losses 
incurred by their nationals as a result of Venezuela’s failure to pay its sovereign debt. 
Some scholars refer to this period as the Era of Gunboat Diplomacy.42 
Two legal doctrines played an important role in shaping developments in international 
investment law in this era. The first of these was the Calvo Doctrine,43 which originated 
in the nineteenth century, and influenced the constitutions, treaties and investment pacts 
of several Latin American countries. The Calvo Doctrine consisted of four key 
elements. First, it argued that in accordance with the principle of sovereignty of states, 
no foreign investor had the right to permanent ownership of land in the host country. 
Second, foreign investors were required to bring any disputes arising in a particular 
state before that state’s national courts prior to referring them to any international 
tribunal.44 Third, foreign investors should not receive better treatment than that 
available to citizens of the host state. Finally, the rights enjoyed by foreigners were to 
be determined by host state laws.45 
The other influential doctrine which emerged during this period was the Hull Formula,46 
widely regarded as one of the most significant developments in international investment 
law during this era. The Hull Formula can be said to represent the view of the United 
States and of other Western countries concerning the rights and obligations of host 
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nations in general and, more specifically, regarding the approach to compensation under 
international law in the case of expropriation.47 Hull stated: 
The taking of property without compensation is not expropriation. It is confiscation. It 
is no less confiscation because there may be an expressed intent to pay at some time in 
the future. If it were permissible for a government to take the private property of the 
citizens of other countries and pay for it as and when, in the judgment of the 
government, its economic circumstances and local legislation may perhaps permit, the 
safeguards which the constitutions of most countries and established international law 
have sought to provide would be illusory.48 
1.2.3 The post-colonial era 
The post-colonial era began as the Second World War ended and is generally deemed to 
have continued until the 1990s, when a new period of globalisation commenced.49 The 
analysis of the evolution of foreign investment during this era will start by establishing 
the broader general political and economic situation, before moving onto the actual 
legal development regarding foreign investment issues.  
It can be argued that the political situation during this era was shaped by three trends. 
First, the developed countries engaged in a programme of massive nationalisation of 
industries that were deemed to be of strategic importance. At the same time, in the 
developing world, there was a growing movement against colonisation, which led to an 
increase in the number of cases involving the taking of foreign investors' property. In 
addition, newly independent countries regained national control over their own natural 
resources and economy.50 
Following the Second World War there was a general fear among countries that had 
newly achieved their independence that a foreign presence within their economy might 
serve to weaken their sovereignty.51 This led to conflicting viewpoints between the 
capital-exporting developed countries and the capital-importing developing countries 
concerning the protection of foreign investment. On the one hand, the capital-exporting 
states placed greater emphasis on protecting and securing the investments of their 
nationals. On the other, capital-importing states were anxious to retain a certain amount 
of control over the important parts of their economies.52  
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The period from 1945 to 1990 witnessed the gradual development of a legal regime 
governing the treatment of international foreign investment but at the same time, there 
was widespread disagreement within the legal system concerning the treatment of 
foreign investors.53 The ICJ commented on what it saw as an unsatisfactory situation in 
the early development of international investment law: 
Considering the important developments of the last half century, the growth of foreign 
investments and the expansion of the international activities of corporations, in 
particular of holding companies, which are often multinational, and considering the way 
in which the economic interests of States have proliferated, it may at first sight appear 
surprising that the evolution of law has not gone further and that no generally accepted 
rules in the matter have crystallised on the international plane. 
Nevertheless, a more thorough examination of the facts shows that the law on the 
subject has been formed in a period characterised by an intense conflict of systems and 
interests […] Here as elsewhere, a body of rules could only have developed with the 
consent of those concerned. The difficulties encountered have been reflected in the 
evolution of the law on the subject.54 
The favouring of a liberal approach to trade by the victorious Allies in the aftermath of 
the Second World War was one of the most important factors which affected the 
structure of international law on foreign investment, which can be seen as a reaction 
against the protectionist policies that had previously been applied during the 1920s and 
1930s. This led in 1947 to the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), which opened the door for the creation of multilateral agreements by 
changing the primary legal framework of trade relations agreements from bilateral to 
multilateral. Although investment issues needed to be addressed outside the GATT 
framework, there is no doubt that the liberal approach towards trade adopted by the 
ratifying countries affected international foreign investment law positively.55 
A number of developments in international foreign investment law occurred during the 
post-colonial era. International foreign investment law started to form as an independent 
body of law. Moreover, as a further step towards recognising the rights of developing 
countries, it became acceptable in international law for the host country to expropriate 
the assets of foreign investors under certain conditions. Nevertheless, according to the 
Hull Formula, this expropriation had to be accompanied by “prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation”.56 This era also witnessed the drafting by the Organization for 
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) of the 1967 Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property, as a result of the keenness of its founding members to 
promote and protect foreign investment. This convention has since been used as a 
model for many bilateral investment protection agreements. Following this 
development, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) adopted its own 
Guidelines for International Investments in 1972.57 
It can be argued that, from the point of view of those wishing to invest overseas during 
the years immediately following the Second World War, international investment law 
presented a number of serious deficiencies. First, it offered inadequate coverage of the 
issues concerning foreign investors at that time, being unable to address the investment 
practices of the time or to provide legal solutions to issues that concerned investors. For 
example, one obvious shortcoming was its failure to address the foreign investor’s right 
to make financial transfers from the host state to elsewhere.58  
Another major problem was related to the ambiguity of the principles being applied, 
leading to significant differences in interpretations. Moreover, international foreign 
investment law did not provide any effective enforcement mechanisms to enable foreign 
investors to claim their contractual rights when these were violated by the host state. In 
addition to these specific shortcomings, there was the more general difficulty that the 
content of international investment law was the subject of serious disputes between the 
developed and the developing countries, which was part of a broader ideological debate 
in which the latter demanded a new international economic order that would take their 
needs into consideration. 59 
As a result, a significant change occurred during the 1970s due to the pressures exerted 
by investors from developed countries and consequently, the international community 
began to rely on treaties instead of international customary law, which was doubted in 
protecting foreign investment and faced difficulties in dealing with various foreign 
investment issues. Another important reason why customary international law was 
mistrusted during this era was that it did not grant foreign investors a direct right of 
action against the government of the host nation.60 Hence, unlike the colonial era, when 
the tendency had been for developed countries to rely on themselves to protect the 
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investment of their nationals, in the post-colonial era they began to enter into bilateral 
agreements with less developed countries, newly industrialised nations, Socialist states 
and other developed countries.61 
1.2.4 The global era 
The current era of globalisation began in the 1990s.62 Generally speaking, over the last 
50 years, and especially since the start of the 1990s, there has been an effort to create a 
global regime of codified international investment law led by the ever-increasing 
integration of the world economy.63 Despite the fact that the investment law dimension 
of the 1947 Havana Charter64 was unsuccessful, major efforts continued toward 
evolving a global system of investment law via a range of instruments, including the 
1992 Foreign Investment Guidelines issued by the World Bank.65 During this era, states 
generally became reliant on foreign investment and in order to compete with each other, 
most countries have made significant attempts to provide a favourable and attractive 
environment for overseas investors, reflected in the incorporation of investor-state 
arbitration clauses into BITs. As a result of their awareness of the growing 
competitiveness of this environment, states now rarely fail to enforce arbitral awards.66  
Under the international customary law, the host state defines the conditions under which 
foreigners may establish their investment on its territory. However, legal outcomes that 
were viewed as unsatisfactory led to the general feeling that there was a need for new 
legal tools that would facilitate investment movements between states. Consequently, a 
number of instruments have been created to achieve a positive environment for 
investment under the terms of public international law.67 These include BITs, 
investment insurance schemes, investment dispute settlement mechanisms, and 
multilateral instruments, such as the WTO Agreements. The current global era has 
witnessed positive changes in the context of international agreements, a development 
which is clearly reflected in the merger of trade and investment provisions in these 
agreements.68 
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Therefore, a noticeable feature which has emerged during this era is the liberalisation of 
government policies toward FDI. This was largely due to the increasing interest that 
government policymakers in potential host nations, especially those in developing 
countries, showed in attracting FDI.69 As a result of the massive increase in FDI70 and 
concern about the implications for the competitiveness of national companies and 
technology transfer, some developed countries, such as the USA, adopted less liberal 
attitudes toward FDI, unlike the developing countries. This situation led to the 
development of international institutional initiatives designed to benefit from the liberal 
policy in developing countries and create pressure against the position of the USA.71 
Despite efforts by host country governments in recent years to liberalise their FDI 
policies, there is still concern about finding the appropriate balance between rights and 
obligations in reference to both foreign investors and host governments within a new 
international investment law system.72 
After 1990 there have also been comprehensive developments in the rule-making 
instruments which operate at bilateral, regional, interregional or multilateral levels, 
whether in the form of binding treaties or voluntary instruments.73 Foreign investors’ 
rights around the world are now protected largely by international treaties, which have 
become the principal source of international investment law.74 In particular, this era has 
witnessed an “explosion in the number of BITs”.75 This situation led one arbitral 
tribunal in 2003 to suggest that hundreds of BITs had effectively formed customary 
international law with regard to the rights of investors.76  
There is no doubt that one of the most important developments which occurred during 
the current era has been the creation in 1 January 1995 of the WTO77 which addresses 
investment issues through its agreements, including the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) and 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Of 
these three, TRIMS is the most relevant to this research since it expanded the 
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jurisdiction of the WTO with respect to investment matters beyond the service sector.78 
The imposition on foreign investment of certain trade-distorting performance 
requirements is banned by this agreement.  
However, it is argued that the international investment system should be considered as 
more flexible than the WTO system and international environmental and human rights 
law. This is because in comparison with the former, international investment law 
includes the non-governmental actors directly in investment disputes, and it is stronger 
than the soft enforcement mechanism or soft-law regime of the latter.79  
All these developments have led some authors to assert that the current era is witnessing 
the emergence of a “common law of international investment”.80 It is argued that this 
trend toward bilateral and multilateral agreements on investment issues runs contrary to 
the liberalisation approach of the international investment system.81 The international 
investment law system has reached a crossroads, and the scope of this system is broader 
today than at any other time in history. The increasing number of investment 
agreements is causing problems for both foreign investors and host countries as each 
party brings unique expectations and demands to the system. International investment 
law has developed rapidly in recent years to meet the needs of both capital-exporting 
and capital-importing countries as a result of all interested parties bringing their own 
demands and needs to the system.82 International investment law has faced continual 
criticism and currently faces challenges from those who call into question its ability to 
meet the needs of all parties “in a sustainable and predictable manner”.83 
1.3 Protection of Foreign Investment under Customary International Law 
Over the course of history, international customary law has played an important role in 
providing protection for foreign investment through a number of fundamental 
principles. For example, it is clear that throughout the colonial era and for part of the 
post-colonial era, customary international law was the primary source of norms for the 
protection of international investment frameworks.84 However, the norms of customary 
international law in the field of foreign investment, like any other customary 
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international rules, are created and applied both together with and independently from 
treaty rules.85  
According to the ICJ, customary international rules are the result of extensive, uniform 
and representative state practice accepted as law. This includes executive acts, 
legislation and regulations, judicial decisions, international treaties, and verbal acts. 
Rules enacted in national legislation may reflect customary international rules, provided 
that they are widespread among states, uniform in their content and coupled with a 
general sense of legal obligation under international law. The resolutions adopted by the 
UN General Assembly provide evidence of customary international law.86 Moreover, 
because of the horizontal nature of the international law system and the large number of 
different countries composing the international community, the creation of customary 
international norms may take place over a considerable period of time.87 
Regardless of the thousands of investment-related treaties which now exist, it is 
believed that customary international law still plays an important role in protecting 
foreign investment.88 This section will analyse the extent of the protection which 
international customary law offers to aliens and the principle of international minimum 
standards. This will be followed by a comprehensive investigation of the extent to 
which customary international law provides protection specifically for foreign 
investment. 
1.3.1 International customary law protection for aliens 
The weak legal protection offered to aliens during the era of Roman law and the Middle 
Ages changed with the development of the national state and migration.89 This 
protection was expressed clearly, for example, in Article 2 (3) of the 1850 treaty 
between Switzerland and the United States: 
[I]n case of [...] expropriation for purposes of public utility, the citizens of one of the 
two countries, residing or established in the other, shall be placed on an equal footing 
with the citizens of the country in which they reside in respect to indemnities for 
damages they may have sustained.90 
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Nonetheless, before the Russian Revolution in 1917, international law commentators 
had no reason to believe that rules were necessary to protect foreign investment, since it 
was already considered to be safeguarded by the national law of the host country. The 
assumption was that this national legal framework would guarantee satisfactory 
protection for alien investors. 91  
The question concerning the protection of aliens in international law is greatly affected 
by the international relations between developing and developed countries.92 The former 
place greater emphasis on the independence and sovereignty of states and reject the 
economic influence of Western countries, arguing that domestic, not international, law 
should be the basis of aliens’ rights.93 On the other hand, the latter argue in favour of 
foreign investors’ rights to protect and secure their property.94 
This difference of attitude among countries seems to have contributed to difficulty in 
establishing international agreement in this regard. Among early efforts to create a 
multilateral legal framework to protect aliens and their property were a number of non-
governmental initiatives, such as the International Law Association’s Draft Statutes of 
the Arbitral Tribunal for Foreign Investment and the Foreign Investment Court (ILA 
Statute),95 and the ICC proposal for an International Code of Fair Treatment for Foreign 
Investment (ICC Code) in 1949. The Draft Convention on the International 
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (1961 Harvard Draft) was prepared by 
Louis Sohn and Richard Baxter at the request of the UN Secretariat. Although the ILA 
Statute and the ICC Code were not adopted, both initiatives were important in shifting 
the main concern from being solely the traditional concept of state responsibility for 
injuries to aliens and their property, to protection of foreign investment with the aim of 
promoting economic development.96 
In addition, the position among scholars and tribunals on the level of protection to aliens 
is varied accordingly. For example, Nwogugu has pointed out that international law 
allows the taking of an alien’s property without imposing on the host state a 
corresponding obligation to pay compensation except in restricted circumstances.97 
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However, one can argue that the agreed rules in international customary law put the 
responsibility for compensation on states, meaning that they have limited alternatives 
not to pay reparations. 
In the other hand, John Bassett Moore noted in his brief in the Constancia Sugar case 
before the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, that unlike nationals, aliens do not have 
the advantage of exercising political rights.98 Furthermore, the tribunal in the Hopkins 
(US) v Mexico case before the United States-Mexico General Claims Commission of 
1923 concluded that “by virtue of their diplomatic and arbitral appeal, aliens may on 
occasion receive “broader and more liberal treatment’ than nationals under municipal 
law”.99 
In the Roberts (US) v Mexico case, the tribunal remarked: 
Roberts was accorded the same treatment as that given to all other persons [...]. Facts 
with respect to equality of treatment of aliens and nationals may be important in 
determining the merits of a complaint of mistreatment of an alien. But such equality is 
not the ultimate test of the propriety of the acts of authorities in the light of international 
law. That test is, broadly speaking, whether aliens are treated in accordance with 
ordinary standards of civilization.100 
The availability of customary international law protection to aliens, including foreign 
investors, the international law of state responsibility, the concept of diplomatic 
protection and international human rights law are considered to be the main principles 
of modern foreign investment law.101 The treatment of alien property in international 
law has moved from the position that the alien has submitted to the application of local 
jurisdiction by entering and carrying on business in the host country, to the principle of 
diplomatic protection, which incorporates the protection of international minimum 
standards of treatment.102 
Importantly, state responsibility arises when an act of state violates the rights 
guaranteed to aliens, either under customary international law or under a treaty.103 The 
ICJ insisted on host states’ obligation to provide protection for aliens and their property 
under international law. This is clearly reflected in Belgium v Spain - Barcelona Traction, 
Light & Power Company, Ltd where it stated: 
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[W]hen a State admits into its territory foreign investment or foreign nationals it is [...] 
bound to extend to them the protection of the law. However, it does not thereby become 
an insurer of that part of another State's wealth which these investments represent [...]. 
The real question is whether a right has been violated, which right could only be the 
right of the State to have its nationals enjoy a certain treatment guaranteed by general 
international law, in the absence of a treaty applicable to the particular case.104 
However, in 2006, the International Law Commission (ILC) issued its Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection, stating: 
Diplomatic protection belongs to the subject of ‘Treatment of Aliens’. No attempt is 
made, however, to deal with the primary rules on this subject—that is, the rules 
governing the treatment of the person and property of aliens, breach of which gives rise 
to responsibility to the State of nationality of the injured person. Instead the present 
draft articles are confined to secondary rules only—that is, the rules that relate to the 
conditions that must be met for the bringing of a claim for diplomatic protection.105 
Jiménez argued that the contents of the standard in the ILC’s Draft Articles are not 
clear. Nor is the nature of the standard clear, either as a general principle of law or of 
customary international law. 106 
1.3.2 The principle of international minimum standards 
Customary international law prescribes certain minimum standards of treatment of 
foreign investment.107 Both capital-importing and capital-exporting states have an 
interest in enhancing the flow of foreign investment. To this end, not only must 
economic concerns be considered, but also the treatment of foreign investors in the host 
state.108 The principle of international minimum standards is the most important legal 
principle which has been developed to offer protection to foreign investors.109 The issue 
which needs to be addressed in this context is how the historical debate between 
developing countries, which support the national treatment standard, and their 
developed counterparts, which defend the notion of international minimum standards, 
can be resolved. 
Developing countries, especially those in Latin America, argue for national standard 
treatment relying mostly on the concept of sovereignty and sovereign equality, and 
contend that placing an alien in a better position legally than the citizens of the host 
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state is a violation of territorial sovereignty.110 Furthermore, they assert that every 
foreigner who resides within the national borders of the state is subject to the law of the 
territory.111 Article 9 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
1933 supports the notion of the standard of national treatment by stating that: 
The jurisdiction of states within the limits of national territory applies to all the 
inhabitants. Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and the 
national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other or more extensive than 
those of the nationals. 
On the other hand, developed countries, including the US, the UK and the European 
states, adopted the position in the early twentieth century that foreign nationals and their 
property were entitled, under customary international law, to a minimum standard of 
treatment.112 Those countries that support international minimum standards argue that 
states must bring their domestic laws up to the minimum standards provided by 
international law.113 They counter the argument regarding state sovereignty by arguing 
that states have the right not to admit aliens to their territory, but once admitted, they are 
entitled to receive a certain standard of civilised treatment. Moreover, they maintain that 
the national standard of the host state may not provide sufficient protection for foreign 
investors, if both nationals and foreigners are treated equally badly114 and the national 
laws of individual states may not reflect international legal obligations.115 In such cases, 
therefore, the notion of national treatment would not provide sufficient protection for 
foreign investors.  
In 1910, Root argued that the standard of justice shaped a part of international law and 
any national law had to conform to this general international standard in the case of the 
treatment of aliens. He stated: 
If any country’s system of law and administration does not conform to that standard of 
justice, although the people of the country may be content or compelled to live under it, 
no other country can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of 
treatment to its citizens.116 
As Miles has observed, the argument that the host state treats its nationals in like 
manner was regarded as an inadequate response to the accusation of violation of the 
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minimum standard.117 As a result, the view that the standard of national treatment 
applicable to foreigners should not fall below the minimum standard recognised in 
international law is supported by many scholars in Western countries.118 
Given the growth in development of international foreign investment, for full 
implementation of the principle, it is vital whether developing countries accept the 
application of the international minimum standards of treatment in their territory as an 
international law principle. Despite early disagreements concerning the principle of 
international minimum standards, the obligation on the host country to provide foreign 
investors with the international minimum standard of treatment has become a norm of 
international customary law.119 Arbitral tribunal awards have asserted the existence and 
the application of international minimum standards of treatment.120 Even as early as 
1955, some scholars like Shea announced the death of the Calvo Doctrine because it had 
failed “to receive recognition as a principle of international law.”121  
Furthermore, as BITs and other bilateral treaties proliferated, the principle of the 
international minimum standard was expanded to include “full protection and security” 
of foreign investment by the host states, “fair and equitable treatment” and payment of 
fair or just compensation against expropriation.122 Clear support for the principle of 
international minimum standards can be found in Article 31 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility which states: 
1.  The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury 
caused by the internationally wrongful act. 
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally 
wrongful act of a State. The obligation to make reparation is governed in all its aspects 
by international law, irrespective of domestic law provisions.  
With regard to possible shortcomings of the system of protection offered by this 
principle, Subedi noted that although the principle of an international minimum 
standard of treatment is broadly settled, its scope and meaning is still the subject of 
dispute. Exactly what is covered by the international minimum standard remains 
unclear, for example.123 This degree of vagueness led Sornarajah to observe that there is 
no truly international standard relating to the treatment of foreign investors, owing to 
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the disagreement between developed and developing countries on these standards and 
the collective position of developing countries supporting the instruments linked with 
the New International Economic Order.124 
However, one may argue that tribunal practice may be helpful to some extent in 
clarifying the scope and meaning of the minimum standard that host countries are 
obliged to provide to all foreign investors under customary international law. In the 
Neer v Mexico case, which is considered to be an influential decision on what state 
actions are regarded as failing to achieve the minimum standard of treatment, 125 the 
Tribunal found that: 
[T]he treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency, should 
amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of 
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and 
impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.126 
It is clear that this case produced an early definition of the international minimum 
standards by indicating that “the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test 
of international standards”. 127 A violation of international minimum standards, as 
explained in the Neer case, needs the availability of “an insufficiency of governmental 
action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man 
would readily recognize its insufficiency”.128 One can argue that notwithstanding this 
explanation by Neer, it could not be said that it removed the vagueness. This is because 
what can be regarded reasonable and impartial by one country might be not to another. 
In addition, what can be recognised as insufficient by a man from a developed country 
might not be by another from a developing country.   
In 1989 the ICJ reflected the change in the international community since the Neer case 
in the 1920s, in an explanation of the principle of international minimum standards in 
the ELSI case.129 The Court said state arbitrariness requires “a wilful disregard of due 
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process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial 
propriety”.130 
It has been argued that the weak point of the principle of international minimum 
standard of treatment is the lack of justification to operate per se “in measuring the 
responsibility of states for injury to foreign investors’ property”.131 Furthermore, it is 
claimed that the extent of the minimum standard does not go beyond identifying the 
superiority of international law in determining the international minimum standard of 
treatment which foreign investors should receive from the host state.132 
However, as Choudhury argues rightly, according to the measures set by the Tribunal in 
the Neer case, only “egregious conduct” may be regarded as a violation of an 
international minimum standard by the host state. Accordingly, a violation of the 
international minimum standard would not arise if the action of the government “fell 
short of being outrageous”.133 
1.3.3 The protection for foreign investment under other fundamental principles of 
international customary law 
The principle of fair and equitable treatment is considered to be a fundamental principle 
in international customary law and the most important principle in protecting foreign 
investors’ rights. It provides a primary level of protection for foreign investors, since it 
is based on fairness and equity. However, although this principle has been interpreted in 
various ways, the most common claim before international investment tribunals is the 
violation of the fair and equitable treatment principle by the host country.134 In addition, 
arbitral tribunals are concerned with the unity of international investment law and the 
need for consistency. Therefore, investment tribunals “are very restricted to principles 
cited by previous tribunals over the meaning of ‘fair and equitable treatment’”.135 This 
can be seen clearly in the view of the British Court of Columbia that the interpretation 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard should not go beyond the pre-existing rules 
of customary international law.136 
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Notwithstanding the view that a fair and equitable standard of treatment is a higher 
standard than the international minimum standard is not accepted by developed 
countries, it led to controversy. However, it has been clearly demonstrated by the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Commission that whenever the standard of 
“fair and equitable” was used by NAFTA it was not considered to be a higher standard 
than the international minimum standard defined in international customary law.137 
Regardless of the debate regarding whether the principle of fair and equitable treatment 
offers better protection than the international minimum standard of treatment for aliens 
and their investment under customary international law, tribunals have generally taken 
the position that the right to a stable and predictable business environment is consistent 
with the standard under customary international law.138 The relation between the two 
principles (international minimum standard and a fair and equitable standard of 
treatment) will be discussed further in Chapter Three. 
Although there is no agreed definition of the principle of full protection and security, it 
is found in many international foreign investment agreements.139 In Noble Ventures v 
Romania, it was claimed that Romania was supposed to grant Noble Ventures “full 
protection and security” by enforcing its laws and providing police protection to the 
foreign investors situated on its territory.140 It has been observed that this principle was 
developed by the United States to provide a firmer basis in customary international law 
and it has been admitted in many arbitral awards, such as the Iran-US claims, that the 
failure to provide full protection and security for foreign investment creates liability in 
the host country.141 
However, it is worth noting that the initial norms of customary international law relating 
to FDI were restricted to general principles, including the legal doctrine of state 
responsibility and the principle of state sovereignty and exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction.142 Traditional international law addresses FDI issues in the light of central 
principles of customary international law, such as the principle of territorial sovereignty, 
which grants the State the right to admit aliens or to exclude them from its territory, and 
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to “take the property of private persons in pursuit of public purposes”.143 The principle 
of nationality determines the interest of states in appropriate treatment for their nationals 
and their property abroad.  
In addition, relying on the customary practice on compensation, some raise the point 
that new principles have emerged that could qualify as being generally accepted as a 
part of customary law, owing to new developments in the international treatment of 
investments.144 Compensation is one of these emerging principles; it is now generally 
recognised that a foreign investor has the right to compensation in the case of 
expropriation by the host country, although the conditions for payment of compensation 
are still a controversial issue. As a result, the absence of established customary 
principles led countries to conclude thousands of BITs in the 1990s.145 
1.3.4 Current level of protection of foreign investment under customary 
international law 
One challenge facing foreign investors in relation to the protection provided by 
customary international law is that the enforcement of its norms relies mostly on 
diplomatic and military action by the home state of the investor, the result and 
institution of which is extremely unclear.146 Therefore, there is an on-going debate 
the actual extent of legal protection provided under customary international law147 and it 
is argued that it provides insufficient instruments for the protection of foreign 
investment.148 Some countries questioned whether customary international law applies 
as an international minimum standard given that, as mentioned above, many developing 
countries, especially those in Latin America, followed the Calvo Doctrine under which 
foreign investors are not entitled to better treatment than local investors. In addition, the 
content of some principles in customary law is vague, including that of the international 
minimum standard.149  
Lester observed that some principles of international customary law such as “fair and 
equitable treatment” received much criticism and countries' fears on its scope have led 
states to attempt to set boundaries on it. Even the latest efforts by the European Union 
and Canada to establish Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) leave 
                                                           
143 Leal-Arcas (n 24) 74 
144 Ibid 75  
145 Dumberry (n 20) 676  
146 Wouters, de Man and Chanet (n 21) 265  
147 Dumberry (n 20) 676  
148 Vandevelde (n 32) 159 
149 Ibid 
34 
issues such as direct expropriation, indirect expropriation, and "fair and equitable 
treatment" quite broad and undefined. 150  
However, others believe that customary international law currently has an important 
role to play in the foreign investment arena for a number of reasons. According to 
Gazzini, BITs only make up 13% of the bilateral investment relationships between 
countries, and significantly, there are no BITs covering relationships between developed 
states. Moreover, he notes that some key players in foreign investment, such as Japan 
and Brazil, have only concluded a handful of BITs. Unlike BITs, international 
customary law is integrated with bilateral and multilateral rules.151 Relying on the 
Chorzów Factory case,152 the Court reached the conclusion that the question of liability 
and compensation is governed by customary international law. The Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) announced that: 
[A]ccording to customary international law, if a state has committed a wrong it is liable 
to pay reparations. The amount of such reparations must be sufficient to eliminate the 
consequences of the illegal act and to place the wronged party in the situation it would 
have been had the illegal act not taken place.153 
Another point supporting the significance of international customary law is that there is 
a close link between the general principles of public international law and the 
agreements that directly regulate international investment, as well as there being a “high 
degree of interpenetration and supplementation between international law and domestic 
law”.154 For example, the actions in dispute must be attributable to the host state, no 
matter whether or not the actual performer was part of its government, in order to find 
that a host state has violated its obligations under an international investment 
agreement.155 The issue of attribution to the host state was examined deeply by the 
tribunal in the case of Al-Tamimi. This will be discussed later in Chapter Three.  
A further significant advantage of customary international law in international 
investment issues is that it can be used to help determine whether or not a specific act 
should be considered a State act, while BITs rarely provide for this matter.156 In the 
absence of sufficient widespread and convincing practice, the tribunal should announce 
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that no customary norm has yet emerged.157 This happened in Marvin Feldman v 
Mexico regarding the customary norm that supposedly “requires a state to permit 
cigarette exports by unauthorised resellers”.158 However, in the absence of any 
established norm forbidding a certain conduct, international tribunals can exercise a 
degree of discretion.159 Thus, in the case of Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, 
S.A. v Costa Rica, the Tribunal stated: 
No uniform rule of law has emerged from the practice in international arbitration as 
regards the determination of whether compound or simple interest is appropriate in any 
given case. Rather, the determination of interest is a product of the exercise of 
judgement, taking into account all of the circumstances of the case at hand and 
especially considerations of fairness which must form part of the law to be applied by 
this Tribunal.160 
Nevertheless, it is believed that the customary rules which should be respected and 
followed are settled rules that have been practised by nations for a long time. The 
District Court of Columbia criticised the decision in McKesson Corp. v Iran. Pointing 
out that “international courts have over a period of decades followed the custom of 
granting only simple interests”, the court stated: 
[I]n enforcing customary international law, the Court is constrained to follow the 
custom, not the rare exceptions, even if there are strong policy reasons to believe that 
the exception should be the rule 161 
It could be argued that customary rules in the field of international investment law 
presently have a number of strengths compared to treaties. First, customary rules may 
be applied to amend the relevant treaty provisions in some cases, if a long time has 
elapsed after the treaty was originally concluded. Gazzini argues that if a customary rule 
would lead to more favourable treatment of the investor, this may modify treaty 
provisions, pointing to the fact that international customary law provides more 
protection for international foreign investment.162 Moreover, it may be inclined to give 
priority to the customary rule if the conflict between treaty provision and the rules of 
customary law cannot be resolved through interpretation under Article 31(3) (c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. Therefore, Subedi argues that foreign 
investors are now eligible for the protection of international customary law principles 
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even in the absence of a BIT between the home and host states. This is because most 
principles of international investment law are recognised in customary international 
law.163  
Although in practice there are difficulties with the content of international law, which 
restrict the host state’s treatment of foreign investors, the content of customary law 
continues to be significant, incorporated as it is into modern investment agreements 
through treatment standards, such as the international minimum standard and the fair 
and equitable standard of treatment.164 
1.4 The Protection of Foreign Investment under BITs 
Notwithstanding that the content of BIT concluded between one state and another may 
differ from those concluded between other states, the provisions and the basic feature 
for all BITs are almost the same. Generally, provisions of BITs deal with the following 
essential areas: (i) definition of investment and investor; (ii) admission of foreign 
investors; (iii) fair and equitable treatment of investors; (iv) expropriation and 
compensation; and (v) dispute settlement.165    
In order to complete the investigation concerning the protection provided under 
international law, it is necessary to examine the protection under BITs. As the following 
section will show, BITs now play an important role in the development of international 
investment law and international law generally, impacting particularly noticeably on the 
second of these areas. This section examines this issue from three perspectives: the 
impact of BITs on the development of customary international law in the area of 
international investment law, the role of BITs in protecting foreign investment and 
finally the role of BITs in attracting foreign investment.  
1.4.1 BITs: A new form of customary international law in international investment 
law? 
In general, developing countries no longer oppose the application of customary 
international law norms and instead, have granted foreign investors more protection by 
using BITs to attract foreign investment.166 As signatories to BITs, over 170 states have 
agreed to treat foreign investors in accordance with international law standards and, in 
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practice, they have agreed to resolve their disputes through international arbitration.167 
Nevertheless, the emergence of BITs has prompted debate amongst arbitrators and 
academics concerning the extent to which these agreements now represent a new form 
of customary international law in international investment law.168 Opinions on this issue 
are divided. 
Some scholars169 believe that these BITs are indeed the new customary international 
since the principles of customary international law have effectively been incorporated 
into these modern investment protection agreements.170 In other words, these treaties 
constitute evidence of customary international law because of the strong similarities 
which can be found in the language of BITs, the common structure, the processes they 
contain, and the huge number of states participating in the negotiation of international 
investment agreements.171 According to Ryan, contemporary international investment 
law takes its legitimacy and authority from about 3,000 BITs and a number of 
multilateral investment treaties, regardless of the fact it originated as a form of 
customary international law.172 In addition, some argue that the functional value of 
treaty regimes is that they reflect many legal principles and interpret them into 
commonly perceived goals, attitudes and values in the international investment law 
field. This functional value of treaties may eventually lead to the development of the 
status of customary international law.173 
Some scholars, such as Kutty and Chakravarty, support this view as well, believing that 
BITs have an influence on customary international law, as reflected in their contribution 
to the consolidation of existing customary norms and to the crystallisation of new norms 
of customary international law.174 Article 31 (3) of the VCLT provides that when 
interpreting a treaty, “there shall be taken into account, [...] (C) together with the 
context: any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties”. The rules of international law here include customary international law, in 
addition to written international treaties.175 It can be argued that Western countries aim 
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to preserve some customary international law rules through BITs, because they have 
encountered a high level of resistance to these on the part of developing countries.176  
However, other scholars reject the notion that BITs represent the new customary 
international law, for a number of reasons, the most important being that these 
agreements lack two crucial elements of customary international law. First, the 
condition of consistent state practice is not met by these BITs. Second, they also lack 
any opinio juris.177 In addition, BITs effectively create a lex specialis between the 
parties and their provisions, no matter how uniform they may be178 serving simply to 
define specific rules regulating investments between the signatories.179 As Mosoti notes, 
“the popularity of BITs should not be taken as evidence in support of customary 
international law”.180 In supporting this view, Sornarajah argues that it may be difficult 
for even the definite rules in BITs to establish themselves as principles of customary 
law,181 and cites the example of the rule of prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation in the case of expropriation by the host state.182 Consequently, both in 
terms of theory and practice BITs do not seem to be capable of creating customary 
law.183 
Nevertheless, whether or not BITs are a new form of international customary law in the 
area of international investment law, what is important is how effective they are in 
protecting foreign investment.  
1.4.2 The role of BITs in protecting foreign investment 
One of the main objectives of BITs is to increase the legal protection of foreign 
investors.184 This is because countries “could bilaterally decide on what rules of 
protection would apply”.185 In addition, it has been observed that the reason for 
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establishing these treaties is to provide lex specialis, due to the lack of clarity in the 
rules of investment protection.186  
It can be argued that BITs provide significant protection for foreign investment which 
can be seen in number of instruments. First, the majority of these treaties contain 
provisions determining the procedures that allow foreign investors to take action to 
defend their rights directly if these are violated by the host state.187 In addition, BITs 
typically offer two features protecting foreign investors against discriminatory treatment 
of their investment: the first is a guarantee of national treatment and the second, a 
guarantee of most-favoured-nation treatment.188 Further protection is offered by 
provisions in a typical BIT that guarantee that foreign investments covered will receive 
fair and equitable protection, full protection and security against the most dangerous 
sources of political risk, and that the host state will exercise reasonable care to protect 
foreign investment from specific kinds of harm.189 With specific reference to 
expropriation, the host state cannot expropriate any investments covered under the terms 
of the BIT unless certain conditions are met, including the payment of compensation. 
Most BITs also guarantee investors’ rights to transfer payments related to an investment 
into a freely exchangeable currency. Some BITs also oblige the host state to provide 
compensation for foreign investors in the case of war or civil disturbance.190 All these 
guarantees will be discussed in further depth in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
However, it is possible to identify a number of concerns regarding BITs as an 
instrument of protection. First of all, investment treaties BITs may be vague or 
ambiguous and consequently restrict the sovereignty of states. At the same time, they do 
not offer international tribunals and courts any guidance on the scope of the obligations 
and rights of the respective parties under these treaties. According to Schill, these 
shortcomings have led to a growing number of contradictory and inconsistent 
interpretations of investment protection norms by international courts and arbitral 
tribunals, not only in reference to different BITs but to the provisions within a treaty.191 
It is said that BITs attempt to offer protection for foreign investment by establishing 
rules covering the host state’s treatment of foreign investors and specifying how those 
                                                           
186 Mosoti (n 178) 132; Sornarajah (n 8) 232-233  
187 Schlemmer (n 73) 544-545  
188 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty’ (1998) 92 Am J Intl 
L 621, 630 
189 Kenneth J Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, policy, and Interpretation (OUP 2010) 
108, 109 
190 Ibid 
191 Schill (n 23) 66-67 
40 
rules are to be enforced.192 In other words, the rules and norms contained in BITs aim to 
control and regularise the behaviour of a host government toward investment by the 
other regime member.193 In cases of dispute, the enforcement process provides for 
international mechanisms outside the jurisdiction of the host state to enforce the rules.194 
Although some BITs control the action of the host state more than others, almost all of 
these treaties serve the function of creating an agreed legal framework for the protection 
of foreign investment and contain the same topics.195 While some of these treaties 
include more general principles and fewer specific rules, presupposing the need for 
good will, because of the requirement to balance the competing interests of both state 
parties, in general, BITs usually contain specific provisions as mentioned above.196 
Given these similarities among BITs with respect to their content and scope, it is likely 
that arbitrators will refer to previous arbitral awards.197  
While Judge Schwebel believes that BITs are a tool to constrain the freedom of the 
State,198 the key question for host governments which are BIT signatories is the degree 
to which they are able to maintain control over foreign investment. As Sornarajah has 
observed, the erosion of the host nation’s regulatory environment is significant in some 
BITs, with those treaties signed with the US typically containing provisions related to 
rights of entry and national treatment.199 
1.4.3 Evaluating the role of BITs in attracting foreign investment 
In general, most countries seek to attract foreign investments by using a variety of 
instruments.200 Typically, developing countries believe that they need investment 
treaties and developed countries are willing to begin the process of providing such 
agreements.201 In recent years, BITs have become a universal way of protecting foreign 
investment. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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(UNCTAD), by the end of 2012, the international investment agreements (IIA) regime 
consisted of 3,196 agreements, which included 2,857 BITs and 339 “other IIAs”, such 
as integration or cooperation agreements with an investment dimension.202  
However, the role of BITs in attracting foreign investment has been extensively debated 
among scholars. Some hold that these treaties help developing countries to attract 
investment and improve their investment environment by providing overseas investors 
with enforceable rights to protect their assets. Others claim that the dispute settlement 
provisions of BITs and the significant increase in treaty litigation against host countries 
and the legal protection of BITs have a detrimental effect on the regulation of public 
and environmental welfare and on the pace of development. 203  
Studies examining the effect of BITs in enhancing the flow of foreign investment to 
signatory countries have reached conflicting conclusions. Some studies claim to have 
found a positive impact of BIT on foreign investment flow. Neumayer and Spess, who 
investigated data from 119 countries for the period 1970 to 2002, reached the 
conclusion that once a host state started to negotiate additional BITs there was an 
increase in its share of foreign direct investment.204 Salacuse and Sullivan obtained 
similar results in a study of foreign investment flows between 1998 and 2000 for more 
than 100 developing states and the foreign investment flows of the US to 31 countries 
over a ten-year period. They found that BITs concluded by the US played a significant 
role in enhancing investment flows for both signatories.205 
However, UNCTAD in 1998, reported only a small positive link between BITs and an 
increase in foreign investment. UNCTAD noted that:  
Following the signing of a BIT, it is more likely than not that the host country will 
marginally increase its share in the outward FDI of the home country [...] The effect, 
however, is usually small. 206  
UNCTAD concluded that BITs play a “minor and secondary role in attracting foreign 
direct investment”.207 The same conclusion was reached by Tobin and Rose-Ackerman, 
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who examined the FDI flows for 62 countries from 1980 to 2000.208 Although large 
numbers of BITs were signed during the 1990s, no clear evidence was found to support 
claims that they encouraged foreign investment.209  
As a result, over time these conflicting views and results have led to confusion on 
whether BITs are vehicles for attracting investment flows.210 It is argued that there no 
strong evidence of either the benefits of BITs or their disadvantages.211 Thus, it cannot 
be said with certainty that treaties act as an instrument for attracting foreign 
investment.212 The high level of enthusiasm among countries, especially developing 
countries, to conclude BITs may be misplaced, given the absence of compelling 
evidence of their benefits. In contrast, they appear to carry a serious risk because, as 
previously noted, the number of cases brought by foreign investors against host states 
increased dramatically in the late 1990s, following an earlier surge in the numbers of 
BITs which had been concluded.213  
Overall, it seems that the attraction of foreign investment involves a number of factors 
and BITs alone are not sufficient for this purpose. Yackee has argued rightly that it is 
inappropriate to expect BITs to provide “a quick and easy cure” 214 for those developing 
countries which have been less successful in attracting foreign investment and if they 
wish to increase their flows of foreign investment, they should do more than simply 
signing and ratifying these treaties.215  
1.5 Effects of the Absence of Global Comprehensive Treaties on Protecting 
Foreign Investment 
According to Subedi, the absence of multilateral international treaties at a global level 
has compounded the existing confusion, since international courts and tribunals offer 
different interpretations of rules relating to foreign investment. Furthermore, every state 
incorporates its own interpretations of customary international law in BITs or other 
legal tools in order to favour its own national interests.216 
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Efforts to create a comprehensive international investment treaty that would protect 
foreign investment started in the 1920s, lost momentum and then resumed in the early 
1960s. To be specific, in 1929 and 1930, two conferences were held with the aim of 
establishing international minimum standards of treatment to protect the person or 
property of foreigners. However, both initiatives failed due to resistance from Latin 
American, East European and ex-colonial states.217 Since then, despite intermittent 
attempts to do so, countries have failed to create a multilateral international agreement 
on the promotion and protection of foreign investments on a global level.218  
Nevertheless, since the first WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1996, the 
argument concerning the need for an international investment treaty has continued. The 
WTO Ministerial Meetings in 1996, 2001 and 2004 encouraged member countries to 
integrate different investment agreements into a comprehensive and global treaty.219 
The purpose of the 1990s negotiations between OECD members on a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) was to liberalise investment regimes and provide 
higher standards of investment protection.220 
Some of the reasons behind the failure to conclude a comprehensive multilateral 
international agreement have already been pointed out. Conflicting ideological 
approaches are adopted by developed and developing countries regarding the protection 
of foreign investment. Drafts of multilateral agreements aimed at providing more 
protection for foreign investment have been resisted by the capital-importing states.221 
Within the OECD, the tendency of developed countries to discuss and negotiate 
multilateral agreements among themselves and then expect them be signed by 
developing countries has led to a failure to ratify a comprehensive international 
investment treaty. In negotiation and discussion of a multilateral investment framework 
under the umbrella of the WTO, developing countries assert the right to participate fully 
in shaping its outcome.222 
Two arguments can be raised on the effects of the absence of global comprehensive 
treaties on protecting foreign investment. It may be argued that even if an international 
multilateral investment treaty was concluded at a global level, it is not certain that 
countries and international courts and tribunals would stop relying on international 
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customary law. As this discussion has shown, currently, despite the huge number of 
BITs and multilateral investment agreements in existence, customary international law 
still influences many aspects of international foreign investment.223 Therefore, 
Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis question the necessity for a comprehensive 
international treaty on foreign investment, arguing that the absence thus far of such a 
treaty has not stopped the progress of the liberalisation of foreign investment.224 Sauvé 
also maintains that a comprehensive international treaty on investment is unlikely to 
enhance FDI in every signatory country because it is not expected that all countries 
would act identically with regard to investment policies such as liberalisation, 
privatisation, competition, macroeconomic, tax, the fight against corruption and the 
elimination of excessive administrative red tape in FDI policy.225  
Conversely, Leal-Arcas argues that a comprehensive international investment treaty 
would have several advantages for improving protection of foreign investment in 
international investment law. First, it would serve as a guide for a new generation of 
bilateral and regional investment agreements, enhancing the coherence of the 
international legal framework of foreign investment. Second, there would be a reduction 
in the transaction costs and an increase in the benefits of foreign investment, due to 
greater coordination among countries. Finally, if a comprehensive agreement was issued 
under the aegis of WTO, it would help to clarify the relationship between the GATS, the 
TRIMs Agreement and BITs.226 
 Overall, it can be argued that the existence of a global comprehensive treaty of foreign 
investment would enhance the protection of foreign investment, because at least 
countries will find one set of international rules upon which to judge their investment.    
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the protection mechanisms for foreign investment currently 
provided under international law. It began by tracing the historical evolution of 
international investment law and then discussed the protection of foreign investment 
provided under customary international law. The protection of foreign investment under 
BITs was analysed. Finally, the possible effects of the absence of comprehensive global 
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treaties covering foreign investment on protection for foreign investors were 
investigated. 
It is argued that the Calvo Doctrine has reflected the position of developing countries, 
especially those of Latin America and the Hull Formula has reflected the American and 
Western approach; both became an ideology for each side. In other words, the issue of 
protection of foreign investment under international law has been affected significantly 
by the international relations between developed and developing countries and their 
respective approaches toward this topic. Despite major disagreements concerning the 
ability of customary international law to provide the necessary degree of protection for 
foreign investors, since most principles of international investment law are recognised 
in customary international law, this continues to play an important role in this context, 
even in the absence of BITs between a home and host state.  
It is argued that for reasons of both theory and practice, BITs are unlikely to create 
customary law, notwithstanding the similarities among them, and they should not be 
expected to provide the solution to developing countries’ lack of success in attracting 
foreign investment. Nevertheless, despite their limitations, BITs are likely to reduce 
risks for foreign investors more than other instruments by controlling unfair action by 
the host state. However, it can be argued that the existence of a comprehensive global 
treaty covering foreign investment would represent a number of advantages with regard 
to promoting protection of foreign investment. While this chapter examined the 
protection of foreign investment under international law, the evolution of the law and 
policy of foreign investment in Oman will be analysed in the next chapter. 
46 
Chapter 2. Overview on Foreign Investment Related Laws and 
Policy in Oman 
2.1 Introduction  
The 1990s economic development plans of the Sultanate of Oman showed a strong 
understanding among policymakers of the strong relationship between Oman’s future 
social, economic and political development and its ability to attract more foreign direct 
investment.227  International organisations such as the IMF in 2013 warned the Omani 
Government that it needed to increase its non-oil revenues as a part of a fiscal 
adjustment strategy intended to tackle recent increases in public spending. This 
spending, funded by higher oil revenues, was intended to expand public sector 
employment, provide higher wages and benefits, create unemployment benefits for 
Omanis, and find new infrastructure and social investment projects.228 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the evolution of foreign investment law and policy 
in Oman. To set the discussion in context, a preliminary overview about the Sultanate of 
Oman will be provided, highlighting its geographical importance, rich history and the 
new era of economic development that began in 1970. Following this, the background 
to the Omani legal system and the role of its Basic Law will be analysed in order to 
facilitate understanding of the general legal environment in Oman. It will show how 
Omani foreign investment law has evolved with the aim of providing better protection 
for foreign investment, and will begin by outlining the previous foreign investment 
regime, especially the 1974 Foreign Business Investment law (FBIL) and its subsequent 
amendments. Finally, the new features of the 1994 FCIL will be analysed. 
2.2 Overview of Oman 
The Sultanate of Oman is situated in the south-east of the Arabian Peninsula and covers 
some 309,000 square kilometres.229 It has a population of 4,438,554230 and the gross 
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national per capita income is 24,765 US$.231 Historically, Omanis have played an 
important role in trade with different parts of the world since the third millennium 
BC.232 During the 16th-18th centuries, Oman benefitted from its location to become a 
trading power and major maritime centre, forming part of a trading network covering 
the area from Zanzibar in East Africa to India.233  
Although Great Britain was closely involved and influenced the Omani policy from the 
mid-nineteenth century, unlike its neighbours Oman never entered into a governing 
agreement. Therefore, the British government was under no obligation to defend 
Oman,234 and the Sultanate sustained full international responsibility as an independent 
and sovereign state throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.235 Before the 
discovery of oil in the 1960s followed by its commercial scale production and export in 
1967, Oman’s budget was wholly funded by religious taxes (zakat) and customs 
duties,236 and the Omani people mainly depended on subsistence agriculture and fishing 
for their livelihood.237 During the reign of Sultan Said Bin Taimur (1932-1970), the 
country was closed to foreign investment for three reasons: first, the civil war in the 
country between the Sultan and Imamate in the internal region,238 second, the Sultan 
adopted a “policy of isolation”;239 and third, before 1970, the Sultan’s financial position 
was fundamentally synonymous with the Sultanate’s public finances,240 
Following the accession of Sultan Qaboos in 1970, the Sultanate’s economic strategies 
and development changed radically.241 Oman’s main need as a developing country was 
to reform its national and international financial structure, as well as initiating a 
programme of economic and political development.242 Therefore, Sultan Qaboos took 
the necessary steps to modernize his country, including stabilising the political situation, 
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providing education for the whole population and establishing a legal framework that 
would help Oman achieve economic development.243 Consequently, in 1971, the Omani 
government announced the first government budget and initiated its first Five-Year 
Development Plan (1976-80). This focused on investment in infrastructure and was to 
be achieved by direct contracts between the government and the private sector.244  
The development of the Omani economy has been somewhat uneven. It witnessed rapid 
growth from 1970 to 1986, and then as a result of the 1985-86 collapse in oil prices, the 
period from 1986 to 1989 was one of economic retrenchment. From 1990 onwards, 
Oman has further developed in economic terms.245 However, some researchers believe 
that the Sultanate faces some economic difficulties, such as providing suitable housing 
and services, especially water; increasing food production through stimulating 
agriculture and decreasing urban migration.246 Addressing these difficulties needs 
combination of solutions, including foreign investment in these areas.  
It is rightly said that nowadays Oman occupies the most strategic location among the 
GCC states 247 being situated at the north-western corner of the Indian Ocean248 and the 
entry point to the Strait of Hormuz,249 which is the most important maritime gateway in 
the world, connecting the Arabian Gulf and Arabian Sea.250 It is estimated that 60% of 
the world’s existing oil and natural gas resources come from the Arabian Gulf251 and 
about 40% of world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz.252 By taking advantage 
of its 2092 km-long coastline and its modern ports, Oman has the chance to become the 
major Indian Ocean shipping lane linking Europe and East Asia.253 With its secure 
location on the Arabian Peninsula and its relative distance from unstable areas such as 
Iraq and Iran, Oman has proved a reliable and consistent supplier of oil and gas to the 
Far East, without the burden of heavily increased insurance imposed on other regional 
suppliers. It is a safe and useful transit point for other Gulf States.254  
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With all these advantages, Oman potentially has much to offer foreign investors. 
However, its ability to capitalise on this attractive position will depend to a great extent 
on whether its legal and institutional environment is conducive to expanding “its foreign 
investment potential”.255 The key question is: does Oman benefit from its strategic 
location to attract and protect foreign investment? Before answering this question, it is 
necessary to provide some general background on the legal system and the evolution of 
the foreign investment law in the Sultanate.  
2.3 The Evolution of the Omani Legal System  
Although there was no written law in Oman before 1970, the general law applied in the 
country was Islamic Law or shari'a.256 The modern Omani legal system started in 1970, 
with the accession of Sultan Qaboos. There was a great need at this time to create a 
legal system and issue laws to support two significant developments. First, the 
economic circumstances of the country began to change in the early 1970s, due to oil 
production and large-scale infrastructure projects.257 Second, Oman began to establish 
strong relationships with Western institutions, with the aim of exploiting them to 
enhance its business activities.258 A modern legal framework is a precondition to enable 
the flow of foreign capital to any state.259 It should be noted that Oman’s experience in 
the evolution of its legal system is unusual for two reasons: first, the relatively late start 
(1970s) of its struggle to begin modernising the country, and second, the fact that since 
Oman had never been colonised, it had not inherited any legal framework from a 
European nation that would serve as a foundation for a new Omani legal system.260 
Currently, there are two kinds of legislation in the Sultanate. Royal decrees, 
promulgated by the Sultan, form the primary legislation, while Ministerial Decisions are 
the secondary source. These are usually issued under specific powers conformed by 
Royal Decree on the relevant executive or ministerial body.261 Therefore, no regulations 
are considered binding unless issued by royal decree or ministerial decision: both of 
these are promulgated in the Official Gazette of the Sultanate of Oman (OGSO). Thus, 
the most remarkable characteristic of the Omani legal system is its simplicity and easy 
accessibility, due to the fact that since 1973 all royal decrees, including laws, have been 
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numbered and published in OGSO, as well as in an annual compilation known as Al-
Mujallad (literally, ‘the Compendium’).262 
It is argued that in order to satisfy its need for rapid and logical development, Oman put 
itself in a position where it is able to choose from different legal systems.263 Therefore, 
the Sultanate has applied a “pragmatic approach” of issuing legislation as it is needed to 
deal with problems instead of adopting a foreign legal system that might not fit with the 
“country’s needs”264. However, it can be argued that the lack of strong legal institutions 
in Oman had two relatively negative outcomes. Firstly, this meant that the legal system 
was slow to develop. Secondly, and more significantly, there is a tendency to issue laws 
that are viewed as necessary in a piecemeal and ad hoc basis, without any clear long-
term strategic vision for the country, whereas the laws should frame and contribute to 
the economic development of the country.   
It is possible to distinguish two main stages in the Omani legal system since 1970. The 
first stage, spanning the 1970s and 1980s, witnessed the establishment of the modern 
Omani state, and the main focus was on issuing the laws necessary for organising, 
running, and securing the country and also for creating an environment that was 
conducive to economic development. Originally, the Omani government believed that 
establishing a modern legal system would be a lengthy process.265 One characteristic of 
the Omani legal system during this era was the priority and importance that was given 
to commercial and business laws. This can be seen in the large number of such laws 
promulgated from the early 1970s in different areas of business law. Key examples 
include Royal Decree 3/1974 on the Commercial Register Law, the Commercial 
Companies Law Royal Decree 4/1974, Royal Decree 5/1974 on FBIL, Royal Decree 
6/1974 on the Law for the Protection of Developing Industries, and Royal Decree 
7/1974 on the Banking Law.  
In the subsequent years, further sectoral business legislation was put in place, such as 
the Commercial Agencies Law promulgated by Royal Decree 26/1977, the Customs 
Management Law Royal Decree 35/1978, the Law for the Organisation and 
Encouragement of Industry by Royal Decree 1/79, and the Insurance Companies Law 
by Royal Decree 12/1979. In addition, a number of important laws in other areas were 
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introduced at this stage, such as the Interpretation of Certain Terms and General 
Provisions by Royal Decree 3/1973, the Criminal Law by Royal Decree 7/1974, and the 
Law Regulating the Administrative Apparatus of the State by Royal Decree 26/1975 
amended by Royal Decree 13/1976. These laws, addressing what were considered to be 
the most pressing issues of the day, preceded the introduction of constitutional and civil 
laws by many years, since these did not appear until the second stage.  
Clearly, Oman could not establish international trade without certain laws being applied 
in the country. Consequently, whether it was planned or not, this approach by the 
Omani government led to the creation of an “integrated and interrelated” business legal 
system.266 It is believed that this “has closed most of the loopholes through which 
foreign interests avoided submission to Omani jurisdiction and control”.267 This 
situation encouraged foreigners who planned to operate in Oman to understand these 
laws and comply with them.268 However, during the 1970s and the early 1980s 
commercial lawyers still faced difficulties in certain unregulated areas. Since laws in 
some important areas, such as contracts and tort, had not been promulgated at that stage, 
there was no alternative law to turn to. 269 
 
The second stage began in the 1990s, when developments in the Omani legal system 
reflected the greater maturity of the modern Omani state and its increasing integration 
with the international community. During this decade, the focus shifted to completing 
and modernising the legal structure of the country and the legal system started to 
respond to demands from international organisations for Oman to become a fully 
constitutional state. This progress in the Omani legal system was to be expected, as the 
Sultanate’s greater integration with the world community generated more development 
and demand for new laws. This was reflected in the redrafting of a number of its older 
laws, such as FCIL in 1994, and later the Labour Law by Royal Decree 35/2003.  
 
Change is also discernible in the nature of the new legislation issued during this era. 
Whereas the laws enacted in the 1970s addressed the pressing need to establish the basic 
requirements for trade, those enacted in the second stage addressed the needs arising 
from an increasingly complex and sophisticated national and international business 
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environment. Examples include the Law of Arbitration in Civil and Commercial 
Disputes (Arbitration Law) by Royal Decree 47/1997; the Finance Law by Royal 
Decree 47/1998, the Law of Intellectual Property by Royal Decree 82/2000, the 
Banking Law by Royal Decree 114/2000, the Law of Money Laundering by Royal 
Decree 34/2002; the Law on the Protection of Consumers by Royal Decree 81/2002; 
and the Privatization Law by Royal Decree 77/2004. These laws reflect the influence of 
Oman’s attempts to attract foreign investors and its preparation in the late 1990s for 
accession to the WTO, finally achieved in 9 November 2000.270  
 
The most significant development during this era was the issuing of the Basic Law.271 
On November 6, 1996, Sultan Qaboos issued the Basic Law of the Sultanate of Oman. 
Although Oman was the latest Arab country in issuing a constitution,272 it is believed 
that Omani Basic Law has two features: first, it reflects both tribal and Islamic concepts 
to form a vision of a harmonized Omani state. Second, it adopted international 
standards, especially in the areas of criminal, commercial, company, banking, 
procedural, foreign investment and arbitration law.273 It can be said that Oman is trying 
to strike a balance in its legal system between its national culture and international 
standards and demands. It applies predominantly international standards, especially in 
those areas covering interaction with the international community, while it applies 
Islamic shari'a in a small number of laws that deal mainly with personal matters within 
the local society. 
2.4 The Role of the Basic Law 
The role of the Omani Basic Law is controversial; Miller believes that the issuing of this 
Law represented a significant step toward state formation and democratization. 
However, Siegfried argues that the effect of this Basic Law on political life and legal 
development is not clear. Nevertheless, all the commentators agree that the issuing of 
the Omani Basic Law represented a significant step on the way to state formation.274 In 
addition, it can be argued that the promulgation of the Basic Law played a crucial role 
in the development of the Omani legal system and of political life in Oman, since all the 
laws issued by the Sultan through Royal Decrees must be consistent with the Basic 
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Law. Moreover, the Basic Law has been used to decide, determine, identify and clarify 
a number of important issues that may help to shape future development with regard the 
implementation of the rule of law in the country. 
While Article 2 of the Basic Law declares that shari'a forms the basis for Omani 
legislation, some argue that Oman actually relies on three fundamental “parallel 
interrelated” sources in its legislation. These are (1) Islamic law, which is in turn 
derived from four sources applied respectively (the Quran, the Sunna, ijma and qiyas); 
(2) a statutory system of law expressed in Royal Decrees and Ministerial Decisions, and 
(3) private international law, applied to commercial and financial transactions.275 In 
Royal Decrees and Ministerial Decisions, the only instruments by which legislation is 
issued, may be based on various sources. Nevertheless, these sources are 
interdependent. An effort has been made during recent decades to develop the 
legislation needed for the governmental system and the administration of justice.276  
Although Oman's legal system, like those of all the Islamic nations in the region, is 
based on shari'a, Western countries have also influenced its system by means of 
commerce-related laws that developed in the twentieth century based upon the French 
pattern.277 This is due to the fact that the Napoleonic Code has been widely applied in 
the Middle East and has been adopted in countries such as Egypt,278 from which Oman 
has benefited via the skills of its consultants, administrators and professionals. This has 
led to Oman widely applying the Napoleonic Code in its legal system.279 Although 
Oman does not completely apply the Napoleonic Code taking into account the 
differences in the content of the Omani Civil and Family laws, it can be argued that the 
application of the Islamic Law in Omani law is limited to specific parts of the Omani 
legal system. For instance, in criminal, commercial and all business related laws, Oman 
does not apply shari'a rules.280  
A second important feature of the Omani Basic Law is that it enshrines principles and 
the protection of basic human rights, thus establishing a basis for commitment to 
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protection of human rights. These rights are emphasised in a number of provisions. 
Article 28 guarantees the freedom to practise religion. The freedom of opinion and 
expression is secured by Article 29. Article 31 guarantees the freedom of the press, 
printing and publication. Citizens’ right of assembly within the limits of the Law is 
ensured by Article 32. In addition, Article 34 provides that citizens have the right to 
address the public authorities on personal matters or on matters related to public affairs, 
in the manner and under the conditions laid down by the Law. However, it can be 
argued that these declared rights might be weakened because most of these articles 
stipulate that these rights should be granted in accordance with the applicable laws, 
which may sometimes limit them. Moreover, there is much doubt concerning how 
effectively these provisions provide real and full protection of the basic human rights, 
because there is a need for enough experience and examination. Nevertheless, the 
existence of all these provisions is a good basis for full human basic rights.  
The sovereignty of the Law and the independence of the judiciary from the executive 
authority are other important principles determined by the Basic Law. Article 59 states 
that the sovereignty of the Law is the basis of governance in the State. Rights and 
freedoms are guaranteed by the dignity of the judiciary and the probity and impartiality 
of the judges. Moreover, Article 60 declares that the judicial power is independent and 
vested in the Courts of Law. In addition, Article 61 states that “there is no power over 
the judges in their rulings except the law. [...] No party may interfere in a law suit or in 
matters of justice; such interference shall be a crime punishable by law”.  
However, the mentioned sovereignty of the Law and independence of the judiciary in 
Oman may be weakened due to the lack of full separation of the three powers.  The 
Sultan is the head of all three powers: judicial, legislative and executive. According to 
Royal Decree 9/2012 he is the president of the Judiciary Council, and he is also the 
president of the Oman Council, which consists of two councils (the Majlis Alshura 
(Parliament) and the State Council). Moreover, he is also the Prime Minister according 
to Article 42 of the Basic Law. In addition, according to the same article and law, the 
Sultan promulgates and ratifies laws. Although members of the Majlis Alshura are fully 
elected by the people, they still do not have the power to issue laws, their current role 
regarding legal issues being limited to:  
 Reviewing draft laws prepared by the Ministries and other government 
authorities before their promulgation.  
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 Submitting what is deemed as appropriate for promotion of the economic and 
social laws in force in the Sultanate.281 
In addition, according to Royal Decree 14/94, the Ministry of Legal Affairs is the body 
responsible for preparing, reviewing and developing royal decrees, laws, regulations, 
ministerial decisions, draft treaties and international conventions that the government 
intends to sign or join. It also reviews any contracts that impose an obligation on the 
government exceeding half a million Omani Rials, and issues official legal opinions and 
interpretations of royal decrees and laws.282 
2.5 The Evolution of Foreign Investment law in Oman 
2.5.1 The establishment of the foreign investment regime 
Oman is an oil-producing country. Thus, the special needs of international investment in 
“natural resources and public utility” projects must be recognised by special 
legislation.283 The provisions of the FBIL 1974, amended by Royal Decrees 2/1977 and 
16/1978 formed the basis of the legal framework that guided foreign investors 
establishing business in Oman, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. The fact that the 
FBIL was issued in 1974, only four years after the accession of Sultan Qaboos and at a 
time whilst a war was still being fought in the south of the country, is a sign of the 
importance attached to regulating foreign investment from the early years of the 
Sultan’s rule, especially in the context of the policy of expanding Omani companies 
with Omani equity participation.284  
 
It has been rightly pointed out that there is a significant relationship between the legal 
framework and the likelihood of foreign investors investing in a country. Foreign 
investors largely target countries which have a good legal infrastructure, especially 
where freedom of contract, protection of property and property rights are guaranteed by 
a legal system and by proper rules “of secured transactions” and where the judicial 
system is perceived to be fast and efficient.285  
It has been argued that the FBIL was intended to control foreign investment in the 
country’s economy. This is because Oman was not free from the international approach 
regarding foreign investment during those decades. Like many developing countries, 
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Oman was concerned about the implications of foreign investment at that time. In this 
respect it was similar to all the GCC States, whose laws all adopted a similar stance.286 
Therefore, the Omani Government was caught on the horns of a dilemma. On the one 
hand, the country needed foreign investment, especially in the oil sector, whilst on the 
other, it was wary of foreign investment and the need to defend the national interest.  
As a result, during the 1970s and 1980s, Oman was not willing to provide absolute 
protection to foreign investors or to grant them any incentives.287 Indeed, foreign 
investment was discouraged by laws that provided for a “high degree of screening or 
sectoral restrictions and barriers”.288 The provisions of this law were mainly designed to 
protect the interests of the Omanis. The use of the word “unlawful” in Article 1 of the 
FBIL reflects the strongly restrictive stance concerning foreign investors: 
It shall be unlawful for any non-Omani national, whether a natural or juristic person, to 
engage in trade or business in the Sultanate of Oman or to acquire an interest in the 
capital of an Omani company except as provided in this Law. 
Therefore, the main effects of this law were to make it known that non-Omanis who 
wished to establish business and trade in Oman would not be granted a licence unless a 
number of conditions were met, and also to prohibit foreign investors from any business 
activity in Oman without the permission of MoCI, as stated by Article 2.289  
This restrictive approach can be seen in a number of provisions of the FBIL and in the 
foreign investment regime generally. First of all, there was the number of governmental 
bodies involved in issuing licences for foreign investors. Article 3 stated that:  
The license (authorization) required in accordance with Article (2) of this law shall not 
be granted unless […] (b) the paid up capital referred to may be decreased to a 
minimum of thirty thousand Omani Rials in accordance with the recommendation of the 
Committee for Foreign Capital Investment and the reasonable economic reasons which 
are given by the Committee and are approved by the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry after the approval of the Development Council. 
This extract shows the required authorization was threefold: the Committee for Foreign 
Capital Investment (CFCI), the Minister of Commerce and Industry, and the 
Development Council. Having this number of governmental bodies involved in the 
decision to granting a licence presented a significant obstacle.  
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Another feature of the restrictive approach of this law is that the Law and the 
subsequent amendments did not permit foreign ownership to exceed 65%. According to 
Article 3 (C): 
The proportion of Omani shareholding in the Capital and share of profits is not less than 
that determined by the Committee for Foreign Capital Investment and is under no 
circumstances less than 35%.  
This requirement of 35% Omani participation in shareholding in the capital and share of 
profits was a challenge. Moreover, in practice, the Foreign Capital Investment 
Committee usually insisted on an Omani participation of 51% and, in certain 
circumstances, even greater.290 
Moreover, foreign investment was only exempted from paying revenue and income 
taxes for a period of five years if the Minister of Commerce and Industry ruled that a 
project involving foreign capital was regarded as an Economic Development Project. 
According to Article 10:  
The Minister of Commerce and Industry may, at his discretion, declare a project in 
which non-Omani capital is being invested to be an Economic Development Project. 
Each Economic Development Project shall be exempt from taxes imposed upon its 
revenue and income, but not other taxes generally applicable to Omani business, for a 
period of five years from a date to be fixed by the Minister of Commerce and Industry.  
Those companies owned by foreign investors were subject to income tax of 20% if the 
profits of a company with 35-51% local participation exceeded OMR 20,000, whereas 
the majority of local-owned companies paid only 15%.291 
Finally, the Law also prohibited foreign investors from involvement in a number of 
business and trade activities in Oman, representing a further obstacle to entry and 
foreign ownership. Article 5 (b) stated that: 
For the purposes of this Law, the following shall be deemed not to be engaged in trade or 
business in the Sultanate of Oman:  
i. Service as an official of the Government of the Sultanate and service or 
employment by persons engaged, hired or retained by the Government of the 
Sultanate;  
ii. individual employment in the Sultanate;  
iii. individual service in the Sultanate as an officer, director or manager of an 
Omani commercial company;  
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iv. any non-Omani bank which has a representative office in the Sultanate but does 
not transact any banking business in Oman there from;  
v. any non-Omani business which has no permanent establishment in the 
Sultanate, does not have any officer, director, employee or agent in the 
Sultanate for more than 30 days in any calendar year and transacts no business 
in the Sultanate through any such officer, director, employee or agent when 
such personnel is in Oman.  
vi. any non-Omani business which has no permanent establishment, assets or 
officers, directors, employees or agents in the Sultanate and has only occasional 
and isolated transactions in the Sultanate;  
vii. any non-Omani press representatives, whether of newspapers, magazines, radio, 
television or motion pictures, provided that such representatives are in the 
Sultanate solely for the purpose of reporting events occurring therein; and  
viii. Any non-Omani company engaged in the business of providing international 
transportation by air or sea; provided that such company does not provide 
domestic service within the Sultanate. 
This article lays out further restrictions on participation in trade or business for foreign 
investors. Therefore, as Mellahi and Guermat rightly observe, the 1974 law governing 
investment in Oman and the amendments that followed it clearly discriminated against 
foreign investors, giving priority to Omani investors.292  
Failure to comply with the FBIL led directly to a strict position being adopted by the 
judicial authority, as was made clear in Case 43/84, heard on 31 March 1985. The case 
had been brought to the Authority for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes 
(ASCD)293 by a foreigner of Bangladeshi origin who had an agreement with an Omani 
establishment to carry on a business in Oman, and on his own behalf, but under the 
name of the Omani establishment to which he paid a commission of 10 per cent of the 
value of every contract he carried out.  
The ASCD held that the agreement was void, stating that the provisions of FBIL were 
intended for the public/common good which overrode the interests of private 
individuals and the Law was linked with “public policy” or “public order”. Thus, 
whether or not the illegality of the agreement had been raised by the defendant, the 
ASCD was disposed to strike down the agreement on its own initiative. Therefore, 
according to McHugo, this case served as a warning to all foreign companies to ensure 
they complied with FBIL provisions.294  
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However, amendments to the FBIL were intended to ease these restrictions somewhat. 
For example, the 1978 amendment to Article 3 was a step towards easing the conditions 
imposed on foreign investors aiming to invest in Oman, since it reduced the minimum 
amount of capital from OMR 150,000 to OMR 30,000 at the recommendation of the 
CFCI, based on a reasonable reason. Article 3 (b) provided that:  
The licence (authorization) required in accordance with Article 2 of this law shall not be 
granted unless all the following conditions are fulfilled: […] 
that the paid up capital of the Omani Commercial Company shall not be less than that 
determined by the Committee for Foreign Capital Investment referred to in Article 9 
hereof and is under no circumstances less than OR 150,000. However, the paid up 
capital referred to may be decreased to a minimum of thirty thousand Omani Rials […].  
The CFCI was responsible for approving any foreign interest in shares in an Omani 
company; this included the cases of shares with an Omani company when the foreign 
company obtained an interest that was less than absolute ownership.295 In addition, in 
Article 6 there were specific exemptions to enable a foreign investor, whether a 
company, institution or individual, to establish business in Oman under its “own name 
and on its own account”296 following approval from the MoCI. According to Article 6 
(a-e), these exemptions could be applied in a number of instances. The Article states:  
The following shall be exempted from the provisions of Article 3 hereof:  
a. Companies, institutions and individuals which are engaged in activities in the 
Sultanate of Oman by virtue of agreements or special contracts concluded with the 
government of the Sultanate or its public institutions;  
b. Companies, institutions and individuals which are engaged in a project declared to 
be an Economic Development Project;  
c. Companies, institutions and individuals who are engaged in a profession which the 
Council of Ministers has declared to be a profession of critical need and shortage in 
the Sultanate of Oman;  
d. Companies and institutions which are licensed banking institutions in the 
jurisdiction of their organization; and  
e. Companies, institutions and individuals which are exempted by Decree of the 
Sultan. 
However, invoking these exemptions might be not easy, as the approach applied during 
the implementation of the FBIL did not favour foreign investment. For example, in 
1982 the MoCI conducted a review of the FBIL, and prohibited foreign investment in 
the trade and service sectors, on the basis that these sectors were sufficiently developed, 
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using this as an incentive to benefit Omani interests.297 This prohibition clearly shows 
the level of discrimination against foreign investors under the FBIL regime. 
2.5.2 The new foreign investment regime post-1994 
The new foreign investment era started on 16 October 1994 with the issue of FCIL 
which replaced the FBIL 1974. Article 4 of FCIL states clearly that: “The Foreign 
Business and Investment Law issued by the Royal Decree 4/74 referred to above shall 
be hereby abrogated”. It is thought that the rapid changes in foreign investment-related 
legislation are indicative of the Omani government’s desire to provide the guarantees 
needed to attract foreign investment to Oman.298 This shift in attitude reflects the Omani 
government’s new approach towad attracting foreign investment during the 1990s, 
which, according to Mellahi and Guermat, was motivated by two main reasons: the fall 
in the price of oil and pressure from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to seek foreign investment and further integrate its economy into the global 
economy.299  
This new position toward reducing the obstacles to foreign investment was 
accompanied by a number of developments during this period, such as the conference 
held in 1995 (2020 Vision Oman). This event was intended to establish development 
targets in various national sectors to be achieved by 2020 and to provide guidance for 
the Omani government’s development plans, including foreign investment.300 In 
addition, the Omani Centre for Investment Promotion and Export Development 
(OCIPED) was established in 1997 to assist foreign investors in various respects. 
During the same period, Oman also made preparations to become a member of the 
WTO, ratified the agreement and acceded to membership on 9 November 2000.301  
Although both the old and new laws provide that foreign investors cannot be involved 
in any foreign investment without a licence from the MoCI, this is couched in softer 
language in Article 1 of the FCIL:  
Non-Omanis – whether natural of juridical persons – shall not conduct any commercial, 
industrial or tourism businesses or otherwise participate in an Omani Company except 
with a licence from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to be issued in accordance 
with the Provisions of this Law. 
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This can be seen in the revoking of the word “unlawful” which was used in the 
corresponding Article of the original law.302  
It can be argued that the significance of FCIL is that it removed a number of restrictions 
on both entry to local business enterprises and ownership in most sectors.303 First, 
Article 2 (1) of FCIL increases the allowable percentage of foreign ownership over that 
stipulated in FBIL. The essential principle in Article 3 of FBIL and Article 2 of FCIL is 
that to operate a business in Oman, all foreign investors must have an Omani as a 
shareholder. While under FBIL in practice the permitted percentage of foreign 
ownership was not more than 49%,304 FCIL set these levels of foreign participation in 
an Omani company, starting from 49%. This can be increased to 65% provided the 
capital invested is not less than OMR 150,000 (US$ 390,000) after a decision by the 
MoCI following a recommendation from the CFCI.  
Moreover, with the approval of the Development Council, the percentage of foreign 
investment can be increased to 100% of the company’s capital, subject to two further 
conditions: first, the capital sum invested must be at least OMR 500,000 (US$ 1.3 
million) and second, the project must contribute to the development of the national 
economy. This change was made because Omani policymakers realised that for foreign 
investors the ability to maintain and to exercise financial and operational management 
over the company plays an important role in investment decisions.305 
However, in practice there are two exceptions to Article 2 of FCIL. The first relates to 
multilateral treaties and permits up to 70% foreign participation in companies, in 
accordance with Oman’s commitments and applicable regulations under the WTO.306 
The second concerns those countries that have an agreement with Oman and in this case 
the provisions of that treaty apply. Thus, for example, American companies can own up 
to 100% of the capital under the FTA between Oman and the USA.307 
It is believed that under FCIL, in the case of those companies with less than 50% of 
foreign ownership, separate Foreign Investment Clearance will no longer be required in 
order to enter on Oman’s commercial registration and seek “authorisation to conduct 
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business”308 there. In contrast, under FBIL, the CFCI enjoyed a “significant measure of 
administrative discretion”309 in how it defined the national economic sectors in which 
the presence of foreign business would be beneficial and this impacted on whether or 
not authorisation was granted to foreign investors.310 Moreover, in the context of the 
FCIL's approach intended to encourage foreign investment, in 1997 the MoCI called on 
all Omani public joint-stock companies to allow at least 49% non-Omani ownership by 
issuing an internal directive requiring corporate articles.311  
An additional significant step is that Article 7 of FCIL reduces the number of authorities 
involved in granting licences to foreign investors, compared with the previous law, as it 
declares clearly that with regard to obtaining a licence for establishment of a new 
company, approval need only be sought from the MoCI: “Licensing shall be granted to 
the projects subject to this Law without the need for obtaining prior approvals from any 
authorities outside the Ministry”. The only exception to this is for companies that are 
100% foreign-owned, where the approval of the Development Council is needed.  
A further important development in FCIL concerns the exemption from income tax and 
customs duties on imports of equipment and raw materials required for production, 
offered to companies with foreign ownership. In association with the supportive 
approach of foreign investment applied in FCIL during the 1990s, the Omani 
government issued a number of commercial laws intended to create incentives for 
foreign investment. These involved relieving foreign-owned companies of the higher 
tax rate to which they were then subject, by establishing five-year tax exemptions for 
companies engaging in an extensive variety of activities.312 Article 8.1 of FCIL states: 
Companies licensed to be incorporated pursuant to this Law and carrying out its activity 
in one of the following areas shall be exempted from income tax: 
One) Industry and Mining. 
Two) Export of locally manufactured or processed products. 
Three) Tourism promotion including operation of hotels and tourist villages, but 
excluding management contracts. 
Four) Production and processing of farm products including poultry farming, processing 
or manufacturing animal products and agro-industries. 
Five) Fishing and fish processing. 
Six) Exploitation and provision of services such as public utility projects, but excluding 
management contracts and project execution contracting [...]. 
In addition, according to Article 9.1: 
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Foreign Investment projects mentioned in this Law can be exempted from paying 
custom duties on plant and machinery imported by them for setting up the projects. 
They can also be exempted from paying custom duties on raw materials needed in the 
manufacturing process which are not available in the local markets, for a period not 
exceeding 5 years starting from the date of commencing production. This exemption 
can be renewed once. 
However, the difference between the two exemptions granted should be noted, namely, 
that Article 8.1 states that companies “shall be exempted from income tax”, whereas 
Article 9.1 announced that they “can be exempted from (paying) custom duties”. In 
other words, it is mandatory to provide the exemption with regard to taxes, but with 
regard to customs duties, it is optional. The amendment in the Law on Income Tax that 
came into force in 2010 introduced full equality of treatment between completely 
Omani-owned companies and foreign companies, regardless of the percentage of 
foreign participation.313 This equality in tax payment is an important development for 
foreign investors, to reduce their fear of discrimination. Moreover, another instrument 
to attract foreign investment was the launch of a 12% “flat rate corporate tax”, applied 
as well from January 1, 2010. This flat-rate tax, one of the most favourable in the GCC, 
is expected to help Oman to secure more direct investment. In addition, Oman does not 
apply personal income tax or wealth tax.314 However, all legal guarantees and 
weaknesses in FCIL will be examined in further depth in Chapter Four. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced foreign investment related laws and policies in Oman. After 
briefly tracing Oman’s history as a trading nation, the focus shifted to an analysis of the 
evolution of the Omani legal system and the role of Omani Basic law, to provide a 
background for the environment of the developments in investment law in Oman since 
1970. Two key pieces of legislation were discussed and compared: the FBIL and its 
more recent successor, the FCIL.  
 
Oman has benefited greatly from its strategic location over the centuries and in more 
recent times, it has embarked on an ambitious development programme that involves 
attracting foreign investment. The key question to be addressed in the following 
chapters is whether Oman has been able to utilise this rich history and strategic position 
to attract and provide legal protection for foreign investment. 
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This chapter argues that the promulgation of the Basic Law was important for attracting 
foreign investment to Oman since the Law defines the Omani policy and attitude toward 
many issues concern foreign companies. The existence of the Law is important as a 
basis for the development and protection of these rights as the Law emphasises the 
sovereignty of the law, and the independence of the Judiciary and judges, and 
criminalises any interference in judges’ work.  
It is clear that the cautious stance of Omani regulations toward foreign investment 
during the 1970s and 1980s, which was seen under the FBIL was because the country 
was focusing mainly on providing the basic needs for Omani citizens and due to the 
weak realisation of the importance of FDI. This was obvious in many features, such as 
in the number of governmental bodies involved in issuing licences, rules regarding the 
permitted percentage of foreign ownership, income tax regulations covering foreign-
owned enterprises, and restrictions on business and trade activities open to foreign 
investors in Oman.  
The shift in developing countries' attitude toward provision of better protection for 
foreign investment during the 1990s, in addition to pressure from international and 
internal factors, was reflected in the promulgation of the Omani FCIL 1994. It is argued 
that the law took a more welcoming attitude towards foreign investors, offering them 
more protection than the previous law. Nevertheless, it seems the law was intended to 
balance attracting foreign investment with keeping national control in certain key areas.  
This policy at national level is complemented by a development in Oman's 
commitments under international agreements. The legal guarantees and weaknesses 
under Oman’s international and regional obligations will be examined in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3. Legal Guarantees and Weaknesses under Oman’s 
International and Regional Obligations 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a widespread belief that investment treaties are important tools both for host 
countries wishing to attract foreign investment and for states wanting to protect the 
foreign investment of their citizens.315 Therefore, Oman has signed many agreements -
bilateral agreements such as Oman's BITs and FTAs, regional such as the GCC, and 
multilateral international such as the WTO (GATS, TRIPS, TRIMS) - to address mainly 
or partly the issue of protection of foreign investment. The extent to which these 
international and regional obligations on Oman provide adequate guarantees and 
protection can be evaluated.  
Therefore, this chapter will examine the legal guarantees and weaknesses under Oman’s 
international and regional obligations. It will provide an overview of Oman's 
international investment and investment-related agreements. This will include the 
analysis of Oman's international investment related agreements such as those with the 
WTO Agreements, the GCC, Oman's BITs, and its FTA with the USA. These are 
Oman's main related international agreements. It important to mention that although this 
chapter generally follows the approach of examining Oman's commitments under the 
WTO, GCC, BITs, and Oman's FTAs, this will be changed in many areas according to 
the level of the strength of Oman's commitments under these agreements.    
The extent to which the obligations provided by international treatment standards 
included in these agreements form an important element of protection will be 
investigated. This will be by focusing on three kinds of treatment standards: national 
treatment provisions, MFN treatment provisions, and minimum standards treatment 
provisions. Then, the possible risk of expropriation in Oman’s treaties will be evaluated 
by examining the strength of protection offered in these agreements and whether or not 
their provisions contain clear conditions for compensation. The case of Al-Tamimi will 
be referred to throughout the chapter in order to derive the legal lessons behind it. 
Another aspect which merits discussion in this regard is how Oman’s international 
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treaties deal with taxes, custom duties and money transfer and what are Oman’s 
obligations with regard to these three issues.  
The effectiveness of dispute settlement provisions in those treaties dealing with foreign 
investment in Oman will also be investigated, by analysing the guarantees and 
challenges under the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO, the ICJ, Oman’s 
BITs, the Oman-USA FTA dispute settlement provisions, and the ICSID. 
Al-Tamimi will serve here as an illustrative example of an international foreign 
investment dispute against Oman and the impact of this case on the Sultanate’s foreign 
investment law and policy will be analysed.  
3.2 Oman's International Investment Agreements 
3.2.1 Overview of Oman's international investment agreements 
As part of the Sultanate’s efforts to market itself as an investment-friendly country, 
Oman has signed most of the important multilateral treaties on trade and investment as 
well as a large number of BITs. Even though there is no conclusive evidence that entry 
into investment treaties is directly associated with an increase in foreign investment, as 
mentioned earlier,316 it is clear that the Omani government is keen to ratify international 
trade and investment agreements as a means of integrating the Omani economy with 
international trade as part of its attempts to diversify its economy. According to Article 
42 of the Omani Basic Law,317 it is the responsibility of the Sultan or a person 
designated by him to conclude international treaties and agreements. 
Despite Oman’s long history as an independent nation, it only became a member of the 
United Nations in 1971.318 It is also party to many international organisations, such as 
the WTO and GCC. As occurred elsewhere in the world, Oman witnessed a boom in the 
number of BITs it signed from the 1990s onwards. Since 1991, the Sultanate has signed 
34 BITs, the first BIT with Tunisia in 1991 and the latest with Bulgaria in 2014.319 
However, with regard to the protection of foreign investment, the most significant 
treaties involving Oman are its agreements with the GCC and the WTO and its FTA 
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with the United States, because of the comprehensive guarantees provided under these 
agreements and their effect on Oman's foreign investment policy. For this reason, these 
agreements will be analysed here. 
3.2.2 The WTO agreements 
Oman viewed accession to the WTO as a vital step towards attracting more FDI, 
obtaining access to other major regional and international markets through trade 
liberalisation and tariff reduction, and improving its financial and economic credibility. 
Therefore, the time-consuming efforts involved in the accession process, either at 
national level or later within the WTO, were considered worthwhile. Internally, the 
application went through a number of steps; in December 1994 the Council of Ministers 
decided that Oman should seek observer status and an application to participate on this 
basis was submitted in January 1995, with acceptance being received in October 
1995.320 Oman officially applied to join the WTO on 22 April 1996, under Article 12 of 
the WTO Agreement, finally becoming a member on 9 November 2000.321 No known 
reservations were expressed to its application.322   
Whether GATT was a suitable forum to discuss the issue of foreign investment policies 
was controversial. Many developing countries argued that allowing foreign investment 
and regulating this should be a purely internal matter, whereas others argued that 
international trade law should be involved in the case of applying policies and 
regulations restricting the ability of foreign companies to invest locally. However, 
ultimately, countries arguing for the involvement of international trade law won and the 
TRIMs agreement was adopted. 323 During the WTO Uruguay round of multilateral 
trade negotiations, the notion emerged of regulating foreign investment as a part of 
international trade.324  
Following Oman's accession to the WTO, Oman became subject to the obligations of 
the TRIMs. Hence, Omani investment and commercial laws should not contain any 
trade-restrictive investment measures. However, the effectiveness of the role of WTO 
agreements regarding the protection of foreign investment in Oman can be viewed from 
two sides. On the one hand, the limitations of the WTO agreements can be noticed in a 
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number of areas. Mavroidis has argued that the implementation of protection provisions 
provided by the WTO agreements can vary among Member States. For example, 
members might or might not provide national treatment for services traders. In addition, 
members might use an exemption from applying MFN treatment relying on Article II of 
GATS on the basis of political reasons. 325 In addition, it is observed that although the 
WTO has addressed investment matters in specific provisions and practice, there has 
been a lack of a comprehensive and systematic way of dealing with those issues related 
to investment. For example, a very small number of governmental measures are covered 
in the TRIMs agreement for goods; the GATS agreement prevents countries and 
industries from applying important principles such as national treatment. 326 Therefore, 
Ewing-Chow has argued that foreign investment provisions in the TRIMS offer a “thin 
form” of protection.327  
On the other hand, the WTO agreements can play a significant role in providing 
protection for foreign investment in Oman, as the country is under obligations to 
provide the protection needed in a number of areas. For example, the TRIPS Agreement 
requires it to provide protection for the intellectual property rights of Trans-national 
Corporations (TNCs).328 In addition, although according to Article 1 the scope of the 
TRIMs Agreement is limited to dealing with “investment measures related to trade in 
goods only”, Oman is under an obligation to eliminate all TRIMs that are "not in 
conformity with the provisions" of the TRIMs Agreement within five years of its date of 
entry into force.329 In addition, Article 5.4 of TRIMs obliges Oman to not amend any 
laws under which the existing foreign investments were established. This provision can 
be regarded as a tool of protection for FDI from any unexpected changes in or 
amendments of laws or measures governing foreign investment in the Sultanate that 
may lead to less favourable treatment for the investment concerned.  
Moreover, according to Article 6.2 of TRIMs, Oman as a member is under an obligation 
to "notify the Secretariat of the publications in which TRIMs may be found, including 
those applied by regional and local governments and authorities within" the country. 
Furthermore, Oman is obliged by Article III of the GATS agreement to provide 
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transparency, not only by publicizing its laws and regulations but also “by disclosing 
investment-related information”. However, it is ambiguous whether this article provides 
protection against misleading information or unclear procedures which may result in 
less favourable treatment being granted to foreign investors at any stage of FDI in 
Oman. In addition, although Article 5 of the Omani FCIL places responsibility for 
defining the investment areas on the CFCI, this article does not oblige the CFCI to 
publicize the investment fields that are available for foreign investors. 330 What is clear 
is that Oman will be in violation of its commitments under the WTO Agreement if it 
fails to ensure the transparency of all related trade and investment measures. It is 
pointed out that since Oman joined the WTO, there have been no claims that Oman 
maintains any measures that are not in compliance with the WTO TRIMs provisions.331 
3.2.3 Oman’s agreements with the GCC 
There has been slow progress in the economic achievements of the GCC since its 
establishment on 8 June 1981.332 However, the desire of the GCC Member States to 
encourage investment among them, strengthening and integrating their economies, was 
one of the most important reasons for establishing this organisation. This approach is 
reflected in a number of agreements and provisions existing amongst the GCC 
countries. For example, Article 4 of the GCC Charter makes it clear that economic 
development and the formulation of similar regulations, especially in the business field 
and specifically “economic and financial affairs; commerce, and customs” has been the 
organisation’s main focus since it was established.333 In 1983 all six member states 
signed an agreement establishing a regional free trade area, which introduced freedom 
of movement for workers and free movement of goods among member states.334 The 
Unified Economic Agreement between the Countries of the GCC (GCC Economic 
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Agreement) 335 is arguably the most important and comprehensive agreement between 
the six countries.336 Although it consists of some nine chapters and thirty-three articles, 
few of its provisions deal with foreign investment specifically. Oman must accord 
investors from GCC member States the same treatment as their Omani counterparts, 
with Article 3 of the Agreement stating:  
GCC natural and legal citizens shall be accorded, in any Member State, the same 
treatment accorded to its own citizens, without differentiation or discrimination, in all 
economic activities, especially the following: (1) Movement and residence (2) Work in 
private and government jobs (3) Pension and social security (4) Engagement in all 
professions and crafts (5) Engagement in all economic, investment and service activities 
(6) Real estate ownership (7) Capital movement (8) Tax treatment (9) Stock ownership 
and formation of corporations (10) Education, health and social services. 
While this article seems to be an assertion of the provisions of the Preamble of the 
Agreement, it is clear that investors from GCC Member States are not subject to FCIL 
with regard to the issues included in the article.  This is because the article obliges the 
GCC member states to accord nationals of other GCC states equal treatment to that 
given to their own citizens. The agreement stipulates that the treatment of members 
should be “without differentiation or discrimination”. Therefore, all non-Omani GCC 
investors must receive the same treatment as Omani nationals in all economic activities, 
including the payment of taxes as well as ownership of real estate.  
In addition, the Article 5 of the GCC Economic Agreement obliges the six countries to 
‘unify' all regulations related to investment and to grant national treatment to all 
investments owned by natural and legal citizens of GCC Member States.337 Although 
Oman is committed in its regulations to treating GCC foreign investors equally to 
Omani nationals, there are no known efforts among the GCC states with regard to 
unifying their investment-related laws.338  
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In 2003 the GCC States established a customs union.339 Later, in January 2008, the 
GCC signed an agreement to establish a common market for services.340 Finally, 2008 
witnessed the application of a common market, a big step for GCC members. Although 
the creation of the common market may challenge the local agency system within these 
countries, its establishment made it much easier for investors from GCC states to 
operate in other GCC countries. In 2014 Oman and Bahrain were the only GCC 
countries which had succeeded in having two GCC countries, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE, among their top-five foreign investor states. Nevertheless, some service-sector 
companies, particularly in property and retail, have succeeded in operating in other 
GCC countries.341 An example is Majid AlFutaim, a UAE citizen who has invested in 
all GCC countries. It is anticipated that by 2020, the total investment of Majid Al 
Futtaim in Oman will be OMR 515 million ($1.3 billion).342 
It may be argued that although such agreements may extend the market for investors 
within the member states (and in some cases for companies established outside the 
region), there is a concern that such regional organisations might introduce 
discriminatory policies against companies and investors from non-member states.343 
Nevertheless, whether a country has the right to grant preferential treatment to certain 
nationalities will be discussed later.  
In addition, Article 31 of the GCC Economic Agreement raises a question about the 
limits that Oman has in its bilateral agreements or FTAs. This article states: 
No Member State may grant to a non-Member State any preferential treatment 
exceeding that granted herein to Member State [...] [or] conclude any agreement that 
violates provisions of this agreement.   
It is clear that this article imposes an obligation on each member states of the GCC. It 
obliges GCC members not to 'water down' this preferential treatment by granting it to 
nationals of states which are not members of the GCC.344 Oman is not in violation of 
this article by ratifying the FTA with the USA, since the treatment granted to the USA 
citizens does not exceed what is granted to Member States of the GCC. However, it 
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seems that the FTAs between Oman and the USA and Bahrain and the USA345 have 
raised concern among other GCC Member States and that is why currently GCC States 
have started to negotiate FTAs with other parties as a bloc rather than as individual 
states. Thus, they have concluded FTAs with Singapore in 2013 and with European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) States in 2014,346 whereas the FTA with the EU is not 
ratified yet.347   
3.2.4 The Oman-US FTA  
The most significant treaty following the WTO Agreement was Oman’s FTA with the 
USA. However, this was not the first trade agreement between these two nations, as the 
trade relationship between them has deep historical roots, dating back to 1833 when 
Oman signed a treaty of Amity and Commerce, becoming among the first Arab States to 
do so.348 This was followed by a number of trade agreements with the USA: the 
Investment Protection Agreement in 1976, the Agreement on Economic and Technical 
Cooperation in 1980, the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Continuation 
of Limited Services in 1996 and the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 
(TIFA) on 7 July 2004, which is regarded as a preliminary step toward the FTA.349 
Generally, the FTA, which consists of twenty two chapters, grants US investors and 
investment the same treatment as those of Oman and the GCC.350 Chapter Ten of the 
FTA deals comprehensively and clearly with the investment issues between the two 
parties, whereas, the WTO Agreements lacks this comprehensive investment protection 
clause. The Oman-USA FTA covers all aspects of investment, including enterprises, 
debt, concessions, contracts and intellectual property.351 Chapter Ten of the FTA 
guarantees six essential forms of protection for foreign investment: non-discriminatory 
treatment, the minimum standard of treatment of aliens, protection from expropriation, 
free transfer of funds, freedom from performance requirements and the right to hire 
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executives regardless of their nationality.352 All these rights are backed by a 
comprehensive dispute settlement system353 described in Chapters Ten and Twenty.  
However, in referring to investment, Chapter Ten, Article 10.2.1 of the FTA states: “In 
the event of any inconsistency between this Chapter and another Chapter, the other 
Chapter shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency.” It is unclear what the possible 
effects of this article on the protection of foreign investment and investors’ rights may 
be, in a case of inconsistency between the provisions in Chapter Ten, which deals fully 
with the protection of foreign investment, and the aforementioned "other Chapter", 
since the latter will prevail. It can be said that, for better protection of foreign 
investment in both countries, this article may need to be amended to grant the foreign 
investment provisions superiority in the case of contradiction or inconsistency between 
them and other provisions in the agreement. 
In the Al-Tamimi case, the “investor of a party” defined under Article 10.27 of the 
Oman-USA FTA raised a debate between Mr Al-Tamimi (the Claimant) and Oman (the 
Respondant). Oman raised two objections; first, that the Claimant was a US-UAE dual 
national and therefore should be excluded from claiming under the Oman-USA FTA 
according to Article 10.27 of the FTA. Second, the Claimant lacked a genuine 
connection to the US.354 However, the tribunal rejected the Oman argument and stated 
that: 
In any event, as a matter of interpretation of Article 10.27, the Tribunal does not 
consider that the language of “dominant and effective nationality” is intended to prevent 
dual citizens of both the United States and a third-party State, such as the UAE, from 
invoking the US–Oman BIT – even where the nationality of the third-party State is 
predominant. Rather, the Tribunal considers that the provision is aimed at preventing 
claims by dual nationals of both State parties (i.e. the United States and Oman) from 
seeking to use the FTA to claim against their own State of dominant and effective 
nationality – thereby defeating the purpose of the FTA to apply investment protection 
only to “investors of the other Party”.355   
The “covered investment” and the entry into force of the Oman-USA FTA was another 
debated issue raised by the Al-Tamimi case. Oman challenged that the OMCO–Emrock 
and OMCO–SFOH Lease Agreements were not “covered investments” under the 
Oman-USA FTA, because OMCO terminated the OMCO–Emrock Lease Agreement 
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under cover of a letter dated 20 July 2008.356 This meant that the lease agreement was 
not in existence as of the date of entry into force of the FTA on 1 January 2009. The 
Claimant argued that OMCO sent a second termination on 17 February 2009, which 
proved that the earlier termination letter was ineffective.357 The Tribunal rejected 
Oman's argument and founds that it possessed "jurisdiction ratione temporis over the 
OMCO–Emrock Lease Agreement, which remained in existence as of 1 January 
2009"358 and stated that: 
In light of this evidence, the Tribunal finds that the second termination notice of 17 
February 2009 must be taken to have superseded the earlier notice of 20 July 2008, with 
the effect that the earlier notice was rendered ineffective. In other words, the 
specification of a 2009 termination date in the second termination notice (“we hereby 
terminate […] with immediate effect”) effectively waived the earlier purported 
termination date.359  
3.3 The Guarantees Provided by Treatment Standards and the Challenges 
they Present 
Although there is debate concerning the meaning and scope of the international 
minimum standards of treatment, most Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), BITs, 
FTAs and other related investment treaties provide basic standards of treatment, 
including national treatment and MFN treatment, as protection instruments for foreign 
investors.360 It is clear that the inclusion of these in Oman’s BITs, in addition to the 
treatment standards accorded under the Oman-USA FTA, offer protection for the home 
state investments and investors who are investing in Oman.   
The reason that the WTO includes the treatment standards in its agreements is that this 
organisation’s essential mission is to liberalise international trade.361 Therefore, WTO 
agreements include national treatment and MFN standards to protect foreign 
investment. The following discussion will examine the role of these standards of 
treatment in Oman’s international agreements.  
 3.3.1 Protection under national treatment provisions  
The aim of the principle of national treatment is to prevent discrimination on the 
grounds of the nationality of ownership of a foreign investment.362 In order to evaluate 
accurately the application of this principle in the case of Oman, there are two simple 
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criteria: (1) are foreign investors and Omani investors placed in a “comparable setting”? 
and (2) is the treatment granted to foreign investors at least as favourable as the 
treatment granted to Omani investors?363  
It can be said that Oman's commitment with regard to the implementation of national 
treatment can be categorised into absolute national treatment guarantees and those 
which contain exceptions. National treatment protection is provided under the WTO 
agreements, the GCC Singapore FTA and Oman’s BITs, contains exceptions, whereas 
the Oman-USA FTA contains absolute application of the principle of national 
treatment. This is clear as Article 10.3 of the Oman-USA FTA, which extends national 
treatment not only to the operation but also to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, and sale or other disposition of investment/investors after they 
enter the host state, whether it is Oman or the USA. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 
mentioned article state that: 
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory. 
2. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less favourable than 
that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in its territory of its own 
investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. 
According to Dolzer and Schreuer, the use of the phrase “no less favourable”, in 
paragraphs 1 and 2, seems to assume that national rules may provide less protection for 
foreign investors than those of the general obligations of international law. Therefore, it 
recognises that other rules might offer greater protection for foreign investments.364 
Consequently, Oman is obliged to provide higher protection for American investment 
and investors than for its own nationals, in those instances where the general rules of 
international law are more protective than Omani national regulations. 
While the words “in like circumstances” stated in paragraphs 1, 2 of Article 10.3 of the 
FTA may raise a debate, as will be seen later in Methanex Corporation v USA, the 
Tribunal in the Al-Tamimi case took a narrow approach in to this provision, stating that: 
However, to provide a relevant comparison for a national treatment claim, any 
comparator investor must still be in materially the same circumstances as the Claimant. 
The Tribunal does not accept the Claimant’s submission that “the Jebel Wasa Quarry 
should be understood as being in like circumstances with all limestone quarries in 
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Oman”. The Claimant must point to evidence that a domestic operator which possessed 
the same or substantially similar approvals as the Claimant, and carried out the same or 
substantially similar material conduct (including the Claimant’s repeated violations of 
the terms of those approvals) was treated less harshly or according to a different 
standard365 
Therefore, it is clear that if there is an absence in one respect of complete similarity 
between the foreign investor's case and treatment of a national investor, this will not 
establish a violation of the national treatment clause. This was apparent in both 
tribunals' interpretation of the words “in like circumstances” in Methanex and Al-
Tamimi. In addition, “in like circumstances” should be applied in the key factors of the 
investment. For example, the Tribunal in Al-Tamimi investigated “like circumstances” 
with regard to the treatment of Mr. Al-Tamimi himself and the Jebel Wasa limestone 
quarry. Evidence was provided by the Respondent that the Claimant was not the only 
case in Oman to be investigated by the Omani authorities for quarrying violations since 
in a 2013 report, 193 cases had been referred to the public prosecutor’s office, including 
cases where operators were investigated for “extending the areas that were allocated to 
them”.366 This convinced the Tribunal that the claimant had failed to prove “like 
circumstances”. Consequently, the Tribunal in the Al-Tamimi case dismissed the 
Claimant’s national treatment claim on the basis of Article 10.3 of the FTA that the 
Respondent had breached the national treatment. 367.  
Importantly, the Tribunal in Al-Tamimi concluded that since Oman imposed fines in the 
first instance against OMCO, the Omani-owned company and Mr AlWaily, an Omani 
citizen who was prosecuted along with Mr Al-Tamimi, this constituted evidence that Mr 
Al-Tamimi had been not targeted because he was a foreigner and therefore, there was 
no breach of national treatment.368 Thus, even though the host states' action against the 
foreign investor was wrong in its conclusion, since it treated the foreign investor and its 
own citizens equally, there was no violation of national treatment.   
Although there are slight differences in its application, the principle of national 
treatment is found in three main areas under the WTO Agreements.369 The first is trade 
in goods. Oman is obliged under the terms of Article III paragraph 1 of GATT not to 
apply to imported or national products any protection measures such as discriminatory 
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internal taxes, other internal charges, laws, regulations and other relevant 
requirements.370 Moreover, if Oman grants products imported to the Sultanate treatment 
less favourable than that granted to its own similar products in respect of all laws, 
regulations and requirements, Oman will be in a violation of GATT Agreement. 
Paragraph 4 of GATT Article III states that: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any 
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded 
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use. 
According to Wang, this paragraph in GATT Article III is the most significant in 
creating the “background and terminology of national treatment of the GATS”.371 
Again, the exceptions given to the WTO's Agreement member states may weaken the 
full implementation of national treatment to like products, as will be discussed later. 
The second area is Oman’s obligation to apply national treatment in trade in services for 
foreign investment of all WTO members, as stated in Article XVII of GATS:  
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers 
of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service 
suppliers. 
Therefore, the only condition for national treatment is to apply treatment not less 
favourable. It is pointed out that the purpose of the national treatment clause is to oblige 
a host state to make no negative differentiation between foreign and national 
investors.372 In addition, according to this article, the words “in the sectors inscribed in 
its schedule” means that Oman is not obliged to apply national treatment to service 
sectors not scheduled; therefore, the Sultanate would not be violating the national 
treatment rule under the GATS agreement if it took discriminatory measures against 
services and service suppliers of any other WTO Members in those sectors.373  
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The third area in which the national treatment principle is applied in trade relates to 
intellectual property rights. Oman would be in breach of its commitments under the 
TRIPs Agreement if it offered foreign investors treatment less favourable than it granted 
to its own citizens in protecting the intellectual property rights of foreign investment, as 
stated in Article 3.1 of the Agreement: “Each Member shall accord to the nationals of 
other Members treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals 
with regard to the protection of intellectual property”. 
However, it should be noticed that one weak aspect of the application of this principle 
in the area of goods, services, or item of intellectual property under the WTO 
agreements is that the national treatment rule only applies once products entered the 
market. Therefore, Oman has the right to charge customs duty at the import stage 
without being deemed to have violated the principle of national treatment, even if it 
does not apply an equivalent tax on its national products.374 This can regarded as a 
challenge for foreign investors unless they are protected by a BIT, FTA or regional 
agreement with Oman. Therefore, although it is argued that the national treatment 
obligations under the GATS are binding on both pre-entry and post-entry measures, 
Wang argues that the non-generality of the application of the principle under the GATS 
weakens its value.375  One difference between national treatment in the case of goods 
and of services is that in the former case it is unqualified, whereas in the latter certain 
sectors and sub-sectors are the subject of specific commitments recorded in the schedule 
of commitments of each Member.  
Despite their previous reservations about the principle of national treatment, developed 
countries now tend to include the national treatment principle in their investment 
treaties, since most economic sectors in developing countries are now controlled by 
nationals. Consequently, in recent years there has been a tendency among developed 
countries to raise the issue of international responsibility “on the basis of 
discrimination” due to the host country’s failure to provide treatment no less favourable 
than that it accords to its own nationals to foreign investors.376  
The significance of the principle of national treatment as a tool to protect foreign 
investment can be seen in the significant number of cases arising from investment 
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treaties in which it is claimed that this has been violated.377 The Tribunal in the case of 
Methanex Corporation v USA illustrates the difficulty of applying the national treatment 
principle when dealing with WTO agreements due to the failure to use the terms used in 
the WTO or GATT agreements.378 The Tribunal found that the term “like products” as it 
appears in GATT Article III is different from the term “like circumstances”, which was 
used as a key element in granting non-discriminatory treatment to foreign investment.379 
The Tribunal made clear that the words “in like circumstances” mean that the Tribunal 
should compare the foreign investor to those most closely comparable among domestic 
investors.380 In this case, Methanex as a manufacturer of methanol should be compared 
to other US-based methanol manufacturers in similar circumstances. The Tribunal did 
not accept that Methanex should be compared with manufacturers of all gasoline 
additives.381 Therefore, the GATT term “like products” could not be applied in this 
All Oman’s BITs call on the contracting parties to apply the national treatment standard. 
For example, Article 3.1 of the Oman-UK BIT, Article 4.1 of the Oman-India BIT, 
Article 3.1,2 of the Oman-Korea BIT, and Article 3.2 of the Oman-Germany BIT all 
oblige Oman to accord the investment and investors of those countries treatment not 
less favourable than is accorded to Omani investors. In addition, some BITs define what 
would be regarded as less favourable treatment, in an attempt to provide helpful 
clarification in case of future dispute. For example, Article 3.3 of the Oman-Germany 
BIT specifies the situations which should be considered as less favourable treatment: 
[U]nequal treatment in the case of restrictions on purchase of raw or auxiliary materials, 
of energy or fuel or of means of productions or operations of any kind, unequal 
treatment in the case of impeding the marketing of products inside or outside the 
country. 
However, each BIT includes its own exceptional situations in which national treatment 
of the other contracting party does not apply. These exceptions relate mostly to customs 
and tax matters such as Article 3.3 of the Oman-Korea BIT and Article 4.3 of the 
Oman-India BIT. In addition, Article 3.3. of the Oman-Germany BIT grants each 
contracting state the right not to apply the principle of national treatment on three 
grounds: “public security, public health or morality”. This article raises two issues: first, 
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these exceptions potentially permit less favourable treatment on the specified grounds of 
public security, public health or morality. Therefore, this might weaken the article by 
granting both parties the latitude to not apply the national treatment standard on these 
grounds. A question also arises as to the situation if Oman took a less favourable 
measure against German investment or investors in Oman, but it was not included under 
one of the less favourable treatment articles mentioned above. 
It is worth noting that Article 2.3 on national treatment of the FTA between the GCC 
and Singapore applied national treatment in accordance with Article III of the GATT 
1994.382 In addition, it took a similar approach of applying exceptions to national 
treatment as it states clearly in Article 6.4.3: 
The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not apply to customs duties 
and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation, the method of 
levying such duties and charges, other import regulations and formalities, and measures 
affecting trade in services other than laws, regulations, procedures and practices 
regarding government procurement covered by this Chapter.    
3.3.2 Protection offered under MFN provisions 
The role of the MFN standard is to ensure that the contracting parties treat members' 
investments and investors in a way at least as favourable as they treat third parties.383 
Thus, the standard ensures equally favourable treatment by the host state for all foreign 
investors of different nationalities.384 Oman is normally obliged by the WTO 
agreements not to discriminate among WTO members by granting one or some of its 
trading partners favourable treatment, such as applying lower customs duties.385  
However, the application of MFN in Oman's international agreements can be divided 
mainly into two kinds: a full MFN guarantee and agreements that include exceptions.386 
Under the first group, Oman is bound by Article 31 of the GCC Economic Agreement 
which prohibits Member States from granting MFN treatment exceeding that granted in 
the Agreement to Member States. Therefore, Oman is not allowed to offer in its BITs or 
FTAs any better treatment to any country than that which is granted to GCC Member 
States. Thus, although the agreements established between the GCC Member States 
should work within the WTO framework, these effectively grant the GCC Member 
States preferential treatment compared to that accorded by the WTO agreements.  
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In addition, Article 10.4 (1, 2) of the Oman-USA FTA obliges both parties to grant the 
investor and investment of each party treatment not less favourable than that which it 
accords in like circumstances, to investors of any non-party. This means that Oman can 
be found to have breached its obligations under the FTA investment chapter if it grants 
investors from GCC Member States more favourable treatment with regard to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or 
other disposition of investments.  
However, the significant example of the exceptions applied to Oman's commitment in 
providing MFN is under the WTO agreement and Oman's BITs. The application of the 
MFN principle can be found in all three main areas under the WTO agreement. First, 
Article I of the GATT obliges Oman to accord MFN treatment in the trade of goods to 
like products of other WTO Members. Second, Article II of the GATS obliges Oman to 
afford treatment that is no less favourable than that which is granted to nationals 
regarding the trade in services, as defined by the first article of this agreement. Third, 
Article 4 of the TRIPS obliges Oman to extend any benefits accorded to one state with 
regard to the protection of intellectual property rights to all WTO members. 387 
Nevertheless, the exceptions included in the WTO agreements can be considered as 
weaknesses in applying MFN under these agreements. For example, if an FTA is 
established, countries can enjoy favourable treatment in the trade between them, 
allowing them to exclude products from outside. This exception would cover Oman’s 
FTA with the United States and the GCC FTA with Singapore. Moreover, Oman can 
grant developing countries special access to its market.388 Oman can also increase 
barriers against products that are regarded to be unfairly handed by particular 
countries.389 Finally, all WTO members are allowed to declare exemptions from the 
MFN standard lasting up to 10 years according to Article II Paragraph 6 of GATS,390 
which obviously weakens this obligation. As a result, Oman can rely on these 
exceptions to exclude itself from applying MFN under the WTO.  
In addition, bilateral negotiations tend to pose a challenge to the application of MFN, 
since they do not extend the MFN to other countries in the WTO which are not parties 
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in the negotiation. This is because of the lack of transparency and the fact that the 
negotiation reflects the interest of the two countries.391 Therefore, Voon argues that 
regional or free trade agreements have negatively affected MFN treatment and the non-
discrimination principle, to the extent that MFN has become the exception rather than 
the rule.392 This is because almost all WTO members accord MFN treatment to specific 
members through such agreements.393 It can be argued conversely that BITs and FTAs 
enhance the application of the MFN between the contracting states. Shill maintains that 
the MFN principle plays an important role in elevating the foreign investment 
protection in BITs to a multilateral level.394   
All Oman’s BITs contain MFN provisions. For example, Article 3.1 of the Oman-UK 
BIT, Article 3.2 of the Oman-Germany BIT, Article 2.3 of the Oman-Netherlands BIT, 
Article 2.4 of Oman-Austria BIT, and Oman’s other BITs oblige Oman to accord the 
investment and investors from those countries treatment not less favourable than that 
which is accorded to any third party investment or investors. These articles in Oman’s 
BITs with other countries would enable foreign investors from those countries to benefit 
from any favourable treatment granted to a third party. However, the exceptions set out 
in specific clauses within each BIT weaken the full application of MFN to these 
countries. A clear example of this is the Oman-Netherlands BIT which states in Article 
2.4 that:  
If a Contracting Party has accorded special advantages to nationals or persons of any 
third State by virtue of agreements establishing customs unions, economic unions or 
similar institutions, or on the basis of interim agreements leading to such unions or 
institutions, that Contracting Party shall not be obliged to accord such advantages to 
nationals or persons of the other Contracting Party. 
Thus, in such cases, Oman is relieved of the obligation to provide MFN treatment; the 
same is true of the exceptions mentioned in each BIT. As a result, according to 
interviews with an Omani policymaker and a foreign investor, it seems that MFN 
treatment is accorded fully in practice only to foreign investors from the GCC Member 
States and the USA.395 
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However, to what extent are the effects of an MFN clause included in other treaties?  
There are two arguments in this regard. Dolzer and Schreuer note that, in practice, no 
tribunal has allowed the invocation of the principle in a way that has led to a regime 
change to the basic treaty, including the MFN clause. They argue that the MFN clause 
will apply only to the extent that “the provision in the other treaty is compatible in 
principle with the scheme negotiated by the parties in the basic treaty”.396 This means 
there is a need to understand the circumstances which make both treaties “compatible in 
principle”.397  
Others argue, however, that the MFN clause should operate in all areas of other treaties 
to which the state is a signatory, “regardless of any comparison or judgement on 
compatibility”.398 So, to what extent might foreign investors benefit from the MFN 
clause? Although Subedi notes that the latest trend is in favour of extending the MFN 
rules to cover the areas of jurisdiction and administration of justice, the different views 
given by international investment tribunals kept the door open. For example, the 
International Institute of Sustainable Development's (IISD) Model International 
Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development adopts the approach that the 
MFN clause should be applied to substantive but not procedural provisions.399 
Therefore, it is believed that whether MFN treatment would cover dispute settlement 
provisions is a very controversial issue. Hence, it is suggested that exclusion of dispute 
settlement from the application of MFN to should be clearly stated.400  
In Emilio Agustin Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain (Maffezini)401 the case involved a 
dispute concerning the interpretation of an MFN clause in an Argentina-Spain BIT. The 
wording of the MFN article in the treaty adopted the broad approach,402 as is the case 
for most of Oman’s BITs, and the ICSID Tribunal rejected the respondent’s claim of a 
narrow interpretation of the principle. The ICSID Tribunal decided that, by virtue of the 
MFN clause of the 1991 Argentina-Spain BIT, the claimant had the right to import the 
more favourable jurisdictional provisions of the 1991 Chile-Spain Agreement and 
concluded that: 
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[I]f a third-party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes that are more 
favourable to the protection of the investor’s rights and interests than those in the basic 
treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the most favoured nation 
clause as they are fully compatible with the ejusdem generis principle.403 
Therefore, the practice of international tribunals in this case decided that this broader 
interpretation of the MFN was applicable. Consequently, this ruling should provide 
more protection for all state parties that are signatories to BITs with Oman containing 
MFN treatment provisions. It is observed that even before the Maffezini case, the MFN 
treatment provisions were understood to extend the benefits granted by one state to all 
states which have concluded BITs, including the MFN standard “applicable to that 
benefit”.404  
3.3.3 Protection offered under the international minimum standards treatment 
provisions  
In order to evaluate clearly the role of international minimum standards as an obligatory 
principle of foreign investment legislation applying to the Sultanate it is necessary to 
first identify the various interpretations that exist of the concept of international 
minimum standards. Sornarajah notes that the idea that specific international minimum 
standards of foreign investment exist in customary law, the violation of which incurs 
state liability, remains highly contentious.405 This is due to the fact that some argue it is 
difficult to identify the content of international minimum standards.406  
Although the WTO agreements do not use the words “international minimum 
standards” specifically in their provisions, it is argued that the doctrine of state 
responsibility is used to apply not only to minimum but also maximum standards of 
treatment in international treaties such as the WTO agreements.407 Therefore, it is clear 
that the WTO agreements themselves represent minimum standards of protection to be 
provided by the signatory states. A significant example of this is the TRIPS agreement 
that establishes these standards by requiring member countries to comply with the 
substantive obligations of the WIPO agreements, together with the Paris and the Berne 
Conventions.408 
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Therefore, Ewing-Chow takes a broader view, arguing that the violation of international 
agreements, such as those within the WTO framework, is covered under investment 
treaties and breaching these would be regarded as a violation of international minimum 
standards of treatment and therefore, a breach of international law. Consequently, if a 
host state breaches the terms of a WTO agreement the foreign investor can take action 
against it on the basis of a violation of international minimum standards by using 
investment treaty arbitration, without the need pressurise the home state to take action 
under the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).409  
However, there is considerable debate as to whether the international minimum 
standards is the origin of the principle of fair and equitable treatment or not. Some 
believe that fair and equitable treatment is merely the international minimum standards 
and others say fair and equitable treatment is an independent standard.410 This chapter 
takes the approach that the principle of international minimum standards is the origin of 
fair and equitable treatment because currently it is widely included under international 
minimum standards. This can be seen in the interpretation applied by the NAFTA, 
Singapore-USA FTA,411 and declared clearly under Article 10.5 of the Oman-USA FTA 
as mentioned above. The wording under the Oman-USA FTA is similar to that of 
Article 1105 of the NAFTA.412  Muchlinski observes that this paragraph is a response to 
the suggestion made by NAFTA's arbitral decisions that the international minimum 
standard is additive to the international law standard.413 In addition, Saleem argues that 
the broad interpretation of minimum international standards by international tribunals 
led countries like the USA and Canada to restrict the interpretation of the principle by 
referring in their agreements to the interpretation of the principle applied in international 
customary law.414  
However, it seems that the use of the principle of “fair and equitable treatment” in 
Oman's BITs instead of the principle of international minimum standards is merely the 
converse of this. Oman’s BITs do not use the term “international minimum standard”; 
instead, some of them call for a treatment in accordance with “fair and equitable 
treatment” and declare the investment shall enjoy “full protection and security”. This 
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wording can be found in the BITs relating to Oman-UK (Article 2.2), Oman-Germany 
(Article 2.2) and Oman-Netherlands (Articles 2.2 and 2.3). Other BITs request parties to 
provide “fair and equitable treatment”, for example the Oman-Sweden BIT (Article 
2.3), the Oman-Brunei BIT (Article 2.3) and the Oman-India BIT (Article 3.2). 
Therefore, Vandevelde observes that it is rare for a dispute to be raised in BIT 
arbitration relying on the breach of international minimum standards.415  
Nevertheless, according to Article 10.5 paragraph 1 of Oman-USA FTA, Oman is 
obliged to accord American investment and investors treatment in accordance with 
customary international law, including two kinds of standards: fair and equitable 
treatment, and full protection and security. Therefore, paragraph 1 makes it obvious that 
both of these principles are understood to form part of international minimum standards. 
Although it has been argued that this paragraph applies international minimum 
standards as a part of the fair and equitable standard,416 the aforementioned Oman-USA 
FTA paragraph declares the opposite.  
It can be argued that the Oman-USA FTA adopts a narrow definition of the concept of 
international minimum standards, as it states clearly in Article 10.5.3 of the FTA that: 
A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of 
a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this 
Article. 
This article clearly seeks to prevent the possibility of a dispute occurring on the basis of 
a breach of international minimum standards if either contracting party breaches another 
provision of the FTA, or a separate international agreement. Therefore, it would be 
helpful for the states that are party to an investment treaty to clarify the scope of the 
minimum standards.417 
It seems that this narrow interpretation of this principle arose because the US lawyers 
who submitted the first draft418 of this agreement benefited from the past experience of 
controversial interpretation of this article, when the Tribunal in SD Myer, Inc. v 
Government of Canada ruled that a violation of the national treatment standard meant a 
violation of the minimum standard.419 The main point in the criticism made by the 
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USA's lawyers on the ruling was that the international minimum standard is merely 
international customary law.420 Therefore, for greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes 
the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the 
minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. Article 10.5 
Paragraph 2 of the Oman-USA FTA emphasises that the meaning of the minimum 
standard of treatment in Paragraph 1 is the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens,421 in order to avoid such an interpretation by 
international tribunals. In addition, the concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and 
“full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that 
which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights.  
Subedi maintains that it is difficult to assume that such an agreement between the US 
and other parties regarding the interpretation and scope of the minimum standards of 
treatment is an accurate application of international customary law.422 For Sornarajah, 
applying the principle of international minimum standard is problematic when it comes 
to investment protection because of the lack of clarity of the contents.423 This view is 
supported by tribunals’ opinion that the international minimum standards are capable of 
being developed in the modern context; they are not static.424  
Consequently, one purpose of FTAs is to provide guidance on how to interpret some of 
the key principles of foreign investment in the case of disputes between parties.425 
Hence, it seems that the US FTA’s approach is to define the scope and the nature of the 
principle of international minimum standards, in order to avoid any disappointing 
interpretation by the international tribunal.426 One of these controversial areas is the 
balance between providing the international minimum standard of treatment including 
“fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” and the host country's 
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right to apply its national laws. In the Al-Tamimi case, the Tribunal made this 
differentiation clear by stating that: 
A State must be permitted to take a legal position in relation to the alleged or perceived 
violation of its existing laws, even if that position turns out ultimately to be wrong, 
provided it does so in good faith and with appropriate due process. To impose 
international liability in such a context would significantly undermine States’ long-
recognised right to reasonably exercise their police powers to enforce existing laws.427 
More clearly, the Tribunal stated that: 
The Tribunal agrees with the Respondent’s submission that the number of 
environmental citations previously issued against the Claimant make plain that both his 
arrest and prosecution were undertaken by the State authorities for a legitimate purpose, 
rather than the furtherance of a covert political agenda.428  
The important question raised in Al-Tamimi by the Tribunal, referring to Article 10.5 of 
the Oman-USA FTA is which party has the burden of establishing the content of an 
applicable rule of customary international law?429 The United States argues that the 
minimum standard of treatment incorporated in Article 10.5 reflects a standard that 
develops from State practice and opinio juris, as expressly stated in Annex 10-A, rather 
than an autonomous, treaty-based standard.430 According to Article 10.5 of the FTA the 
burden is on a claimant to prove that this custom has become binding on the other party, 
since the claimant is the party who relies on a custom.431 The Tribunals applying Article 
1105 of NAFTA Chapter 11 in many cases such as in Cargill Inc. v. Mexico, ADF v. 
United States, Glamis Gold v. United States, and Methanex v. United States, confirm 
that a party who intends to rely on a rule of international customary law must prove its 
existence.432 Moreover, a tribunal must look to the elements set forth in Annex 10-A; 
specifically, the “general and consistent practice of States that they follow out of a sense 
of legal obligation,” taking into consideration as well the criteria recognized by the 
ICJ.433 Then, the claimant must show that the respondent has engaged in conduct that 
breached the established rule.434 
However, it is worth commenting that the burden of proof of the content of customary 
international law remains an outstanding issue. For example, Judge de Castro's dictum 
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in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v 
Iceland) case states that: 
International customary law does not need to be proved; it is of a general nature and is 
based on a general conviction of its validity [...]  Only regional customs or practices, as 
well as special customs, have to be proved.435 
The ICJ states that: 
[T]he burden of establishing and proving rules of international law cannot be imposed 
upon any of the parties, for the law lies within the judicial knowledge of the Court.436 
On the other hand, some argue that the more widespread the practice of international 
customary rule, the less proof is needed, and the less widespread the practice, the more 
proof is needed. In addition, where the practice is not at all widespread, the onus is upon 
the party seeking to rely on it to prove it.437  
The Tribunal in Al-Tamimi found Oman did not breach the minimum standard of 
treatment, and it was not in violation of Article 10.5 of the Oman-USA FTA. The 
Tribunal's reasoning in its decision was as follows: 
There has, in short, been no credible evidence presented to the Tribunal that the 
Respondent was responsible for any loss or damage to any property at the Claimant’s 
quarry site, or otherwise failed to act reasonably to protect the Claimant’s property. 
There is no evidence that Oman encouraged or fostered any looting or vandalism at the 
quarry site. To the extent that the Claimant was willing to abandon his property, he 
cannot equally assert that the Respondent failed to take steps to preserve it.438    
It is clear that this conclusion of the Tribunal shows that the Tribunal investigated 
whether Oman failed to provide “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security”, even though it did not state it clearly. Therefore, it can be argued that because 
the wording of the international minimum standards provision under the FTA contains 
specific details, the Oman-USA FTA would provide more clarity in a case of 
arbitration, compared with the international minimum standard under other Oman’s 
international agreements. For example, this is clear as 10.5.2 (a) of the FTA, which 
provides what “fair and equitable treatment” includes or 10,5,2 (b) on what “full 
protection and security” requires are ultimately intended to provide clarity and enable 
consistent interpretation, and are expected to help achieve better foreign investment 
protection. This is clear in Article 10.5.4, 5 and 6 by organising the treatment of foreign 
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investment and investors during armed conflict or civil strife, in order to limit the 
possibility of ambiguity and minimise the likelihood of incorrect interpretation by 
international tribunals. 
3.4 The Threat of Expropriation 
3.4.1 Evaluating the strength of protection from expropriation in the agreements 
The large number of BITs signed by Oman is assumed to provide greater protection for 
foreign investment from unfair expropriation and all of these have provisions covering 
protection from unfair expropriation.439 In addition, Article 10.6 of the Oman-USA FTA 
provides protection from expropriation in accordance with international customary law 
as a basic protection for foreign investment. It can be noticed that these BITs signed by 
Oman with other countries follow a similar pattern in expropriation provisions,440 by 
admitting the host country’s right to expropriation on the basis of its sovereignty over 
its own territory, and provide almost the same conditions, namely, that the expropriation 
should be “for a public purpose in accordance with law on a non-discriminatory basis 
and against prompt, fair and equitable compensation”, with more detail given in the 
Oman-USA FTA. However, there is no clause on expropriation in the Oman-Pakistan 
BIT. Therefore, the protection of foreign investment in the issue of expropriation is less 
under the Oman-Pakistan BIT, compared with Oman's other BITs. In addition, although 
the GCC-Singapore FTA does not contain an expropriation clause, it cannot be claimed 
that it offers less protection, because it contains a substantive chapter of dispute 
settlement. 
 
The treaties set out conditions defining the cases in which the host state can apply 
expropriation. Importantly, under Article 10.6 (1), the Oman-USA FTA adds a fourth 
condition that is: “in accordance with due process of law and Article 10.5.1 through 
10.5.3.” Those four conditions in Oman’s BITs and under Article 10.6.1 of the FTA are 
crucial in eliminating the chances of expropriation and nationalization by Oman, which 
the host state should consider before taking any such action. More important, in the Al-
Tamimi case, the Tribunal made clear that these four conditions are "conjunctive rather 
than disjunctive" and should be "satisfied before an expropriation may be considered 
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lawful".441 This clarification by the Tribunal reduces the chance of expropriation by the 
host state and therefore, provides more protection for foreign investors.  
With regard to the condition, “in accordance with due process of law” under Oman-
USA FTA, the difficulty is that what can be regarded as a due process in a one country 
may not in another, as every state has different procedures to determine what is justice, 
and those procedures may produce different final judgments.442 In Bank Melli Iran v 
Pahlavi, a US court stated, "A foreign judgment cannot be enforced if it was obtained in 
a manner that did not accord with the basics of due process."443 Therefore, it can be 
agued that the condition of due process is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it 
contains a protection of foreign investors' rights. On the other hand, it may become a 
weapon that can be used by foreign investors, especially during a difficult time between 
the host state and the home state, as the investor may seek the help of his home country 
using its judiciary institution. A foreign investor may bring an arbitration case against 
the host state under the relevant BIT or FTA because of "fundamental breaches of due 
process."444 
However, to solve the mentioned difficulty it is stated that international due process 
consists of "certain minimum standards in the administration of justice" with regard to 
the "elementary fairness and general application in the legal systems".445 In Society of 
Lloyd's v Ashenden the court referred to "a concept of fair procedure simple and basic 
enough to describe the judicial processes of civilized nations".446  In addition, Kotuby 
believes that currently it has become more common among national courts to apply the 
international concept of due process.447  
A more fundamental question concerns what constitutes expropriation. This has been 
defined and argued widely in international tribunals and among scholars, as referring to 
not only the direct taking of foreign investors’ property, but also any means used to 
neutralize the use or the benefit of the property of foreign investors, including 
“constructive taking”, “regulatory taking” or “creeping expropriation”, also known as 
indirect expropriation.448  
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Therefore, Article 10.6.1 of the Oman-USA FTA includes the words “either directly or 
indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation”. This constitutes a strong and 
comprehensive statement that if Oman takes any measures considered equivalent to 
expropriation of American investment and investors, this will be regarded as a breach of 
the FTA. Therefore, there is no need to rely on customary international law or the 
international tribunal to define whether an action is regarded as expropriation or not. In 
the Al-Tamimi case, the Tribunal stated that: 
Any claim for indirect expropriation based on the Respondent’s actions after 17 
February 2009 would also have to confront the express stipulation in Annex 10-B.4 (b) 
of the US– Oman FTA that non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a State designed 
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, including protection of the 
environment – and, the Tribunal infers, the enforcement of Omani private property laws 
– do not constitute indirect expropriations.449  
Therefore, action by Oman as a host country will not constitute an indirect 
expropriation in this case, provided two conditions are met, that the Omani government 
action is non-discriminatory, and the protection of public welfare objective is legitimate. 
However, if one of these conditions is not met, Oman will be committing indirect 
expropriation, even if the other condition is met. For example, if the action of Oman 
against a foreign investor was on the basis of a legitimise protection of public welfare 
objective, such as the protection of environment, but the action was on a discriminatory 
basis, the Omani government would be accountable. As another example, if the action 
by Oman against a foreign company was a non-discriminatory regulatory action but 
without serving legitimate protection of public welfare objectives, Oman as a party 
would be responsible for indirect expropriation. Nevertheless, it can be argued that all 
the host state's actions must be assumed non-discriminatory and legitimate unless it is 
proved otherwise by a foreign investor or claimant. 
The Al-Tamimi case raised a debatable issue of whether an action by a governmental 
company can be attributed to the government of Oman. The Tribunal rejected the 
Claimant's claim that unlawful expropriation of his investment took place through a 
series of measures carried out by Oman. The Tribunal found that: 
[T]he conduct of OMCO, including its commercial decision to terminate the OMCO–
Emrock Lease Agreement on 17 February 2009, cannot be attributed to the Respondent. 
OMCO did not exercise the necessary regulatory, administrative or governmental 
authority for its actions to be considered those of the Omani State.450  
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There are two arguments on the conclusion of the Tribunal. Saleem argued that the 
conclusion of the Tribunal in Al-Tamimi could be challenged on the basis that 
governmental companies play an important role in investment issues and they tend to 
establish contracts with foreign investors; a similar argument was raised in the Maffezini 
case.451 In addition, Articles 5 and 8 of the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts govern such acts, as the Draft reflects international 
customary law.452 Article 5 the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts states that:  
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but 
which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental 
authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law, provided the 
person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance. 
Article 8 of the Draft states that: 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, 
or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the conduct. 
It can be argued in counter that this dispute was governed by the Oman-USA FTA. In 
addition, the Draft article on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
is not binding, whereas the Oman-USA FTA is an international agreement binding on 
both parties. Furthermore, the Tribunal in Al-Tamimi investigated this issue and rightly 
decided that the case was ruled by Article 10.1.2 of the Oman-USA FTA, which states:  
A Party’s obligations under this Section shall apply to a state enterprise or other person 
when it exercises any regulatory, administrative, or other governmental authority 
delegated to it by that Party. 
It is clear that this article intends to apply narrow approach to exclude governmental 
companies from having a party's obligations. In addition, the FTA is a private 
agreement that has precedence over the general rules of international law. The Tribunal 
stated:  
[I]t is clear that the central element of the expropriation claim is the termination of the 
OMCO–SFOH and OMCO– Emrock Lease Agreements.453  
[I]n the language of Annex 10-B.2, there can be no expropriation because there has been 
no relevant action or series of actions by Oman which interfered with a tangible or 
intangible property right at Jebel Wasa.454 
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[T]he legality of OMCO’s termination of the OMCO–Emrock Lease Agreement must be 
resolved as a matter of private contractual law, not public international law.455 
It is argued that home states aim to control the sovereignty of the host state by insisting 
that international law governs the international agreement and by applying the 
stabilization clause. 456 However, there is a need to strike a balance between two issues; 
first, Oman is a sovereign state, a member of the United Nations and entitled to apply its 
national laws in its territory. Second, foreign investors who possess and spend 
considerable amounts of money deserve, in return, compensation of an amount 
considered appropriate, in compliance with the regulations of the UN Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974. In addition, it is pointed out that there is a 
distinction between the host state's temporary interference with property rights as a 
legitimate exercise of regulatory powers over its own territory and the case of the 
permanent deprivation of the foreign investor's property rights.457  
According to Sattoriva, the non-expropriatory standard of treatment incorporated in 
international investment agreements has played an important role in the considerable 
change in the protection of foreign investment in the last few decades.458 Therefore, 
BITs and FTAs offer greater protection of foreign investment. As Subedi argues, the 
law on foreign investment has been internationally understood as the law included in 
BITs and regional investment treaties, not as that incorporated in international soft law 
instruments.459  
3.4.2 The issue of compensation 
Most of Oman’s BITs and the Oman-USA FTA apply the same conditions for 
compensation, which must be “prompt, adequate, and effective”. This is because most 
BITs concluded after 1960 apply the Hull Formula with regard to the standard of 
compensation for expropriation favoured by investors' home countries. Although 
Oman’s BITs and its FTA with the USA are its main strong obligatory international 
agreements with regard to compensation, the challenge is that there is a lack of an 
international formation of a definite principle on the issue of compensation for 
expropriation of property, due to the absence of a multinational treaty or a uniform 
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customary practice or sufficiently strong sources of international law such as treaty and 
custom.460  
 
One of the reasons that led to the failure to formulate a multinational treaty on 
investment protection was disagreement on the standards of compensation to be offered 
for expropriated property.461 While some scholars, such as Brownlie, tried to establish 
standards for compensation according to international law, others believe that there are 
no clear guidelines on the standards of compensations.462 This deficiency may weaken 
the effectiveness of compensation as a tool for protection of foreign investment. In 
Metalclad Corp. v United Mexican States, on the basis of Chapter 11 Article 1110 of 
NAFTA the arbitral tribunal awarded the foreign investor (Metalclad) compensation on 
the basis that the denial of Metalclad's permit by the Mexican government was a 
violation of the principle of fair treatment provided under Article 1105 of NAFTA, 
having established expropriation under Article 1110 of NAFTA.463 This ruling was 
criticised on the basis that the tribunal interpreted Article 1110 harshly and considered a 
lawful regulatory act as an expropriation, which would render states unable to protect 
their national environment and public health.464   
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has issued two 
draft conventions on the limitations of expropriation and the rule of prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation.465 However, Oman is not a member of the OECD. In 
addition, Oman’s BITs and the FTA contain different criteria governing the 
compensation. Most of Oman’s BITs contain an obligation on contracting parties to 
provide prompt and effective compensation, without defining the rules to guide the 
parties and tribunals in this regard, leaving scope for disagreement between the parties 
or for different interpretations among tribunals.  
 
Nevertheless, it can be said that the Oman’s BITs with Germany and Netherlands and 
Oman-USA FTA are good examples of attempts to define and delimit the issue of 
compensation. Article 4.2 of the Oman-Germany BIT and Article 4 (c) of the Oman- 
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Netherlands BIT. Both of these include the condition that in case of expropriation, the 
host state should provide compensation equivalent to the expropriated investment 
before the actual expropriation or the threat of it becomes publicly known. This is good 
because it refers to a specific period and so minimizes the chances for the host state to 
delay paying compensation. Thus, if, for example, Oman decides to expropriate German 
or Dutch investors and this becomes known to the public before compensation is made, 
it will be regarded as a violation of the BIT terms. This condition is not contained in 
other Omani BITs.  
 
Other examples of good protection for foreign investors are the conditions on 
compensation contained in the Oman-USA FTA, which require that compensation 
“should be paid without delay”466, “must be equivalent to the fair market value of the 
expropriated investment, immediately before the expropriation took place (the date of 
expropriation)”467, “must not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended 
expropriation had become known earlier”468, and “must be fully realizable and freely 
transferable”.469 It is asserted that “the fair market value must be no less than the fair 
market value on the date of expropriation, plus interest at a commercially reasonable 
rate for that currency, accrued from the date of expropriation until the date of 
payment”470.  
 
In addition, if the fair market value is denominated in a currency that is not freely usable 
the value applicable will be the fair market value on the date of expropriation, converted 
into a freely usable currency at the market rate of exchange prevailing on that date, plus 
interest, at a commercially reasonable rate for that freely usable currency, accrued from 
the date of expropriation until the date of payment”471. These conditions included in 
Article 10.6 (2,3 and 4) of the Oman-USA FTA set up all the measures needed to 
provide fair compensation, and to protect foreign investors’ rights by providing the 
necessary degree of clarification. The more clearly the terms of the investment 
agreement define the basis and conditions of the compensation, the more likely this is to 
reduce disagreement between parties and prevent a disappointing interpretation by the 
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international tribunal, as demonstrated by the Oman-USA FTA and Oman’s BITs with 
Germany and the Netherlands.  
In the Al-Tamimi case the Claimant argued that the Omani Government's actions 
destroyed his multi-million dollar investment in the site, in violation of its obligations 
under the U.S.-Oman FTA, and caused losses and damages of approximately $560 
million.472 However, the Tribunal rejected his claim, stating that: 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, and rejecting all claims and submissions to the contrary, 
[…] The Tribunal rejects all of the Claimant’s requests for declaratory and 
compensatory relief.473 
 
Although it cannot be claimed that this award is evidence that Oman guarantees 
compensation, to some extent this ruling is an investigation of Omani government 
practice in cases where compensation was claimed. 
3.5 Issues relating to Taxes, Custom Duties and Money Transfer 
3.5.1 Taxes  
The Omani government has adopted measures to increase the efficiency of its tax 
system and to improve the state’s competitiveness, assumed to be an important 
incentive for foreign investment. This is clearly reflected in the fact that globally Oman 
is ranked tenth from a total of 189 countries, on the ease of paying taxes.474 While 
Oman adopted in 2010 a tax regime to be implemented equally in all companies 
working in Oman, this section examines how Oman's international agreements address 
it. 
Oman's international investment related agreements have three approaches in dealing 
with taxation issues. While Article 3.8 of the GCC Economic Agreement grants the 
advantage for foreign investors from GCC Member States to be treated like Omani 
nationals with regard to taxes,475 some of Oman’s BITs include an exception to the 
MFN and national treatment provisions in relation to tax matters. For example, Article 
3.3 of the Oman-Finland BIT states: “The treatment mentioned above shall not apply to 
any advantage accorded to investors of a third state by either Contracting Party […] or 
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any international agreement or arrangement relating wholly or mainly to taxation”. The 
GCC-Singapore FTA also excludes the provisions of the Agreement from applying to 
any taxation measures.476 The main reason behind excluding tax issues from national 
treatment is that both parties have their binding regional agreements. For example, this 
is the case of Oman with the GCC and the case of Finland with the EU. 
The third approach by some other BITs is to direct the contracting parties on how 
taxation issues are to be dealt with. For example, Article 3.5 of the Oman-Germany BIT 
specifies that income and capital taxes should be dealt with in accordance with the 
provisions of the Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation between the contracting 
states. If there is no such agreement, the host state should apply the national tax law. 
Nevertheless, Oman has signed Agreements for Avoidance of Double Taxation with 32 
countries.477 Generally, the common pattern in investment and taxation agreements is to 
call on the contracting parties to solve claims of unfair taxation by consultation between 
the parties.478  
It has been argued that excessive taxation may be regarded as indirect expropriation by 
the host state. However, others maintain that a uniform increase in taxation should not 
be regarded as a case of expropriation, but only those cases where a foreign investment 
is subjected to a unique and heavy taxation.479 Therefore, the scope of the taxation 
exception has been addressed by only a few tribunals.480 Nevertheless, no known 
taxation case has been brought against Oman.   
3.5.2 Customs duties  
Since 1st January 2003, Oman has been obliged to provide “free movement of goods 
among the GCC States without customs or non-customs restrictions”481 under the 
Implementation Procedures for the GCC Customs Union482 effectively implementing 
the GCC customs union. In addition, it is obliged to apply “A Common External 
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Customs Tariff for products imported from outside of the GCC customs union”.483 This 
tariff consists of “5% on all foreign goods imported from outside of the Customs 
union”.484 In response to its commitments as a member of the WTO and GCC, Oman 
issued the Royal Decree 67/2003 in order to implement the WTO Custom Valuation 
Agreement (CVA) on the basis of the GCC Common Custom Law and its Rules of 
Implementation and Explanatory Notes.485 The transaction value is the first basis on 
which the customs value is defined.486 If this value cannot be determined, it is 
calculated using the methods established by the CVA.487 This Agreement plays an 
important role in providing protection for investors from GCC Member States in Oman, 
and with investors from outside GCC. It is reported that between 80% and 90% of the 
269 customs disputes between Oman and other states during the period from January 
2008 to June 2013 were decided in favour of the importer.488  
Some of Oman’s BITs leave more leeway for the contracting states, by setting out 
exceptions from the granting of MFN treatment to investments and investors from each 
contracting state, if one of them grants any advantage to any investor from a third-party 
state on the basis of a “customs union, common market, free trade zone, regional 
economic agreement, multilateral international agreement or an agreement on avoidance 
of double taxation or facilitation of frontier trade”. This is stated in the BITs that Oman 
has signed with Sweden (Article 3.3), the UK (Article 3.3 a,b), Germany (Article 3.4) 
and Brunei (Article 3.3). Therefore, it may be difficult to say that the excluding of 
custom duties from MFN treatment will weaken the protection accorded to foreign 
investment and investors of states parties in the Sultanate, as this is based on the will of 
all states parties and serves their national economic interest.  
In comparison with these BITs, the Oman-USA FTA provides a number of protective 
measures for foreign investment and investors, improving the level of protection. For 
example, this FTA obliges Oman to publish in advance any regulations governing 
customs matters.489 This will ensure the transparency of the Omani regulations for US 
foreign investment and investors. In addition, it obliges Oman to apply procedures 
providing for the release of goods within a period no greater than that required to ensure 
compliance with its customs laws and, to the extent possible, within 48 hours of 
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arrival.490 Moreover, it does not allow Oman to “increase any existing customs duty, or 
adopt any new customs duty, on an originating good”.491 Oman is also obliged to reduce 
its “customs duties on originating goods, in accordance with its Schedule to Annex 2-
B.”492. Consideration is to be given to accelerating the elimination of custom duties 
upon the request of either party.493 
All these articles guarantee that Oman will reduce its customs duties in accordance with 
the agreed schedule and, at the same time, will not increase its customs duties. 
However, the Oman-USA FTA contains vey specific exceptions, meaning that Oman is 
still bound to honour its commitments to reducing and not increasing customs duties 
under the Agreement. For example, the FTA specifies exceptional situations under 
which both parties can increase customs duty to the level established in its schedule, or 
stop reductions of tariffs, according to Article 2.3.4 (a) and (b) of the FTA. This can 
cover two cases: first, to raise customs duty back to the level established in its Schedule 
to Annex 2-B following a unilateral reduction; or to maintain or increase a customs duty 
as authorized by the DSB of the WTO. In addition, both parties may increase the rate of 
customs duty on a good on condition of not exceeding the lesser of:  
(i) the most-favoured-nation (MFN) applied rate of duty on the good in effect at the time 
the action is taken, and  
(ii) the MFN applied rate of duty on the good in effect on the day immediately preceding 
the date of entry into force of this Agreement.494 
Therefore, it is clear that the customs duties provisions under the Oman-USA FTA 
provide better protection for American investment and investors compared to Oman’s 
BITs. 
3.5.3 Money transfer  
Whilst the issue of money transfer is important as a guarantee for foreign investment, 
the national interest of Oman should be taken into consideration. Therefore, on the one 
hand, Oman has obligations embodied in Article VIII sections 2 and 3 of the Articles of 
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Agreement states in Article 
VIII Section 2 that: “no member shall without the approval of the Fund, impose 
restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international 
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transactions.” Thus, as a member state, Oman is not allowed to impose any restrictions 
on so-called “current transactions”495. In addition, section 3 of the same article states 
that: “No member shall engage in, or permit any of its fiscal agencies referred to in 
Article V, Section 1 to engage in, any discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple 
currency practices”. Hence, Oman is not allowed to impose any restrictions on 
payments and transfers relating to current international transactions, and or to engage in 
any discriminatory arrangements. As a result, due to the full guarantee of money 
transfer in the country, it is reported that the amount of money transferred from Oman 
by expatriates in 2013 was $9.1 billion, and increased in 2014 it to $10.29 billion.496 
Although a great part of this may be related to foreign workers in Oman, it shows the 
ease of money transfer policy in the country. 
With regard to money transfer, Oman is obliged to treat foreign investors from the GCC 
Member States in the same way as its own citizens according to Article 3.7 of the GCC 
Economic Agreement.497 Its BITs with Korea (Article 6.1), the UK (Article 6), 
Germany (Article 6.1,2), India (Article 7.1), and the Netherlands (Article 3), GCC-
Singapore FTA (Article 5.12) and the conditions of the Oman-USA FTA (Article 
10.7.1, 2) oblige Oman to enable money to be transferred freely and without delay in 
accordance with the applicable market rate of exchange on the day of transfer. The 
Oman-Germany BIT contains a back-up procedure to be applied in the absence of a 
foreign exchange market, in which case the parties should apply the rates applied by the 
IMF on the date of payment.498 
Generally, international treaties adopt three basic approaches to money transfer.499 The 
first approach allows foreign investors to transfer capital one year after the money has 
entered the host state. The second approach is to apply restrictions only during 
exceptional financial circumstances that affect the monetary stability of the host state. 
The third approach is not far from the second one; it is to reserve the right of both the 
host and the home country to preserve “the safety, soundness, integrity or financial 
responsibility of financial institutions”. None of Oman BITs adopt the first approach. 
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However, both foreign investors and the host state are greatly concerned about the 
condition of transfer of investors’ funds into and out of the host country.500  
On the other hand, one very important issue that needs to be considered is the right of 
Oman, as the host state, to protect the stability of its national financial market from the 
negative effect of large currency transfers into or out of the state, or sudden short-term 
capital inflows.501 Therefore, it is believed that no treaty grants foreign investors an 
absolute right to transfer.502 Thus, it is observed that in current BIT practice, the 
exceptions to money transfer have become more sophisticated.503 Hence, the Oman-
USA FTA contains very detailed exceptions to the application of free transfer without 
delay, and other guarantees provided under paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 10.7. These 
exceptions are: 
(a) bankruptcy, insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors; (b) 
issuing, trading, or dealing in securities, futures, options, or derivatives; (c) 
criminal or penal offenses; (d) financial reporting or record keeping of transfers 
when necessary to assist law enforcement or financial regulatory authorities; or 
(e) ensuring compliance with orders or judgments in judicial or administrative 
proceedings.504  
Whilst this article set some conditions for prevention of money transfer in the above 
cases, it stipulates that the application of its laws should be equitable, non-
discriminatory, and in good faith. The challenge is how to ensure that these conditions 
are applied fairly. Overall, it can be stated that these exceptions should balance between 
providing the host state with the sovereign right to protect its national interest and at the 
same time not threatening the guarantee provided under this article if state parties apply 
it other than in the manner intended. 
3.6 The Effectiveness of Dispute Settlement Provisions under Oman’s 
International Agreements 
Wang has argued that modern international investment law should be examined by 
investigating the dispute settlement mechanisms relating to international investment.505 
The effectiveness of dispute resolution by the national courts in the host state is always 
doubted, especially in developing countries.506  
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3.6.1 The guarantees and weaknesses under the DSB of the WTO 
Although Oman has been a member of the WTO since 2000, reports show that to date, 
it has not been a party to any dispute in the WTO, with another WTO member either as 
a complainant or defendant.507 In order to evaluate the guarantees provided by the DSB 
in the protection of foreign investment in Oman, it is important to examine two issues. 
Firstly, it is necessary to consider whether the objectives of the dispute settlement 
system cover the needs of foreign investment protection; secondly, and possibly more 
importantly, to consider whether in practice the system achieves these objectives.  
The objectives are contained in Articles 3.2, 3.3 and 3.7 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), and are intended to ensure that the international trading regime is 
secure and predictable, to guarantee the rights and obligations of the WTO members 
under the agreements covered, to make the provisions of the agreements clear and 
interpreted in accordance with customary international law,508 to guarantee prompt 
settlement of disputes between members,509 and to ensure the withdrawal of WTO-
inconsistent measures.510 By putting these objectives in the context of Oman's 
commitments under the WTO agreements, the objectives of the dispute settlement 
system may serve relatively the needs of foreign investment protection; this will be 
analysed further later.  
 
Whether in practice the guarantees of the WTO dispute settlement system can provide 
protection to foreign investment in Oman may raise two points of view. It can be argued 
that the WTO dispute settlement system provides foreign investors and investment in 
Oman with a number of guarantees, which are found in its agreements. At the outset, it 
can be argued that Oman’s membership of the WTO was an important step forward in 
protecting foreign investment in the Sultanate. Under the WTO agreements Oman is 
obliged to resort to the WTO’s dispute procedures in investment disputes involving 
                                                           
507 For example, see WTO (n 340) 10  
508 Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes (DSU), art 3.2 states that:  
“The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element […] to clarify the existing provisions of 
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international Law 
Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided 
in the covered agreements”. 
509 Ibid art 3.3 states that: 
“The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly 
or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is 
essential to the effective functioning of the WTO”. 
510 Ibid art 3.7 states that:  
“In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is 
usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the 
provisions of any of the covered agreements”.  
104 
Oman and other member states. In addition, Oman can also be brought before the DSB 
for breaching WTO regulations with respect to FDI. 
 
The WTO dispute settlement system has the advantage of combining various 
mechanisms and appeal. Specifically, the DSU grants parties to a dispute the right to 
choose how to resolve this from four options: the first three, good offices, conciliation, 
and mediation can begin and be terminated at any time as stated clearly in Article 5. 3 of 
the DSU: “Good offices, conciliation or mediation may be requested at any time by any 
party to a dispute”. The fourth option is arbitration. It is stated in Article 25.2 of the 
DSU that “resort to arbitration shall be subject to mutual agreement of the parties which 
shall agree on the procedures to be followed.”  
 
In comparison, the dispute settlement provisions under most BITs, FTAs and IIAs are 
less flexible and do not provide these instruments.511 The DSB and DSU contain three 
instruments of protection; first, if there is any ruling or recommendation against Oman 
the DSB would monitor the implementation of such rulings and recommendations, 
according to Article 21.6.512 Second, the DSB has the power to authorise retaliation if 
Oman does not comply with a ruling, as stated in Article 22.2 of the DSU.513 BITs and 
FTAs lack both these protective mechanisms. Third, the complaining party may resort 
to the compensation provisions under Article 22.2 of the DSU.514  
 
Foreign investment disputes, however, can benefit from the well-established dispute 
settlement body with its clear sets of responsibilities and authorities under the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO. States must exhaust all possible ways to solve the 
dispute with the state supposedly in breach in an amicable manner in order to invoke the 
DSU.515 Then according to Article 2.1 of the DSU,516 the DSB has the authority to: 
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into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view to 
developing mutually acceptable compensation”. 
515 Christopher Bovis, EC Public Procurement: Case Law and Regulation (1st, OUP 2006) 93 
516 DSU, art 2.1 states that: 
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“establish panels”, and prepare Appellate Body reports', “maintain surveillance on 
implementation of rulings and recommendations”, and “authorize suspension of 
concessions and other obligations under the WTO agreements”. For example, under 
Article 27.2 of the DSU, any developing country Member has the right to request 
additional legal advice and assistance in respect of dispute settlement from the 
Secretariat. Therefore, if any developing country member initiates an investment dispute 
against Oman in the DSB, that country is entitled to qualified legal expert assistance 
from the Secretariat of the WTO. 
 
Despite this limitation, the clear, flexible and relatively quick process of the DSU 
contributes to foreign investment protection. Article 4.3 of the DSU defines the time 
schedule from the beginning of the process of consultations.517 Therefore, for example, 
if a member submits a request for consultations on a dispute with Oman, the latter is 
obliged to reply within 10 days and enter into consultations within a period of no more 
than 30 days from the date of receiving the request. Thus, according to this article, the 
requesting member will not have to wait until the end of the 60-day period set for 
consultations. The period it will have to wait before requesting panel establishment, will 
not exceed 30 days. This speed and flexibility are to the benefit of the foreign investor 
state.  
However, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has also been criticised for not 
providing suitable protection of parties’ rights, thereby casting doubt on its ability to 
provide real protection for foreign investment. The DSU mechanism is to resolve state-
state disputes, as the only possible approach under the WTO dispute resolution 
mechanism is inter-state remedies.518 Hence, unilateral remedies to foreign investors are 
not possible under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.519 As a result, private 
performers in international trade may claim that the existing WTO system does not 
                                                                                                                                                                          
“The Dispute Settlement Body is hereby established to administer these rules and procedures […] 
Accordingly, the DSB shall have the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body 
reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize 
suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements”. 
517 Ibid art 4.3 states that: 
“If a request for consultations is made pursuant to a covered agreement, the Member to which the request 
is made shall, unless otherwise mutually agreed, reply to the request within 10 days after the date of its 
receipt and shall enter into consultations in good faith within a period of no more than 30 days after the 
date of receipt of the request, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. If the Member does 
not respond within 10 days after the date of receipt of the request, or does not enter into consultations 
within a period of no more than 30 days, or a period otherwise mutually agreed, after the date of receipt 
of the request, then the Member that requested the holding of consultations may proceed directly to 
request the establishment of a panel”. 
518 See Bovis (n 515) 93; Sornarajah (n 8) 272  
519 See Bovis (n 515) 93 
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provide justice for them.520 Nevertheless, it is believed that the right for the private 
sector to access the DSB might become real in future.521 At that stage, the WTO DSB 
would serve as a more protective mechanism for foreign investment.  
McRae has argued that the WTO dispute settlement system has “limited effectiveness”, 
for two reasons;522 first, the only remedy that it might provide for the complaining party 
is to make the particular member remove an inconsistent measure. Second, the 
effectiveness of the types of sanction provided, namely, compensation and retaliation, is 
weak. There is much scepticism about whether practical remedies such as compensation 
and retaliation will make the violating country implement the WTO agreements. It is 
believed that compensation under the WTO system does not cover the losses caused by 
the offending measure and it is not “retroactive”. Therefore, according to McRae, 
compensation and retaliation are merely sanctions with a “limited objective”.523 As a 
result, due to the lack of the compensation as a practical option under the WTO DSU, it 
is never used. Although there is limited use of retaliation, it is an incoherent tool, 
especially in view of the difficulties for a country with a small market initiating 
retaliation against a country with massive markets.524 Therefore, Hsueh concludes that 
compensation and retaliation are not effective alternatives for the correction of WTO-
inconsistent measures. They work only as temporary measures to persuade the 
respondent member to fulfil its commitments under the WTO agreements.525  
Therefore, it is believed that the mission of the DSU is merely to stop the illegal act.526 
In addition, one scholar argues that the role of the WTO's DSB with regard to foreign 
investment cases is limited because its scope is restricted to the interpretation of the 
provisions of the TRIMs Agreement. As a result, so far the DSB has dealt with only a 
small number of foreign investment cases.527 However, some argue that the lack of 
practicality and the informal nature of the WTO dispute settlement process contribute to 
the ineffectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement system. These limitations can be 
found in a number of features in the system, such as the “use of email for the exchange 
of pleadings, the use of conference rooms as courtrooms and the relative informality of 
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522 Donald McRae ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement System’ (2008) 3 Asian 
J WTO & Intl Health L & Policy 1, 8  
523 Ibid  
524 Ibid 13 
525 Ching-wen Hsueh, ‘Direct Effect, WTO Compliance Mechanism and the Protection for Individuals: 
Lessons Learned from the EC’ (2009) 4 Asian J WTO & Intl Health L & Pol'y 521, 528  
526 Ibid  
527 Subedi (n 7) 37  
107 
panel and even Appellate Body hearings”.528 As a result, the whole process has become 
no more than a routine way to conduct relations between states, compared with the 
formal and pragmatic process of the ICJ.529  
 
Overall, it can be argued that the DSB under the DSU generally provides soft protection 
for foreign investment, which can be seen through the mentioned doubts as to 
effectiveness and at the same time its advantages as a dispute settlement mechanism. 
For example, it was noted in United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products 530 that “the duty to negotiate a settlement cannot be converted into a 
duty to agree”.531 Therefore, it can be said that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
does not directly and strongly addressing foreign investment cases. As a result, it is not 
the ideal tool to do so. 
3.6.2 The guarantees and weaknesses of the ICJ 
As a member of the United Nations, Oman is ipso facto a party to the ICJ Statute, as 
noted in Article 93 (1) of the United Nations Charter.532 It is therefore bound by the 
ICJ's decisions, as is stated clearly in Article 94 (1) of the Charter: “Each Member of the 
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case to which 
it is a party.” According to Articles 7 and 92 of the United Nations Charter as the 
“principal judicial organ” of the United Nations, the ICJ is entitled also to deal with 
investment disputes. Furthermore, to avoid serious consequences in the case of non-
compliance, Article 94 (2) of the Charter declares that:  
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a 
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security 
Council, which may, if it deems it necessary, make recommendations or decide upon 
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.  
This article shows the strong teeth of the ICJ in a case of enforcement. Enforcement is 
an important role which the ICJ would be able to play in the field of international law 
and it decisions in foreign investment cases. Vannieuwenhuyse argues that the 
enforcement power of the ICJ extends even to the ICSID award; by enforcing ICISD 
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awards in the case of non-compliance in the execution of an ICSID award, the ICJ could 
play significant role.533 In other words, although the foreign investor’s consent to 
arbitration under the ICSID Convention will suspend the right to diplomatic protection 
according to Article 27.1 of the Convention, non-compliance with an ICSID award 
would be a reason to exercise diplomatic protection. For example, if Oman did not 
implement an ICSID dispute award, the foreign investor's home state could use the 
channel of diplomatic protection to bring Oman before the ICJ according to Part II.534 It 
is worth mentioning that the Anglo-American Oil Company535 case showed clearly the 
strength of the ICJ with regard to the protection of foreign investment, since Judge 
Carneiro argued that there must be full compensation granted for expropriated 
property.536  
 
However, Muchlinski has pointed out two shortcomings of ICJ involvement in 
investment-related cases. Firstly, similarly to the difficulty under the WTO system, an 
individual foreign investor has no right to bring a claim against a sovereign state before 
the ICJ since Article 34 (1) of the ICJ Statute says: “only States may be parties to 
contentious cases before the Court”. It seems that this is due to the classical notion of 
public international law that “only states have the right to bring international claims as 
they are the only subjects of that law”.537 The theory is that under international law the 
private individual lacks a legal personality enabling him to take action.538 However, 
Muchlinski argues that a foreign corporation signing a contract with a state is subject to 
international law and entitled to an international legal personality as a foreign 
corporation.539 Nevertheless, no change has been made to the ICJ Statute. Therefore, the 
only recourse for a foreign investor is to convince his home state to take action before 
the ICJ on his behalf. The second criticism, raised by Dean Acheson, the former U.S. 
Secretary of State, concerns the questionable justiciability of the ICJ because of its lack 
of clear criteria; in his view, the ICJ should not interfere in specific politico-legal 
situations which are of essential interest to states.540  
                                                           
533 Gauthier Vannieuwenhuyse, ‘Bringing a Dispute Concerning ICSID Cases and the ICSID Convention 
Before the International Court of Justice’ (2009) 8 Law & Prac Intl Cts & Tribunals 115, 118  
534 Ibid 
535 Anglo-American Oil Company Case (1952) ICJ Reports 93, para 151  
536 See Sornrajah (n 8) 428  
537 Muchlinski (n 217) 704  
538 Ibid 
539 Ibid  
540 Anna Spain, ’Examining the International Judicial Function: International Courts as Dispute 
Resolvers’ (2011) 34 Loy LA Intl & Comp L Rev 5, 16-17  
109 
3.6.3 Protection offered under Oman's BITs provisions 
It can be argued that the dispute settlement mechanism provided under Oman's BITs can 
be regarded as one of the strongest tools of foreign investors' protection in Oman. The 
fact that BITs allow individual foreign investors to take action in an international 
tribunal against states can be seen as a major development in international foreign 
investment law,541 since they no longer need to persuade their home state to take action 
on their behalf against the host state.542 The evidence of this is the hundreds of foreign 
investment cases before international tribunals relying on BITs.  
 
All of Oman’s BITs contain fairly similar provisions dealing with dispute settlement 
because these are derived from a very small number of common sources. These deal 
with two kinds of disputes: those between the contracting states themselves and those 
between the host state and foreign investors. In addition, all Oman’s BITs contain 
arbitration clauses to be applied to resolve disputes’ arising between the contracting 
states. 543  These BITs establish different rules and procedures for disputes between the 
contracting states themselves, and for disputes between contracting states and an 
investor from the other contracting state, another common approach in most 
international BITs.544 For example, Article 7 of the Oman-UK BIT, Article 8 of the 
Oman-Sweden BIT, Article 9 of the Oman-India BIT, and Article 8.2 of the Oman-
Netherlands BIT set rules in the case of a dispute between a state party and an investor 
from the other party. In addition, Article 8 of the Oman-UK BIT, Article 7 of the Oman-
Sweden BIT, Article 10 of the Oman-India BIT and Article 8.1 of the Oman-
Netherlands BIT deal with disputes between the contracting states.  
All of those BITs, bar one, also mention referring the dispute to the ICJ if a specific 
arbitral tribunal has been not been constituted within a period of four months. Only the 
Oman-Netherlands BIT (Article 8.3) does not specify a period of time within which the 
parties should reach an amicable resolution before starting the process of appointing an 
arbitrator from each party, using instead the vague phrase, “a reasonable lapse of time”. 
Failure to specify this period of time may cause problems regarding when to begin 
appointing arbitrators. 
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Although some BITs refer to the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), for example Oman-UK (Article 7), most of Oman’s BITs specify 
ICSID for resolving investment disputes involving one of the contracting states and a 
foreign investor from the other contracting state, to be ruled by the ICSID Convention. 
Examples can be found in Oman’s BITs with Sweden (Article 8.2) and India (Article 
9.3 (a)). Although the period allowed for amicable settlement under the Oman-Germany 
BIT is shorter compared with some other BITs such as the Oman-UK BIT, it offers 
more options for settling disputes between investors and the contracting state, including 
the domestic court of the host state, ICSID, UNCITRAL, the ICC or any form of 
dispute settlement agreed upon by the parties.545 Article 10 of the Oman-Austria BIT 
offers similar dispute settlement mechanisms to the Oman-Germany BIT, for example, 
the 60-day period for amicable settlement, and the jurisdiction over disputes between 
parties. The fact that the UK is the main investor in Oman may explain why the Oman-
UK BIT is more detailed concerning procedures in the event of disputes between the 
contracting states. In contrast, the Oman-Sweden BIT gives more details in the case of 
dispute between an investor and the contracting party. It seems the more detailed the 
dispute settlement process is, the more foreign investment and investors’ rights are 
protected, as there will be less vagueness in a detailed BIT.  
3.6.4 Dispute settlement mechanisms in the Oman-USA FTA 
The FTA between the Sultanate and the USA contains the most detailed and 
comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism of all Oman’s investment and trade 
agreements. Although Chapter 20 of the FTA deals with dispute settlement rules, 
Chapter 10, which focuses on investment, contains its own dispute settlement rules. 
However, the dispute settlement process set out under Section B, Articles 10.15 to 10.26 
is different from that in Article 20. This merits further discussion. Why does Chapter 10 
on investment contain only investor- state disputes and not deal with disputes between 
contracting states? What is the effect on the coherence and unity of the dispute 
settlement system in the agreement, when there are two separate different dispute 
settlement procedures in different chapters? The dispute settlement mechanism under 
Article 10 covers investor-state disputes whilst Article 20 focuses on states parties, 
Article 20.2 noting that: “this Chapter shall apply with respect to the prevention or 
settlement of all disputes between the Parties”. It is worth noting that while the Al-
Tamimi case, filed on 5 December 2011, was the first international dispute on the basis 
                                                           
545 Oman-Germany BIT 2007, art 10 gives three months from the date of receipt of request for settlement.  
111 
of Oman-USA FTA, the dispute lasted for more than four years (2011-2015) before 
ICSID raised any issue related to the lack of coherence and unity of the dispute 
settlement system in the agreement by the parties or the Tribunal. 
Article 10 contains a detailed and organized definition and account of the dispute 
settlement process and the applicable law. It clearly describes the whole dispute 
settlement process, starting with negotiations and consultations (Article 10.14), then the 
arbitration process (Article 10.15), and finally the tribunal’s decision. Oman consents to 
arbitration under Article 10.16. Therefore, if it violates investment rules under Section 
A of Chapter 10 on investment, the foreign investor from the USA has the right to 
submit a claim in accordance with Chapter II of the ICSID Convention, ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules and Article II of the New York Convention.546  
The applicable law is clearly defined under Article 10.21 (1), (2) and (3). The process to 
be followed in case of a dispute is similarly detailed under Article 20, starting with 
consultations (Article 20.5), referral to the joint committee (Article 20.6), establishing a 
panel (Article 20.7), its report (Article 20.9) and implementation of its findings (Article 
20.10), and then compliance review (Article 20.13).  
The dispute settlement process under the FTA provides significant guarantees. In order 
to address the weakness under Oman’s BITs which do not provide parties to the dispute 
with the right to appeal against the panel’s report or the tribunal’s award, the Oman-
USA FTA states under Annex 10-D that the contracting states should consider within 
three years after the date of entry into force of the Agreement establishing a bilateral 
appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered under Article 10.25. 
Therefore, the FTA acknowledges the weakness in the BIT dispute settlement system, 
and the FTA may provide in future better protection for foreign investment compared 
with other BITs by giving the chance for the contracting states to decide on the 
formation of the appellate body.  
Another guarantee provided by Article 20.2 of the agreement is the broad scope of its 
application and its flexibility, since state parties are granted the right to establish a 
dispute settlement process in a number of circumstances: concerning the interpretation 
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or application of this Agreement, or only on the occurrence of one of the following 
cases: if “A measure of the other Party is inconsistent with its obligations”, if “the other 
Party has otherwise failed to carry out its obligations” or “A benefit the Party could 
reasonably have expected to accrue to it […] is being nullified or impaired as a result of 
a measure, whether or not the measure conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement”. 
Therefore, the USA can initiate the dispute process against the Sultanate if it believes 
that one of the mentioned cases has occurred.  
In Al-Tamimi, although the USA was the home state of the claimant, surprisingly it 
made a written submission to address the issue of treaty interpretation, not serve the 
claimant's claim.547 Article 10.19.2 of the U.S.-Oman FTA allows the non-disputing 
Party to make oral and written submissions to a tribunal. The claimant challenged the 
USA submission on two grounds that: "(a) it was untimely;[…] (b) it exceeded the 
United States’ permitted scope of participation under the FTA".548 On 14 October 2014, 
the Tribunal issued Procedural Order No 12 admitting the United States’ submission 
into the record, concluding that the submission was filed within a reasonable time, and 
the tribunal directed the parties to exchange memoranda with respect to the issue of the 
scope of the USA submission.549  
In addition, the agreement does not specify a particular model or forum to be followed 
in order to a settle a dispute. Therefore, discretion rests with the complaining party to 
choose the forum in which to settle the dispute if any matter arises under this 
Agreement, or the WTO Agreement, or any other agreement to which both Parties are 
signatories, as stated in Article 20.4.1.550 Paragraph 2 of this article states that: “The 
complaining Party shall notify the other Party in writing of its intention to bring a 
dispute to a particular forum before doing so.” Therefore, for example, if the USA or its 
investor is the complaining party, it has the advantage of choosing the forum, and its 
only commitment is to notify the Omani party in writing of its intention to bring a 
dispute to a particular forum, without a need to secure the consent of the Omani party. 
Thus, the complaining party (the USA or its investor in this case) has the advantage of 
choosing its legal battleground. 
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Finally, the annual monetary assessment introduced by Article 20.11.5 works as a 
protective measure as this must be paid by the party complained against as a penalty. 
This measure under the FTA is not available under Oman’s BITs or the DSU.551 
Overall, it can be seen from the above discussion that the Oman-USA FTA contains 
stronger guarantees in its dispute settlement provisions, compared with other Omani 
international agreements. Although the tribunal in Al-Tamimi rejected all of the 
Claimant’s requests for declaratory and compensatory relief,552 this case raised by the 
claimant against Oman shows that on the basis of the dispute settlement mechanism 
provided under the FTA, US foreign investors' rights in Oman are protected by 
international tribunals.  
 
However, the FTA raises a number of shortcomings, Article 20.5.1 of the Agreement, 
concerning the time limit within which the other party has to respond to the consultation 
request, is unclear, since the word “promptly” in Articles 20.5.1 and 20.5.3 does not 
specify the exact time allowed for replying to the request and seeking other views, 
which may lead to disagreement between the USA and Oman. Article 20.5.3 of the FTA 
states: “Promptly after requesting or receiving a request for consultations pursuant to 
this Article, each Party shall seek the views of interested parties […] in order to draw on 
a broad range of perspectives.” Although this article allows “interested parties” to 
submit their views,553 it does not specify who these might be: other foreign investors, or 
non-governmental organisations? Moreover, it is unclear if a party such as Oman would 
breach this clause of the FTA if it failed to seek such views. 
The second shortcoming concerns the transparency of the arbitral proceedings, which is 
another protection instrument. Article 10.20.1 requires both parties to the dispute to 
make all documents available to the public and Article 10.20.2 requires the tribunal 
hearing to be open to the public. However, the latter article cites some exceptions 
related to legally protected and confidential information.554 It seems that it is left to the 
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party concerned to define whether a document is confidential or not. These exceptions 
may weaken the transparency of the arbitral proceedings, as any party to the dispute 
may claim that the document submitted is protected or confidential information, while 
these documents may be vital in the case or the tribunal award.  
 
Another shortcoming concerns the Joint Committee in the Agreement, which works as a 
protective instrument. This committee acts as a supervisory body for part of the dispute 
settlement process. According to Article 10.21.3, the Joint Committee's interpretation of 
the FTA provisions is binding on a tribunal and provides that all decisions and awards 
of a tribunal should be consistent with that interpretation. In addition, Article 20.6 states 
that: 
If the consultations fail to resolve a matter within 60 days of the delivery of a Party’s 
request for consultations under Article 20.5, 20 days where the matter concerns 
perishable goods, or such other period as the Parties may agree, either Party may refer 
the matter to the Joint Committee by delivering written notification to the other Party. 
The Joint Committee shall endeavour to resolve the matter.  
 
Both Articles 20.5 and 20.6 made the right of a party to seek consultation and a joint 
committee optional by using respectively the words “Either Party may request 
consultation” and “either Party may refer the matter to the Joint Committee”.555 
However, Joint Committee supervision is not applicable throughout the whole process 
of the dispute settlement process. According to Article 10.25 of the agreement, a 
tribunal may make an award against a respondent, not only for monetary damages, any 
applicable interest, or restitution of property, but may also award costs and attorneys’ 
fees. This is important to ensure that foreign investors will be compensated for the cost 
of the award and the fees of the attorney. 
3.6.5 Protection offered under the ICSID 
Since signing the ICSID Convention on 23 August 1995,556 the Sultanate of Oman is 
under an obligation to resort to ICSID in disputes between Oman and nationals of other 
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member states that adhere to ICSID. This means Oman is bound by any arbitral award 
or recommendation made by conciliators.557  
According to Article 25.1 of the ICSID Convention, two conditions are necessary for 
entitlement to submit to the ICSID; first, both countries must be signatories of the 
ICSID convention. Second, both parties to the dispute, whether they are a state or 
foreign investor, must agree in writing to submit their dispute to the ICSID. Hence, if 
the parties to a dispute with Oman do not agree beforehand, in writing, to refer their 
dispute to the Centre, the Centre has no jurisdiction over the dispute.  
Most of Oman’s BITs make reference to the ICSID to resolve disputes between foreign 
investor and a contracting state.558 Such provisions, for example, can be found in 
Oman’s BITs with Germany (Article 10.2 (b)), Sweden (Article 8.2), Lebanon (Article 
9.2.(C)) and India (Article 9.3 (a)). Indeed, in most BITs between states, the ICSID is 
the “sole or optional” dispute settlement method.559 In addition, Oman has consented to 
the submission to arbitration, under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of 
Procedure under Article (10.16 (1,2)) of Oman-USA FTA. Therefore, in Al-Tamimi, 
Oman did not challenge the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal.  
 
Oman’s membership of ICSID as a specialized and workable system of investor-state 
disputes offers a further strong form of protection for foreign investors in the Sultanate, 
for a number of reasons: first, ICSID proceedings and awards are fully independent of 
any kind of influence, compulsion, or review. Second, the unwillingness of a party to 
cooperate will not weaken or stop the proceedings of ICSID.560 In this case the 
arbitrator will be appointed by the Centre according to Article 38 of the Convention, the 
tribunal will decide jurisdiction matters (Article 41) and the proceedings of the tribunal 
will not be stalled by non-appearance at hearings or non-submission of memorials by a 
party (Article 45). Thirdly, the tribunal’s award will be final, binding and enforceable, 
even if one party fails to cooperate.561 Finally, all member countries are obliged to 
enforce ICSID awards as they would final judgments by their own courts, as provided 
by Article 54 (1) of the ICSID Convention. 
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Foreign investors in Oman will prefer to seek the ICSID, as a reliable dispute settlement 
body, compared with the national courts. It is likely that the Omani national courts 
would be avoided for two reasons; first, they are the host country’s courts. Second, it is 
a common approach among foreign investors and those involved in trade disputes 
generally to choose arbitration over the court system. Nevertheless, although ICSID 
currently is the most suitable mechanism of dispute settlement for investor- state 
disputes, it does not mean that the forum is in favour of the foreign investor.562 
While one specific situation in which ICSID awards can be challenged is through the 
annulment of the award, Article 52 limits the grounds on which parties can request 
annulment and makes the rules in this regard precise, because of the potentially serious 
results in the event of the invalidation of an arbitral award.563 In addition, there are 
specific conditions under which ICSID awards are subject to interpretation and revision 
by the parties under Articles 50 and 51 of the convention. Although state practice shows 
the enforcement of the arbitral award may be rejected on a particular basis, Oman is a 
signatory of the New York Convention,564 and is therefore obliged to recognize and 
enforce the arbitral award according to Article 1.1 of this Convention.565  
Criticisms have been raised regarding the ICSID dispute settlement system. Some, such 
as Carlos Garcia, 566 argue that the lack of an effective review and appeals process in 
investor-state disputes under ICSID, combined with uncertainty in interpreting treaty 
rights, is a real weakness in the ICSID system. However, others argue that is not 
practical to create an effective review system with certainty in interpreting treaty rights 
when there are thousands of treaties containing different rights.567 It is worth clarifying 
that when the applicable law is defined in the contract between Oman and the foreign 
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investor, this would be applied by the ICSID tribunal. However, the outcome would be 
less clear if the applicable law lacked clarity or, more likely, if the arbitration were to 
proceed on the basis of consent stated in advance in a BIT where no choice of law is 
stated.568 Nevertheless, the WTO has the advantage over ICSID regarding the issue of 
applicable law, because the former has a binding and comprehensive set of 
agreements.569  
One final controversial area is the cost of ICSID proceedings. Some maintain that 
ICSID arbitration is expensive and time consuming, whilst others claim it is cheaper 
compared with ad hoc arbitration.570 For example, in Al-Tamimi the tribunal stated that: 
"Under the US–Oman FTA and the ICSID Convention, therefore, the Tribunal has a 
broad discretion to determine “how and by whom” the expenses of this arbitration, 
including attorney’s fees, should be paid"571  
Then the Tribunal ordered that:  
the Claimant shall pay to the Respondent forthwith the sum of US$5,667,410.24, which 
comprises the Respondent’s reasonable costs and expenses incurred in connection with 
this arbitration, including the cost of their legal representation, expert witness and 
consultants’ fees, disbursements associated with this proceeding, and the Respondent’s 
share of the ICSID arbitration costs and lodging fees paid.572 
It can be argued that, taking into consideration the time and the effort that was made in 
this case, the cost is reasonable. In addition, a reasonable cost is needed to ensure the 
seriousness of the claimant in raising disputes against the host states, because if the 
proceedings are very cheap, this will make it easy to bring parties before ICSID, 
regardless whether there is a serious reason to take action or not. 
3.7 The Impact of the Al-Tamimi Case on Oman's Foreign Investment Law and 
Policy 
3.7.1 The facts of the case 
The Al-Tamimi dispute was brought before the ICSID by the Claimant Mr Adel A 
Hamadi Al-Tamimi, is a USA citizen born in the UAE, against the Respondent 
Sultanate of Oman.573 While the main arguments of both parties have been furnished 
throughout the thesis, the Claimant submitted his notice of arbitration as mentioned 
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earlier, on 5th of December 2011 declaring that the Omani Government's actions 
destroyed his multi-million dollar investment in the site, in violation of its obligations 
under the U.S.-Oman FTA and caused losses and damages of approximately $560 
million,574  
The Claimant argued that Oman’s actions constituted a breach of Article 10.6 of the 
Oman-USA FTA.575 The Claimant as well submited that Oman had breached its 
obligation under Article 10.5 of the Oman-USA FTA to provide the minimum standard 
of treatment to the Claimant’s investment.576 Furthermore, the Claimant alleged that, in 
breach of Article 10.3 of the Oman-USA FTA, Oman treated the Claimant less 
favourably than it would treats national investors in like circumstances.577  
However, on 27 October 2015, the Tribunal issued the following award: 
1. The Tribunal rejects all of the Claimant’s requests for declaratory and compensatory 
relief  . 
2. The Tribunal orders that the Claimant shall pay to the Respondent forthwith the sum 
of US$ 5,667,410.24, which comprises the Respondent’s reasonable costs and expenses 
incurred in connection with this arbitration, including the cost of their legal 
representation, expert witness and consultants’ fees, disbursements associated with this 
proceeding, and the Respondent’s share of the ICSID arbitration costs and lodging fees 
paid . 
3. Interest shall be payable on the costs listed at 2 above from 60 days after the date of 
issue of this Award, calculated at the 91-day US Treasury Bill rate and compounded 
quarterly.   
 
Prior to all this, the investor began his investment activities in Oman in 2006 and on 
behalf of two companies, Emrock Aggregate & Mining LLC (Emrock), and SFOH 
Limited (SFOH), Mr Al-Tamimi established an investment in Oman and through two 
lease agreements with an Omani state-owned company, Oman Mining Company LLC 
(OMCO) to operate a limestone quarrying and crushing concession on a parcel of 
Government-owned land.578  
On 22 August 2007, OMCO instructed Mr Al-Tamimi by letter that Emrock and SFOH 
could begin quarrying operations on 1 September 2007, after receiving the initial 
environmental permit from the Omani Ministry of Environment and Climate Affairs 
(MECA) and the Certificate of Quarrying Operation from MoCI. On 22 August 2007, 
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OMCO sent letters to Emrock and SFOH reminded Mr Al-Tamimi that he was allowed 
to mine only “quarry strata seams and beds of limestone” and that he was restricted to 
the “exploitation of limestone rock products only”. The Claimant therefore started 
quarrying operations at the Jebel Wasa quarry on 1 September 2007.579 
On 28 August 2007, OMCO wrote to Mr Al-Tamimi declaring that Emrock was 
violating the OMCO–Emrock Lease Agreement by “processing material originating in 
the alluvial deposits located in the area’s streams”. On 22 September 2007, MoCI issued 
a notice to OMCO that its experts had observed during a site visit that the Claimant was 
working beyond the borders of the restricted site. On 29 September 2007, OMCO wrote 
to Mr Al-Tamimi warning that Emrock was engaging in blasting outside of OMCO’s 
concession. MECA issued two additional breach notices to OMCO on 7 October 2007 
and 24 October 2007. Then, on 25 December 2007, MECA issued an infringement 
report and fined OMCO OMR 2,000.580 
On 21 April 2008, MoCI issued OMR 10,000 fine against OMCO for claimed failure to 
“observe the boundaries of the leased site as previously determined”581 and required that 
the Claimant stop such operations immediately. Mr Al-Tamimi claimed that he 
voluntarily ceased all production in the wadi at this time. OMCO paid the OMR 10,000 
fine to MoCI and sought compensation from the Claimant. The Claimant offered to 
compensate OMCO but only if it would provide him with copies of the permits it had 
obtained.582 
On 20 July 2008, OMCO decided to terminate the OMCO–Emrock Lease Agreement 
by sending letter to Emrock. Then, on 2 June 2008, OMCO informed the Claimant that 
it considered the OMCO–SFOH Lease Agreement as “null and void”, because of the 
Claimant’s failure to register SFOH in accordance with the Omani laws.583 In addition, 
on 17 February 2009, OMCO terminated the Lease Agreements by sending two letters 
to Emrock stating the termination of the lease agreement on a number of grounds.584  
Eventually, on 23 May 2009, the Royal Oman Police arrested the Claimant at the 
request of MECA for “allegedly conducting operations outside of his permitted 
boundaries, operating without the necessary permits, and removing material from the 
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dry riverbed to the west of the Jebel Wasa mountain range”.585 Later, on 8 November 
2009, the Mahda Court of First Instance sentenced Mr Al-Tamimi “on two 
misdemeanour counts: (a) stealing sands and stones without a permit; and (b) violating 
Omani environmental law by engaging in quarrying and crushing operations without the 
requisite permissions”.586 Then, “on 6 June 2010, the Ibri Court of Appeal issued a 
judgment overturning Mr Al-Tamimi’s conviction on both misdemeanour counts”.587  
3.7.2 The impact of the case on Oman's foreign investment law and policy  
While the full picture of the impact of the Al-Tamimi case, especially in the domestic 
arena may need more time to emerge, since the award is relatively recent, certainly the 
involvement of the Omani government as a party in the case since the case was filed in 
2011 is expected to lead to specific impacts and policies by the Omani policymakers, 
especially on the issues related to the case. This case is special, not only because it is the 
first arbitration case that Omani government faces, but also because the case raised and 
examined the Oman's practice in significant foreign investment issues, such as 
expropriation, international minimum standards and national treatment. 
It can be argued that the clear impact of the Al-Tamimi case on Oman's foreign 
investment law and policy is that it raised awareness among policymakers in Oman of 
the need to reduce the vague areas in the foreign investment system and enhance its 
efficiency. Consequently, this led the Omani government to speed up its efforts to 
provide more protection and to improve the national legal system to attract foreign 
investment by requesting the World Bank's help to work on the DNFIL.  
It is hoped that the DNFIL with the rights it provides, may help to improve the 
efficiency of the legal protection offered for foreign investment and will increase 
foreign investor confidence by enhancing consistency and removing possible conflict 
with international agreements and arrangements.588 This is mainly for three reasons. 
First, the new law is assumed to take into consideration all Oman's commitments under 
existing international agreements, especially the WTO and FTAs. Second, it is expected 
to overcome some of the challenges in the current FCIL related to discrimination, 
vagueness and restrictive provisions. Finally, the draft of the new law has addressed 
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some specific weaknesses of the current law, and provides for 100% foreign ownership, 
removal of a minimum capital requirement and an absolute right to refer disputes to 
international tribunals.589  
It can be said that Oman's step of elevating the protection provided under Omani 
national law to that under Oman's BITs and FTAs is part of a progressive approach of 
offering better protection than existed previously. Therefore, in one sense it is similar to 
the approach of seeking absolute protection of foreign investment in international 
foreign investment law, taken by other states and institutions, since both are going 
forward. Such an approach is apparent in provisions of the 2012 US Model BIT, and in 
the European Commission’s proposal in 2015 to create a new (WTO) dispute settlement 
body-style Investment Court with an appellate body in relation to the negotiations with 
the US concerning the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).590 Subedi 
sees these as examples of a shift in attitude towards offering extensive protection to 
foreign investors.591  
States concluding BITs or IIAs with an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 
Mechanism represented a significant development in international law, especially 
international investment law.592 This is because, by allowing foreign investors to sue 
them before international courts and tribunals, host states are accepting an exception to 
their sovereign immunity. 593 Singapore is an example of this approach as it makes a 
distinction between state sovereignty and the foreign investor's right to take legal action 
against the government. When a Singaporean government agency enters into a contract 
with a foreign company, this is treated similarly to a contract concluded between two 
private entities,594 according to Article 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Singapore which empowers the government to make contracts and to sue and be sued. 
In addition, the State Immunity Act of Singapore emphasizes this by stating clearly that: 
A state is not immune as respects proceedings relating to a commercial transaction 
entered into by the State; or an obligation of the State which by virtue of a contract.595  
Or where the  
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State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute that has arisen, or may arise, to arbitration, 
the State is not immune as respects proceedings in the courts in Singapore that relate to the 
arbitration.596  
In another sense, although Oman’s current international approach is different, the 
standard of protection provided by Oman under the DNFIL seems to be similar to that 
taken by other developing countries. For example, in order to prepare themselves for the 
termination of their BITs, a number of countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador and South 
Africa, have passed national laws to offer standards of protection to foreign investors 
similar to those provided by BITs. Importantly, the new Bolivian Investment Promotion 
Law provides that any disputes will have to be resolved under Bolivian law.597  
Subedi notes that growing opposition to the ISDS mechanism under the IIAs is being 
voiced not only by developing countries but also their developed counterparts598 since 
this new form of state practice is expected to contribute towards creating new norms or 
modifying existing norms of customary international law regarding the absolute 
protection of foreign investment.599 Subedi argues that due to pressures coming from 
different directions, a paradigm shift is taking place within international investment law 
in favour of a more equitable, just and fair system.600 There are numerous examples of 
this new pattern. In September 2013, many Latin American states agreed to take 
collective action against the ISDS mechanism under the IIAs and to introduce 
alternatives to this mechanism.601 Developing countries, particularly India, Indonesia 
and South Africa, are leading a stand against the older generation of BITs.602  
According to Subedi, many developing countries, particularly disadvantaged ones, have 
reached the conclusion that BITs are detrimental to their national interests and have 
started to reject signing BITs with unclear principles on protecting foreign investors. 
For example, the Constitutional Court of Ecuador stated that all BITs are 
unconstitutional and the country has started issuing its own laws for the protection of 
foreign investment.603 Because of the growing caution and scepticism towards the ICSID 
mechanism, many countries have started systematically terminating BITs that offer 
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access to ICSID for foreign investors.604 Therefore, some scholars assume that history 
may be repeating itself with a return to the Calvo doctrine, or there may be a process of 
fundamental change in the landscape of international investment law.605 It is not yet 
clear whether Omani policymakers share similar concerns about the ICSID mechanism. 
Shan identifies a third international trend that aims for a balanced approach, which is 
more or less similar to the latest approach, arguing that while states will continue 
liberalising their investment systems and providing protection through BITs and IIAs, 
they will be more willing to exercise their sovereign rights to regulate foreign 
investment. Therefore, states will insist on maintaining their regulatory discretion when 
negotiating or renegotiating BITs or other IIAs. 606 This trend started to emerge due to 
the huge number of arbitration cases filed against states after 2000. While 71 of the 102 
regulatory changes made in 2009 were in favour of foreign investors, restrictive legal 
changes have increased more rapidly. It is expected that this trend of liberalising the 
investment regime and preserving the host state's necessary power to regulate foreign 
investment will continue until a balanced liberal investment regime is achieved.607 
In supporting the need for a balanced trend, it is recommended that it is vital to apply 
coherence and discipline to both international investment arbitration and the European 
Commission’s proposal for a new and transparent system for ISDS: the Investment 
Court System. According to these proposals, the judges of these courts will be highly 
qualified and publicly appointed, comparable to those in the WTO Appellate Body and 
the ICJ.608 
Overall, it is clear that the Al-Tamimi case has influenced Oman's foreign investment 
law and policy by prompting Omani policymakers to make the national foreign 
investment law a reliable source of foreign investment protection. Whether this will be 
followed by revising the Oman's BITs and whether Oman will establish its own model 
of BITs are not clear yet. What is clear is that the international trends in state practice 
and the lack of fundamental reform indicate that neither the ISDS mechanism nor the 
BIT/IIA regime may continue for long in their current form.609  
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3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter argued that while all foreign investors in Oman are generally protected by 
international customary law, the protection provided under Oman's international 
agreements varies. International agreements signed by Oman provide three levels of 
guarantees. The first level is the obligations on Oman under the WTO agreements. The 
second is under Oman's BITs and the GCC FTA with Singapore, which contain more or 
less similar standards of protection. The third and the strongest level of protection is 
under the GCC Economic Agreement and Oman-USA FTA. 
 
It is argued that Oman applied fully both principles, national treatment and MFN under 
the GCC Economic Agreement and Oman-USA FTA compared with other Oman's 
international Agreements, such as the WTO agreements, BITs and the GCC-Singapore 
FTA, which contain exceptions to the principles. In addition, the principle of 
international minimum standards in the Oman-USA FTA is a much more reliable 
instrument in a case of arbitration, compared with the international minimum standard 
under Oman’s other BITs.  
 
In addition, it can be said that the more an investment agreement defines the basis and 
conditions of compensation, the more effectively it will reduce disagreement between 
parties and avoid a disappointing interpretation by the international tribunal, as 
demonstrated by the Oman-USA FTA and some BITs, such as those with Germany and 
the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the provisions of protection from expropriation included 
in Oman’s BITs and its FTA will potentially play an important role in considerably 
enhancing the protection of foreign investment in Oman from expropriation.  
While in most cases, exceptions in Oman's international agreements work as hiding 
rooms, there must be a balance between the protection of foreign investor rights in the 
case of money transfer and keeping the financial interest of the country secure and 
protection of the national interest. It is argued that the interaction of the narrower WTO 
protection rules with the broader measures of investor protection under BITs and, 
especially under FTAs, will achieve astonishing results.610 Therefore, it can be argued 
that this combination of Oman’s foreign investment commitments under the WTO, 
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GCC, BITs, FTAs with USA and Singapore, and other international agreements will 
lead to significant foreign investment protection in Oman.  
It can be argued that ICSID has proved to be a specialized and workable system of 
investor- state disputes. In addition, the fact that Oman is a member is a useful step 
further toward providing protection for foreign investors in the Sultanate as it is clear in 
the Al-Tamimi case. However, other mechanisms such as the DSB under the DSU and 
the ICJ generally are not suitable tools for individual foreign investors to take action 
against Oman.  
While the Al-Tamimi case draw the attention of the Omani policymakers to improve the 
foreign investment legal system, it can be said that the full picture of the impact of the 
case on national law and policy awaits developments in the international arena, 
especially from developing countries.      
The Oman international commitments cannot work alone and will not be effective in 
protecting foreign investment unless combined with a proper national legal system and 
practice. Therefore, the next chapter will examine Oman's commitments under Oman's 
national legal system. 
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Chapter 4. Guarantees and Weaknesses in the Omani Legal 
Framework 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the guarantees and challenges for foreign investment in Omani 
law. The aim here is to analyse the various national legal norms that regulate foreign 
direct investment in Oman and investigate their effects on investment. These guarantees 
of protection are to be found in the Basic Law, the FCIL, the NDFIL, Labour Law and 
other related legislation. According to AlSameraie the national legal framework on 
foreign investment is the formal expression of the national policy and approach toward 
foreign investment.611 To provide the fullest form of protection for foreign investment 
in international and regional agreements, there is a need for a compatible domestic law 
in the host country.  
 
It is said that the 1994 FCIL removed restrictions on entry to the Omani market, 
including obstacles to ownership in most sectors, such as the amendment of FCIL by 
Royal Decree 16/1996 eliminated minimum capital requirements. In addition, FCIL 
provides guarantees regarding the transfer of money and profits. Moreover, companies 
with foreign participation may be exempted from corporate tax and customs duties 
during the first five years after establishment.612  
The value of unilateral guarantees is controversial. It is argued that the protective 
measures included in national laws are of less importance for foreign investors since 
they are unilateral.613 It is believed that foreign investors are not satisfied by the national 
laws and regulations provided by host states, mainly because the latter can unilaterally 
change any guarantee provided under their national laws.614 Moreover, according to 
Sornarajah, since this is a constitutional matter, guarantees given by one government are 
not binding on its successors, especially when their ideology is different.615 This is 
because the host state is completely free to amend or change investment law, on the 
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basis of its sovereign rights over its territory and its right to choose its own economic 
and social system. This factor has had significant impacts on the history of the relations 
between sovereign countries and foreign investors, since they fear discriminatory 
treatment by the host state.616  
Although non-commercial risks can be determined broadly or narrowly, according to 
the literature on the Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency, foreign investors evaluate guarantees in terms of four non-commercial risks: 
guarantees of currency transfer; guarantees against expropriation; guarantees of 
repudiation of a contract, and guarantees from war and civil disturbance.617 Sornarajah 
maintains that if domestic legislation provides a guarantee of dispute settlement 
provisions, this could provide vital protection for foreign investors.618 In addition, as 
AlSameraie notes, any legislative changes made by the host state that lessen the level of 
protection provided for foreign investment will decrease the trust of foreign investors in 
the host state and consequently will negatively affect the state’s ability to attract future 
foreign investment.619 Undoubtedly, the obligations placed on Oman as a member of the 
WTO, its BITs and other international conventions all influence its commitments in 
national level toward the protection of foreign investment.  
It is argued that the effectiveness of the guarantees included in investment laws largely 
depends on the permanence and enforceability of these provisions and if these are 
lacking, then this creates an insecure investment environment for foreign investors.620 
Therefore, in this chapter, Omani laws and practice will be evaluated in relation to 
international law standards and case law.  
The first part of this chapter will examine how the Omani legal framework deals with 
the foreign investment risk of expropriation, focusing on the following issues: the legal 
protection from expropriation provided under the Omani system, concerns caused by 
indirect expropriation, the value of the guarantee, guarantees of compensation in Omani 
legislation property and intellectual property rights protection, the role of consumer 
protection, and the associated challenges. 
The second part will analyse guarantees of non-discriminatory treatment. This will be 
done by examining the legal basis for non-discriminatory treatment in Omani law, the 
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incentive of taxation and customs duties, the role of tax incentives, activities in which 
investors cannot invest, the guarantees provided by Free Zones (FZs), Duqm Special 
Economic Zone (DSEZ) and Knowledge Oasis Muscat (KOM), and the guarantees of 
transferring benefits.  
The third part will examine the laws relating to industrial regulations. It will consider 
trade union regulations in Oman, the guarantees for companies wishing to bring workers 
to Oman, the challenge to employment regulations and the challenges posed by the 
Omanisation policy and the minimum salary for Omanis. Eventually, the guarantees of 
political stability will be analysed by examining the basis of political stability and the 
uncertainties associated with the handover of power in the Sultanate. 
The analysis in this chapter is based mainly on three kinds of materials. The first 
consists of Omani legislation, both primary sources and secondary sources, beginning 
with existing Omani legislation ministerial decisions, and the implementation of those 
regulations. The second is the World Bank Group investigations and findings, and other 
materials, such as the outcome of meetings held by the Diwan Royal Court with 
lawyers, auditors and senior managers of foreign companies in Oman. The third is 
interviews carried out by the researcher in order to ascertain the actual situation on the 
ground of the guarantees and weaknesses in the Omani legal framework. 
4.2 Guarantees against Expropriation 
4.2.1 The legal basis for protection against expropriation under Omani Law 
Property expropriation is the most important risk from which foreign investors need to 
be protected.621 The prohibition of expropriation in Oman's national laws can be found 
mainly in two laws: the Basic Law and the FCIL. Article 35 of the Basic Law, 
foreigners and their property, offers protection to all foreigners legally present in the 
Sultanate and to their property.622 However, the protection offered by this article is that 
specified in Omani law. In addition, Article 11 of the Basic Law provides that 
expropriation is prohibited except under three conditions: it must be for the public 
interest; it must be according to the due process of law and it must be accompanied by 
provision of fair compensation.623 Confiscation of property is also prohibited under 
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Article 11 of this law except in the case of a judicial decision.624 Hence, according to 
this article, if confiscation of property by the Omani government occurs without a 
judicial decision and does not fall within the cases specified by Omani laws, it will be 
illegal. Consequently, the foreign investor has the right to fair compensation if such an 
action takes place.  
Article 12 of FCIL states that:  
The said projects may not be confiscated or expropriated unless for the public interest 
and against equitable compensation.  
Therefore, both laws agree on the prohibition of expropriation except under the two 
conditions, that the action is in the public interest and that fair compensation is 
provided. Although the condition of due process is not stated in FCIL, it must be 
applicable to all expropriation cases in Oman because of the precedence of the Basic 
Law over all national laws. In addition, all the conditions should be met and the absence 
of one condition will violate the Basic Law.   
Importantly, the DNFIL contains stronger protection with regard to expropriation 
because the provisions are intended to enhance clarity and reflect international good 
practice.625 Article 19/1 adds the condition of non-discrimination, besides the conditions 
of the public interest and the due process of law.626 This addition is an important step 
towards reducing the threat of expropriation and guaranteeing fundamental investor 
rights according to international standards and obligations.627  
Sornarajah argues that there is a great deal of doubt about the value of unilateral 
commitments concerning the protection against expropriation.628 The amount of legal 
protection provided for foreign investment is extremely dependent on what a host state 
considered to deserve legal protection under its legal system.629  
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However, although the tribunal in Saluka Investments v the Czech Republic recognised 
the legitimate right of the host state to regulate domestic matters in the public interest,630 
it concluded that the host state is obliged to treat foreign investors fairly and equally.631 
When expropriation is made without due process it will be discriminatory and a breach 
of commitments. Hence, this may amount to a “compensable taking”.632 Nevertheless, 
foreign investors have to prove that due process has been violated by the host state. In 
the case Concrete Pipe & Products of California v. Construction Labourers Pension 
Trust for Southern California, the US Supreme Court stated that: "the burden is on one 
complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an 
arbitrary and irrational way".633  
It may be argued that since due process is a condition under the Omani Basic Law, this 
will automatically ensure the non-discrimination factor. So, what is the point of adding 
the condition of non-discrimination in the DNFIL? It can be argued in counter that due 
process is not linked fully to non-discrimination. In other words, the availability of due 
process in a case may not ensure non-discrimination in that case, because a similar case 
may be treated favourably. In addition, the inclusion of a non-discriminatory clause will 
make it much easier for foreign investors in Oman to prove discriminatory cases during 
the dispute settlement process by comparing with similar cases. Furthermore, the 
availability of both conditions under Omani legislation is much better than one, as it 
will be much easier for foreign investors to prove their case.  
The opportunity given to foreign investors to rectify any breach of FCIL within a 
specified period of time can be seen as a feature of protection of foreign investment. 
According to Article 16 of the FCIL, violation of the provisions of FCIL is a justifiable 
reason to withdraw a licence, but before this can be withdrawn, a process must be 
followed. The foreign investor must first be notified of the nature of the violation; if he 
or she fails to rectify the violation within one month from the notification, the Minister 
of Commerce may then withdraw the licence if the CFCI recommends this. It remains 
unclear, however, whether the Minister can withdraw the licence without this 
recommendation from the CFCI. The members of the CFCI are not independent, since 
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they are under the supervision of the Minister of Commerce. However, the weakness in 
this process from the foreign investor’s side is that the Law does not grant any right to 
appeal the Minister's decision before the court. 
International law was designed to deal with what is known as direct expropriation, but 
such actions are unusual today as states are aware of the need to attract foreign 
investment. The law is ambiguous concerning more recent developments in the field of 
foreign investment and according to Sornarajah, regulatory expropriation is an emerging 
problem. Developing countries seek the maximum benefits from foreign investment for 
their economies, so they now have protected foreign investment that enters their 
countries within a regulatory structure. Therefore, those countries regard regulatory 
interference as non-compensable takings, as is the case in developed countries. 634 
4.2.2 Concerns caused by indirect expropriation  
Indirect expropriation arises when a state applies measures that considerably deprive 
investors of their private property.635 A typical example of indirect expropriation would 
entail the host state denying the presence of an investment and consequently refusing to 
compensate the foreign investor.636 The World Bank considers that the notion of 
protection against expropriation also covers damages arising from government actions 
that may affect control over, eliminate or reduce ownership of the insured investment. 
Moreover, it also covers a series of acts that, over time, have an expropriatory effect, 
such as "creeping" expropriation. 637 However, because treatment standards must be 
tested by tribunals, some recent BITs made no distinction between direct and indirect 
expropriation.638 Subedi notes that international law does not differentiate between 
direct or indirect expropriation when it comes to making adequate reparation or paying 
compensation and the host state is obliged to pay compensation in both situations.639  
Whereas FCIL did not deal with indirect expropriation, Article 19/2 of the DNFIL 
specifies that protection also extends to the effects of expropriation, by stating:  
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Expropriation as provided for in paragraph (1) of this article shall include 
nationalization, dispossession, forcible seizure and any other measure of like effect640 
Gutbrod et al. assert that any significant interference with the property rights of a 
foreign investor by the host state that might considerably reduce its value, is enough to 
raise a case of indirect expropriation.641 However, Article 19/2 of the DNFIL also 
makes it clear that a negative effect on the value of the foreign property does not, per se, 
constitute expropriation by stating: 
Any measure which adversely affects the economic value of the capital invested or the 
investment project is not in itself sufficient for the measure to be considered 
expropriation. 
It is observed that this clarification addresses the inadequacy regarding investor rights in 
FCIL and raises these to international standards, including guarantees against 
expropriation.642  
Two elements need to be taken into consideration here. First, the accepted criterion for 
distinguishing between expropriation and legitimate administrative regulation is the 
severity of the effect on the owner’s legal status, namely the ability to use, enjoy, 
control and freely dispose of his investment. However, it may be debated whether this 
severity should be the sole determining factor since643 the scope of national policy 
would be reduced to zero if the reduction in property value were to determine indirect 
expropriation. A host country would be confronted by foreign investor claims for 
compensation every time it changed its policy. In addition, this would limit international 
law on foreign investment to acting as an insurance policy against bad business 
decisions.644  
Although international law recognizes that claims of indirect expropriation cannot be 
established on the basis of actions aiming to protect “legitimate public welfare 
objectives”, it is not clear what objectives can be regarded as legitimate.645 In Al-
Tamimi, Mr Al-Tamimi accused Oman of creeping indirect expropriation, arguing that 
Oman, "through OMCO and other instrumentalities of the Omani government, has 
plainly and completely deprived Mr Al-Tamimi of his investment in the Quarry”, and 
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rendered him “unable to exercise any of the mining or leasehold rights he had acquired 
and invested in so heavily”.646  These measures by the Omani government were:  
Termination of the OMCO–Emrock and OMCO–SFOH Lease Agreements ;the arrest of 
Mr Al-Tamimi; the police coercion of Mr Al-Tamimi to sign an undertaking to refrain 
from further production at the Jebel Wasa quarry ;the prosecution of Mr Al-Tamimi; and 
the forced dispersal by the police of Mr Al-Tamimi’s workforce and physical assets.647  
Two issues need to be raised here. First, to establish an indirect expropriation there 
should be a clear link between the action of the host state and the indirect expropriation. 
In other words, the indirect expropriation must be a result of the host state's action. For 
example, with regard to the prosecution of Mr Al-Tamimi, the tribunal stated: "It is 
clear that it did not constitute or contribute to the loss of the Claimant’s right to operate 
at the Jebel Wasa quarry, and accordingly did not permanently deprive the Claimant of 
any property rights"648 The second issue is that Oman's implementation of its private 
property laws does not establish indirect expropriation. 649  
The second element of consideration, the amount of interference needed to hold the host 
country liable for indirect expropriation, is controversial.650 A crucial means of 
differentiating between direct or formal expropriation and indirect expropriation is 
whether the measure in question has affected the legal title of the owner. Nowadays 
direct expropriation has become rare because countries are hesitant to threaten their 
investment climate by taking the radical step of openly taking foreign property. An 
official act of expropriation would cause lasting damage to the state's reputation for 
hosting foreign investment. Although indirect expropriation leaves the title of the 
investor untouched, it prevents him from utilizing the investment in a meaningful 
way.651 It is this grey area that makes indirect expropriation a challenging issue. 
4.2.3The value of the guarantee   
Does the guarantee provided under Omani laws against expropriation provide the 
protection needed for foreign investment? Two arguments can be raised in this regard. 
According to Sornarajah, a unilateral guarantee against expropriation must be backed by 
the jurisdiction of a foreign arbitral tribunal created through a treaty commitment, as a 
guarantee without full compensation has no international effect. Unilateral guarantees 
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against expropriation cover foreign investors, including individuals and entities such as 
multinational corporations that do not have a personality in international law, meaning 
that the guarantees provided in domestic laws can be viewed as no more than strategies 
to attract foreign investment.652 
Article 14 of FCIL only allows referral of disputes between foreign investment projects 
and third parties to international tribunals if they are protected by a BIT. However, this 
shortcoming is addressed in the provisions under Chapter Seven of the DNFIL, which 
deals fully with dispute settlement matters and allows referral to international dispute 
resolution upon agreement of all parties.653 According to Articles 25 and 26 (1,2) of the 
DNFIL, a foreign investor has the right to resort to ad hoc or institutional arbitration. 
The process of dispute settlement detailed under Articles 24, 25 and 26 of the DNFIL 
provides a better guarantee. It is worth mentioning that in Al-Tamimi, Mr Al-Tamimi, in 
his claim of indirect expropriation against Oman, did not refer to any provisions of 
FCIL. Rather, his claim was totally based on the Oman-USA FTA. This suggests that it 
is unlikely that foreign investors in Oman will base their claims of expropriation upon 
FCIL.  
However, it may be argued that unilateral acts of states, related to international 
concerns, have some binding force, even in the case of regime changes in the host state 
if, for example, they include referral to an international tribunal in case of 
expropriation.654 Inclusion of such a clause provides protection for foreign investors. 
Subedi maintains that since the national law of the host country is the applicable law in 
the case of investment contracts, whether these are for overseeing engineering projects, 
constructing infrastructure, managing privatisation programmes, or operating of public 
services, tribunals should consider domestic laws in deciding international law 
disputes.655 The tribunal may therefore have to investigate the obligations of the host 
state under its national law.656 An example where the international tribunal took the 
national laws and policy into consideration was in Southern Pacific Properties (Middle 
East) Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt,657 where the tribunal argued that since Egyptian policy 
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in investment legislation is to grant better security to investment, there is a reason “for 
an international arbitral tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute”.658  
Countries face the challenge of balancing development of their internal, economic and 
environmental policy with their commitments toward providing an attractive 
environment for foreign investors.659 Thus, the admission of a foreign investment and 
granting of licences are conditional; failure to meet those conditions justifies state 
intervention that may lead to the withdrawal of these licences. If the legal procedures 
are followed in such cases, the legality of such measures under domestic legislation will 
be certain. This raises the question whether intervention in such circumstances by the 
host state can be regarded as expropriation under international law. It is believed that 
since the foreign investor was admitted on condition that domestic laws were obeyed, it 
would not be regarded as an expropriation. However, the conclusion on the issue will be 
different.660  
Sornarajah observes that the new trend in modern international law is to regard taking 
by the host country as lawful unless it can be proved otherwise by the other party. 
However, host states must exercise this right on the basis of two conditions: that it is 
non-discriminatory and on the basis of public interest. Those conditions are consistent 
with international customary law and are applied in all BITs.661 However, others, such 
as Bolivar, add a further condition: that the taking should be followed by prompt, just, 
and adequate compensation.662  
Beyond the case of Al-Tamimi, there have been no reports of expropriation in the 
Sultanate663 and its increased interest in attracting foreign investment and technology 
transfer has made expropriation unlikely.664 However, the World Bank recommended 
that Oman needs to develop and implement modern expropriation law.665 The existence 
of a guarantee against expropriation in the national legal system is important in 
determining the legality of a taking and the significance of damages caused by the 
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expropriation.666 Sornarajah emphasises that when unilateral guarantees are violated, 
such guarantees can work as a secondary tool to exercise “arbitral jurisdiction and 
awarding damages to the foreign investor”.667  
4.2.4 Compensation for expropriation 
The norm of full compensation is usually included in national foreign investment laws, 
since this is most attractive to foreign investors.668 Omani legislation has provided that 
foreign investors have the right to be fairly compensated in the case of expropriation. 
Article 11 of the Basic Law states that: 
No property shall be expropriated [...] provided that the person dispossessed shall be 
fairly compensated. 
This article obliges the Omani government to provide fair compensation to the 
individual whose property has been expropriated and it applies to corporations also.669 
The obligation under the Basic Law is important in providing protection for foreign 
investment. In addition, this obligation is emphasised by Article 12 of FCIL, which 
states that:  
[T]he said projects may not be confiscated or expropriated unless for the public interest 
and against equitable compensation.  
These two articles raised the issue of what constitutes fair or equitable compensation 
AlSameraie argues that such compensation should be sufficient, immediate, and 
effective, but neither of these laws includes these conditions.670 In addition, the words 
“fair and equitable compensation” used in Omani laws, seem to be similar to “just 
compensation”, which is usually interpreted to mean the same as the ‘Hull Formula’ 
under the USA national legal system. However, this interpretation is definitely not an 
agreed interpretation in all other domestic laws.671 Article 19/4 of the DNFIL remedies 
the weakness in FCIL and complies with international standards and obligations,672 
stating that: 
The compensation provided for in paragraph (1) of this article shall be considered to be 
appropriate if it is adequate, effective, and prompt. 
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It is pointed that although, at times, compensation may be paid incrementally, this 
practice shows that Oman is willing to offer compensation for any expropriations it 
makes.673 Sornarajah argues that countries with a history of expropriation are keen to 
provide guarantees of compensation intended to reduce the risk sensitivity resulting 
from past nationalisations; those with a low risk of expropriation do not need to issue 
such guarantees.674 However, this is not always the case, as some countries offer such 
guarantees to reflect the depth of their commitment towards foreign investment.  
According to AlSameraie, expropriation is illegal unless it includes compensation for 
the property owner.675 It is recognised that unlawful nationalisation establishes an 
obligation to pay restitutionary damage, while lawful taking entails paying 
compensation.676 Nevertheless, it is argued that the challenge with laws that contain a 
promise of full compensation is the lack of uniformity on the standard of 
compensation.677 Unlike the FCIL, which does not specify the standard level of 
compensation, Article 19/5 of the DNFIL attempts to do this by stating: 
The quantum thereof shall reflect the market value as it is prior to the date of issue of the 
decision to expropriate, or the date when the threat of expropriation become publicly 
known, whichever is the earlier. Payment of the compensation awarded shall be made 
without any restrictions, and the amount of the compensation shall bear interest at the 
prevailing rate in the Sultanate as from the date mentioned in this paragraph until 
payment is made in full. 
However, compensation for expropriation of foreign investment is a controversial area, 
since different legal systems adopt diverse approaches to property protection, making it 
difficult to extract common principles. It is argued that because of the different terms 
used under national laws, compared with the mostly standardised compensation under 
investment treaties, makes compensation under the treaty standard clearer, and possibly 
higher, than the national law standards.678 Nevertheless, it is believed that unilateral 
guarantees, along with bilateral investment agreements, play an important role in 
providing guarantees for foreign investment in host states.679 
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4.2.5 Property and intellectual property rights protection 
4.2.5.1 Protection of property rights 
Both moveable and real securitized interests in property are recognised and enforced in 
the Sultanate.680 Oman applies a free market economy that respects and protects 
individual ownership. Article 11 of the Basic Law states that: "The national economy is 
based on justice and the principles of free economy". According to Article 1 of Royal 
Decree 12/2006, foreign investors have the right to own or invest in properties in 
Integrated Tourism Complexes (ITCs). Article 3 of the same Decree provides that 
foreign-owned land in these ITCs should be invested within four years; otherwise, the 
Ministry of Housing (MoH) has the right to withdraw the land. In this case, the owner 
should be compensated with a sum equal to the land price at the time of buying or 
selling, whichever is lower. It is obvious that this four-year period is intended to ensure 
the seriousness of investors and to urge them to invest in the location. However, Article 
4 of the Decree provides that the four-year period mentioned can be extended for a 
further two years following a recommendation by the Ministry of Tourism (MoT).  
Three important features of protection and incentives for foreign investors appear in 
Royal Decree 12/2006. First, according to Article 3, the owner has the right to appeal 
against the expropriation decision before Omani courts. The Omani government has the 
right to expropriate but as stated in Article 6 of the Decree, fair compensation must be 
provided. It can be argued that since the appeal will be heard before a national court, the 
supervision of the judiciary over such a decision is an important guarantee to enable 
foreign investors to defend their rights. This right is much better than the expropriation 
decision being final. Article 7 of the Decree raises a second important issue for foreign 
investors since, after the death of a foreign investor, the law applicable for transferring 
ownership of the property would be the national law of the foreign investor. This is 
intended to avoid any conflict between the foreign investors' national laws and the 
Omani legal system in transferring the property ownership. Finally, Article 8 of the 
Decree provides an incentive for foreign investors who own property in Oman by 
offering them the right to a residence visa for themselves and their primary (first level) 
relatives.  
The only other exceptional case of land ownership outside the ITCs is that of GCC 
citizens, who have the right to be treated as Omani nationals681 but this ownership is 
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subject to certain conditions. The preamble of Royal Decree 21/2004 on Organising the 
Ownership of Lands of GCC Citizens in Oman makes it clear that this right is acquired 
on the basis of Article 3 of the GCC Economic Agreement, which declares that GCC 
citizens should be treated as nationals in the different GCC member states, and have the 
freedom to own land. According to Article 1 of the Decree, GCC citizens are allowed to 
own land and property in Oman, like Omani citizens. However, land ownership should 
not exceed four years, during which the GCC citizen must invest by building on it; 
otherwise, the Omani government has the right to withdraw the land but must provide 
compensation equal to the land price at the time of buying or selling, whichever is 
lower.682 Even in the case of expropriation in the public interest, Article 4 of the Decree 
makes it clear that this should be on an equal footing with the treatment of Omani 
nationals.  
The first issue which arises from this discussion of ownership for all foreign investors, 
including GCC citizens, is whether it is fair to provide compensation equal to the land 
price at the time of buying or selling, whichever is the lower, as provided in Article 3 of 
the Decree 12/2006, and Article 2 of the Decree 21/2004. Although the owner has the 
right to appeal against this decision, he is still restricted by conditions regarding the 
price he is to be offered. It can be argued that a fairer price for a foreign investor would 
be the highest price of land at the time of selling or buying or at the time of 
expropriation. This is because it is usual for land prices to increase every year. This 
argument can be challenged as well that foreign investor suppose to know the regulation 
in this case and avoid putting him or herself in such situation. 
A further question that may arise is whether granting certain nationalities (GCC 
citizens) preferential treatment in relation to land and property ownership can be 
considered discriminatory treatment. This issue of preferential treatment to some 
nationalities has been discussed earlier, as it is the government's right to grant certain 
nationalities special treatment on the basis of international treaties, and this treatment is 
granted to GCC nationals on the basis of a regional agreement among the members of 
the GCC.   
The Omani British Friendship Association (OBFA) highlighted two weaknesses 
resulting from ITCs. Firstly, title deeds and visas for property owners within ITCs are 
unclear.683 Second, the recent revocation of various ITCs has created uncertainty 
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regarding property investment.684 However, although the reason for these revocations is 
not yet clear, and may have been due to the violation of provisions related to the 
requirement concerning investment in the property within the four-year period, 
expropriation was not identified as a challenge for foreign investors in the Sultanate by 
any of the sixteen professionals interviewed as part of this study.685 
Although Oman allows foreigners to buy landed property in ITCs, these areas are 
limited. Therefore, Oman needs to attract investment in real estate by allowing 
foreigners to purchase apartments, in order to encourage vertical expansion and it seems 
that it faces difficulties due to limited local investors and buyers. One Omani 
policymaker interviewee pointed out that to attract foreign investment to Oman it is 
important to allow full ownership of real estate for all foreign investors and in all areas 
in the country.686  
4.2.5.2 Protection of Intellectual property rights  
It is important for Oman to achieve the level of protection applied in international 
standards as this will encourage foreign investment and lead to technology transfer.687 
Therefore, Omani laws related to intellectual property rights must be in accordance with 
the international standards applied in the TRIPS agreement and they must be backed up 
by an enforcement mechanism. The security of the intellectual and physical property of 
foreign investors in the host state is needed to guarantee the success of foreign 
investment.688  
Nawafleh maintains that developed countries have used BITs and Bilateral Trade 
Agreements as instruments to build wider and better protection for intellectual property 
than that which existed under the WTO TRIPS Agreement.689 Therefore, Oman has 
modified its intellectual property rights laws as a result of domestic economic reforms 
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and its commitments under BITs, the TRIPS Agreement (WTO) and the FTA with the 
USA. This resembles the situation that applies in most developing countries.690  
The fact that Oman seeks to attract multinational corporations and its commitments as a 
WTO member have challenged the Omani legislators to improve the conditions of 
intellectual property rights to reach international standards of protection. It is argued 
that the aim of many companies in engaging in foreign investment in the host country is 
to protect their intellectual property rights.691 The case of Plain Tobacco Packing692 is 
an example of when foreign investor can bring a case against a state before an 
international tribunal on the basis of a BIT or FTA with regard foreign investors' 
intellectual property rights. 
It can be argued that the intensive efforts made by Oman in recent years to establish 
comprehensive legal protection for intellectual property rights have significantly 
developed protection for intellectual property rights. This culminated in the 
promulgation of two laws: the Industrial Property Law (Royal Decree 67/2008) and the 
Law for the Protection of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (Royal Decree 65/2008). 
The first is a set of measures designed to protect owners of patents, trademarks and 
topography, and to afford protection from unlawful competition.693 The second aims to 
provide protection for creative works of literature, science and the arts.694  
Oman is obliged to apply Article 3/1 of the TRIPS Agreement by not discriminating in 
treatment given to its own citizens and to nationals of other WTO member states with 
regard to the protection of intellectual property.695 According to Article 41.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, Oman is required to ensure that enforcement procedures are 
available under its domestic law “so as to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights covered”. These enforcement procedures 
must include “expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which 
constitute a deterrent to further infringements”. Although the development in related 
laws has been able to provide foreign investors with the necessary degree of intellectual 
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property protection, Oman needs to ensure that it continues to review and amend its 
intellectual property rights laws. One foreign investor interviewed stated that 
intellectual property rights in Oman are well defined.696 
In addition, Oman needs to have tools at its disposal to guarantee effective enforcement 
and transparent application. Nawafleh maintains that even though a WTO member state 
may provide adequate provisions in its legislation, the enforcement mechanism that is 
applied may fail; in this case, the country will be in violation of its commitments under 
the TRIPS Agreement and could eventually be subject to trade sanctions.697 Therefore, 
Oman should consider that the two elements, having intellectual property rights that 
match international standards and implementing these effectively, must be made to 
work together.698 The next subsections will analyse the protection of foreign investment 
under Oman's copyright, patent and trademark related laws. 
4.2.5.3 Protection of foreign investment under Oman's Copyright Law 
Oman's Copyright Law is intended to provide automatic protection for foreign investors' 
scientific work, original artistic work (including paintings, sketches and musical 
compositions), computer programs, books, lectures, and articles, upon their creation.699 
It can be argued that the Copyright Law offers robust protection for foreign investors of 
two kinds. First, Oman applies the terms of protection of copyright in accordance with 
international standards. For example, according to Article 26 of the Copyright Law the 
term of protection for economic rights is "the life of the author and seventy years 
starting from the beginning of the Gregorian calendar year following the year of his 
death” Moreover, under Article 31 of the Law, the economic rights of performers are 
protected "for ninety-five years starting from the first day of the Gregorian calendar 
year following the year during which the recorded performance was legally published 
for the first time". Likewise, according to Article 14/5 of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
term of the protection afforded to performers and producers of phonograms "shall last at 
least until the end of a period of 50 years computed from the end of the calendar year". 
It is clear that the Omani Copyright Law specifies the Gregorian calendar Oman may in 
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some cases use the Hijra calendar, for example, in some cases in Omani Family Law. 
However, it is the approach in all Omani business laws to use the Gregorian calendar. It 
is essential here to link this point with Oman's commitments under the TRIPs 
Agreement. It is interesting that Article 14/5 of TRIPs did not define which calendar is 
to be used; the reason might be that the Gregorian calendar has become an 
internationally agreed calendar. 
Oman is bound by relevant international agreements as a signatory of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, in force since September 2005,700 and signatory of the Berne 
Convention (1971) since July 14, 1999.701 Under Articles 9, 10 and 14 of the TRIPS 
Agreement it must apply the Berne Convention-related provisions. In addition, Oman is 
a signatory of the Paris Convention (1967) in force since July 1999,702 which calls on 
TRIPS members to apply the related provisions as specified by Articles 15 and 16 of 
TRIPS.  
Added protection can be found in the enforcement mechanism provided by the 
Copyright Law. This can only be by defining the scope of protection and prohibited 
actions in relation to copyrights that are provided under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 40 of the 
Law. This is important to provide a clear meaning of the infringement of copyrights and 
to determine acts that constitute copyright infringement.  
Importantly, the law specifies two elements regarding the application of protection for 
the owner of copyrights and neighbouring rights. Firstly, civil and administrative 
procedures and remedies are determined in Articles 43 to 48. For example, Article 43 
defines the mechanism that should be used to calculate compensation along with the 
Executive Regulations used to determine the amount of compensation due. The standard 
of compensation included under this article in a case of infringement is an important 
guarantee of a foreign investor's copyrights.703 The second element relates to the 
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For the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph, the right holder is each and every exclusive 
licensee, and also the unions and association representing the right holders, as per prevailing laws”.  
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criminal procedures and penalties specified under Articles 49 to 56. In order to ensure 
compliance with the Copyright Law, civil and criminal penalties can be applied against 
those who violate the Law, which also supports copyright protection for foreign 
investors’ intellectual property.704  
4.2.5.4 Protection of the patent rights of foreign investors 
Since the level of protection of patent rights offered by host states is a serious issue for 
foreign investors making a decision about where to invest, the Omani Law on Industrial 
Property Rights offers three advantages of protection of patent rights:705 First, the Law 
complies with international standards since Oman has a signed a number of 
international agreements to enforce patent protection. These include The Hague 
Agreement, in force since March 2009, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, in force since 
October 2001,706 and the Paris Convention. In addition, according to Article 12.1.A of 
the Law on Industrial Property Rights, patents are protected for twenty years707 in 
compliance with TRIPS Agreement Article 33.  
However, Article 13.B of the Law on Industrial Property Rights raises an issue 
concerning the full rights of the patent owner. This article accords the Minister of 
Commerce the right to decide to exploit an invention for a government agency or a third 
person, without the agreement of the owner of the patent. Although the article notes that 
the provisions of the WTO General Council should be taken into account when applying 
this right, the fact that since it is “without the agreement of the owner of the patent” may 
weaken the protection of patent rights. In addition, the protection of patent rights may 
be weakened under national laws benefiting from the exceptions under TRIPS 
Agreement rights given to Member States. Therefore, such exceptions are controversial 
because of their impact in foreign investors' rights. For example, Article 27.2 of the 
TRIPS Agreement grants Member States the right to exclude the patentability of certain 
inventions under the reason of protecting public interest or morality.708  
Second, in certain specified cases, the right to the patent belongs to the employer, which 
represents an important issue for foreign investors, particularly those in the information 
technology (IT) sector. If an employee has the right to claim the ownership of a 
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program, this may discourage foreign investors. Therefore, Article 4 (3, 4) of the Law 
on Industrial Property Rights grants the employer the right to the patent in specific 
cases. Consequently, IT corporations and foreign investors are expected to benefit from 
these rights specified in Article 4 (3, 4) as follows: 
3 - Where an invention is made in execution of an employment contract the purpose of 
which is to invent, the right to the patent shall belong, in the absence of contractual 
provisions to the contrary, to the employer […]  
4 - Where an invention is made by an employee but not in execution of an employment 
contract, and when for making that invention the employee used materials, data and/or 
know-how of the employer, the right to the patent shall belong, in the absence of 
contractual provisions to the contrary, to the employer […]  
Therefore, it is clear that the article grants the employer ownership of the patent in the 
two specific cases mentioned in the article. In addition, it is clear that the availability of 
one of the above cases is enough to grant the employer the right to the patent.  
A third feature of the protection afforded by this Law is that it provides tools to apply its 
provisions effectively. Article 11 specifies the infringement acts which may occur by a 
third party whether the patent is for a product, process, plant or plant variety and others. 
Defining infringement acts is important to enable foreign investors who have exploited 
their patented invention to take action in cases that are detailed comprehensively and 
determined by this article. In addition, Article 24/3 grants the registered owner of an 
industrial design the right to establish court proceedings, not only in case of actual 
infringement but also when this is thought likely to occur.709 Most importantly, in a case 
of infringement of those rights provided by the Law, remedies including injunctions and 
compensatory damages are possible by bringing a case before Omani courts, as stated 
by Articles 66-72 of the Law.  
While the above analysis may ensure the regulation side of the protection of the patent 
rights of foreign investors, the effectiveness of these guarantees in practice needs deep 
investigation. Nevertheless, the Omani government has taken steps, such as in 2011, to 
implement the Intellectual Property Rights of American pharmaceutical and software 
manufacturers.710 
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4.2.5.5 Protection of the trademark rights of foreign investors 
Article 39/1 of Royal Decree 67/2008 provides that the owner of a registered trademark 
shall have protection through the exclusive right to prevent others from using without 
his consent, "identical or similar signs, including trade names and geographical 
indications, for goods or services related to those" which have been registered, if any 
confusion is likely to happen on account of such use.711 However, the words “identical 
or similar signs” may raise debate between the foreign investors who own the trademark 
and others on what is the degree of similarity needed to raise the right for or against 
foreign investors. An example of this occurred in a recent case of Alqudra Holding 
Company v. Registrar of Trade Marks MoCI before Muscat Court of Appeal. The 
claimant was a foreign investor who applied to the registrar at the MoCI to register the 
trademark of ALQUDRA but the registrar refused on the basis that there was a 
similarity with another trademark, ALSTOM, arguing that the similarity appeared in the 
letters Q and O of the two trademarks, and was likely to lead to confusion. On 24 March 
2016, the Court issued a verdict that the decision of the registrar (no.47652) with regard 
to the claimant (Alqudra Holding Company) was null and void.712 The court found that 
there were clear differences between both trademarks and confusion between them was 
unlikely. 
However, foreign investors can benefit from two elements of protection under the Law: 
first, the power of the judiciary can be used to ensure effective protection of the 
trademark owner’s rights. They can challenge in court the Registrar's decision to refuse 
registration or make acceptance conditional, within thirty days, as provided by Article 
11 of the Law.713 The above Alqudra Holding Company case is a clear example of how 
the owner of a trademark can benefit from the judiciary in Oman against a governmental 
body. In addition, the owner of a registered trademark shall have the right to bring 
action against any person who infringes it by using it without his approval, or 
involvement in acts that make an infringement of the trademark likely to occur as 
provided by Article 39/2. The courts may also be involved in protecting a brand’s 
reputation. For example, a brand name could be damaged if it is copied or used by 
another company supplying lower quality goods or services. Therefore, Article 42/1/A 
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and B grants the interested party the right to take action to request the court to invalidate 
the registration of a mark if it is proved that there is a breach of the Law.714 Further 
judicial protection is offered by the penalties applied for non-compliance regarding 
trademarks under Article 93 of the Law.  
In this context, also, concerns may be raised by Article 40/1,2, which grants the MoCI 
the right to declare a trademark right exhausted:  
[W]hen that product is not available in the territory of Oman or is available in the 
territory of Oman with unreasonably low quality standards or in a quantity that is not 
sufficient to meet the local demand or at abusive prices or for any other reason of public 
interest. 
The words “for any reasons of public interest” can be used in a very broad way that may 
breach the trademark rights of foreign investor. Therefore, more protection would be 
offered to foreign investors if such rights were kept under the judiciary's jurisdiction, or 
if the trademark’s owner were allowed to appeal the Minister's decision before the 
Omani courts. 
Further protection is guaranteed by the fact that the Law obliges the provisions of the 
law to be applied according to international standards. Article 100/1 of the Law obliges 
Oman to enforce the Law in accordance with conventions and treaties to which Oman is 
a party, and to provide citizens of those countries which are parties of the multilateral 
and bilateral conventions and agreements to which Oman is also party all rights with 
regard to trademarks and trade data.715 Therefore, Oman would be obliged by this 
article, in the application of this Law, to not discriminate against foreign investors and 
to provide foreigners with the same rights provided to Oman nationals. In addition, 
since joining the WTO, Oman has had to restructure its intellectual property (IP) legal 
system to conform to international standards.716 For example, the term of protection of 
trademarks under Article 41 of the Industrial Law is ten years from the filing date of the 
application for registration, whereas, under Article 18 of the TRIPS Agreement it shall 
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be not less than seven years. However, the protection under the TRIPS Agreement 
represents the minimum standard of protection. 
4.2.6 The weakness caused by the Public Authority for Consumer Protection  
The role of the Public Authority for Consumer Protection (PACP)717 regarding its 
intervention in the pricing of goods and services is controversial. This is because on the 
one hand the PACP and related regulations were established to protect consumers' rights 
in the Sultanate.718 On the other hand, Oman has a free market economy,719 the laws and 
forces of supply and demand must be free from any intervention by any government 
authority and the prices for goods and services must be set freely by consent between 
sellers and consumers. Although intervention by PACP on prices may be supported by 
the majority of Omani consumers,720 it has a negative effect on foreign investment when 
companies find themselves controlled by another body in their retailing policy.  
In addition, one of the lawyers interviewed pointed out that the role played by PACP 
may lead to a lack of freedom in the Market, meaning that foreign investors do not have 
rights with regard to the market prices of their products.721 Indeed, there are a number of 
cases where the practices of PACP have represented a challenge to foreign investment. 
For instance, four employees of the well-known multinational retailer Marks and 
Spencer (including an Omani female manager) were arrested and jailed because the 
prices of some goods were increased without having PACP approval.722 In another case 
recalled by an interviewee, the widespread retailer Select faced difficulties operating in 
Oman due to the restriction applied by PACP on their price capping.723 When 
companies cannot increase the prices of their products without PACP approval, this 
creates problems.724 PACP’s actions were viewed as a barrier to investment in Oman 
and it was thought that consumers should decide whether or not they are prepared to pay 
increased prices.725  
The legal basis for PACP’s actions needs to be examined. It can be argued that the 
generality of some articles of the Law may cause challenges for foreign investment. 
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According to Article 9 of the Consumer Protection Law, the only situations in which the 
chairman of the PACP can take temporary measures to curtail price increases are 
emergency cases, natural disasters, exceptional circumstances, extraordinary and 
special-nature market situations.  
However, according to Article 13 of the Consumer Protection Law, the chairman of the 
PACP “may take the necessary measures and actions to guarantee consumer rights as 
stipulated in this law”. Nevertheless, it does not define or specify these necessary 
measures and actions or what is meant by consumers’ rights, leaving all these areas 
open to interpretation. These areas need to be clear to investors. In addition, the same 
article grants the chairman the right to stop any breach of "consumer rights or general 
health and safety rules related to the commodities or services". This article may 
represent a challenge to foreign investors due to its vague wording and lack of detail 
regarding what is covered by these areas, leaving these open to interpretation in an 
overly broad manner. 
Article 37 may also create challenge for foreign investors since it states that: 
The public prosecution– pursuant to a prior request from the chairman or the authorized 
representative thereof – may issue a decision to temporarily shutter the premises or 
suspend the activity until the adjudication of the lawsuit and stakeholders may appeal 
the decision before the Court of Appealed Misdemeanors at the deliberation chamber.  
Although closing premises or suspending commercial activity is viewed as a temporary 
measure pending the Court’s decision, a closure or suspension period of this type would 
harm foreign investment. This could be done by amending Article 37 to have the 
suspension enacted by court decision instead of by the public prosecution. Overall, it 
can be argued that a balance needs to be sought in PACP regulations and practice 
between protecting consumers' rights and fully applying the policy of free market 
economy to achieve the country's target of attracting foreign investments. 
4.3 Guarantees of Non-Discrimination 
4.3.1 Legal basis for non-discriminatory treatment in Omani law 
Oman is bound to issue its national laws in accordance with its international 
commitments under the WTO and its other international agreements. For example, as a 
signatory to the WTO agreements, Oman is generally obliged not to discriminate either 
among its trading partners, or between its own and foreign products, services or 
nationals.726 Subedi noted that the basis of non-discriminatory treatment provided for 
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foreign investors in international law could be found under customary international law, 
BITs, investment contracts, WTO agreements and other regional and international 
tools.727 The principle of non-discrimination forms the basis of a considerable part of 
traditional foreign investment law and is founded on the notion that foreign investors 
doing business in a host country should be protected from undue or unfair 
discrimination.728 
The guarantee of non-discriminatory treatment is present in various areas of Omani 
national law. One example as discussed above concerns prohibition of confiscation or 
expropriation unless for the public interest and against equitable compensation under 
Article 12 of the FCIL. AlSameraie identifies two types of discriminatory treatment that 
can be exercised by host countries. The first entails expropriating foreign investments 
involved in certain commercial or industrial activities, but not those of national 
investors carrying out the same activities. The second concerns expropriating certain 
foreign investments belonging to some nationalities but not others engaging in the same 
activity. In both these cases, the responsibility of the host country will arise in 
discriminating between foreign investments.729 The host country may be considered to 
have carried out discriminatory treatment of foreign investors 
While FCIL has not addressed the principle directly, the DNFIL clearly acknowledges 
the principle of non-discriminatory treatment. Article 14 of the DNFIL binds all Omani 
government bodies to grant foreign investors treatment not less favourable than that 
given to Omani nationals at all stages of their investment.730 This is also emphasised 
under Articles 13 and 15 of the DNFIL. Therefore, after the promulgation of DNFIL, 
then any discriminatory treatment would be a breach of the Law, and a foreign investor 
receiving unfair treatment would have the right to take action on the basis of its 
provisions.   
Nevertheless, two further guarantees of non-discriminatory treatment in Omani law are 
the exemption provided in respect of paying taxes and customs duties provided under 
Articles 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3 and foreign investors’ right under Article 11 of FCIL to 
transfer abroad the imported capital along with the profits accrued from the project. 
Both will be examined here. 
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According to an interview with an Omani policymaker, a member of the CFCI at the 
MoCI, there are two main reasons why applications are rejected: firstly, when the 
source of the investors’ capital is not known, since this raises security concerns, and 
secondly, when there is a clear indication that the Omani partner is not serious.731 
Although the first reason is understandable for security reasons, the second seems to be 
vague, as it is unclear how the seriousness of the Omani partner can be evaluated and 
decided.    
However, five challenges can be found for the guarantee of non-discriminatory 
treatment under Omani laws. First, it is argued that the requirements relating to national 
ownership specified by Article 2 of FCIL limit market entry to Oman.732 In addition, the 
condition of a minimum capital requirement of OMR 150.000 established in Article 2 of 
FCIL is another challenge that limits market entry to Oman.733 It is believed that 
eliminating or reducing minimum capital requirements and instead using visas and work 
permits to control immigration would be a possible solution.734 Several OECD countries 
handle this issue by requiring investors to obtain and update visas or work permits.735 
The third challenge, is the lack of foreign investors' right to seek judgment by an 
international tribunal under FCIL,736 as discussed earlier. Subedi noted that non-
discriminatory treatment is guaranteed by the right of foreign investors to take action 
before international tribunals in cases of alleged discriminatory action by a host state. 
However, the DNFIL clearly guarantees this right upon the parties’ agreement. 
Therefore, in a case of expropriation, a foreign investor can be compensated according 
to international standards regardless of the kind of expropriation he has experienced. As 
Subedi points out, this places foreign investors in an advantageous position compared 
with national investors and such an approach may mean that national companies face 
reverse discrimination in their own state, as mentioned earlier.737  
Another challenge is the slow approval process for establishing a business in Oman. 
Although the one-stop shop for government clearances based in the MoCI exists, in 
practice, some investment projects still need clearance from other governmental bodies 
such as the MECA, MoM, and different Municipalities, meaning that approval of 
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investment projects may take six months or more. Delays caused by red tape are 
exacerbated by a lack of clarity in procedures covering clearances.738 
Finally, the latest challenge is the recent requirement imposed by the MoCI that foreign 
companies aiming to hold shares in a company incorporated in Oman must have been 
incorporated for a minimum period of three years. Moreover, the foreign company 
should have proof of its incorporation and should submit the latest audited accounts to 
prove its financial standing. Jones and Al Sabahi argue that these new conditions not 
only make it difficult for foreign investors to establish a business in Oman but also this 
amounts to discriminatory treatment between foreign and national companies. 739 They 
note the requirement results from the increased number of shell companies in the 
Sultanate failing to sustain their share capital, since there are no limitations and 
restrictions on capital transfer. In addition, the authors explain, such companies are not 
using their capital to achieve their declared objectives, or to comply with Omanisation 
requirements. However, according to Jones and Al Sabahi, the majority of those foreign 
companies are small businesses and there is no justified reason to lose the available 
chances to invest in important infrastructure projects in Oman.740 As a result, the World 
Bank Group have criticised FCIL for lacking some important investor rights and 
consequently inadequately addressing these rights.741 
Two key principles must be considered when dealing with discrimination:742 firstly, the 
basis of comparison for the supposed action of discrimination and secondly, whether it 
is necessary to prove that discrimination was intended, or if the fact that unequal 
treatment has occurred is sufficient to establish that discrimination has occurred. The 
question is how to define discriminatory action by the state. While one factor in 
deciding this question is whether the policy is lawful under other relevant rules of 
international law,743 it is difficult to establish criteria that enable comparison of the 
activities of national investors with those of foreign investors. Is it essential that they are 
both conducting exactly the same business or merely in the same economic sector, 
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regardless of the exact nature of their business?744 In Marvin Feldman v Mexico, the 
phrase “in like circumstances” was understood to mean in the same line of business,745 
as examined in relation to Al-Tamimi, earlier. Therefore, it is argued that in specific 
cases, domestic policies in favour of national public interest can be a basis for providing 
less than national treatment.746  
Dolzer and Schreuer argued that discriminatory action is independent of a violation of 
national law because this law itself may be the reason for violating an international 
standard.747 In Ronald S Lauder v The Czech Republic, the BIT that was applied 
provided protection against “arbitrary and discriminatory measures”. The tribunal 
stated: 
For a measure to be a discriminatory, it does not need to violate domestic law, since 
domestic law can contain a provision that is discriminatory towards foreign investment, 
or can lack a provision prohibiting the discrimination of foreign investment. 748  
This is true; the national law largely is not a standard by which to evaluate the 
discriminatory action. Rather, the national law itself must be consistent with 
international standards and best practice. 
However, Sornarajah argues that discriminatory investment policies in favour of 
national investors are justifiable and should remain in place in order to ensure the 
development of national economies. This argument is based on the fact that in the past, 
most developed countries benefitted from applying discriminatory policies in favour of 
their local investors to ensure their development, yet now deny the same policies to 
developing countries.749 Nevertheless, countries aim to attract foreign investment must 
avoid any discriminatory measures. Therefore, Oman has established a number of 
incentives that may help to reduce discriminatory concern. These include incentives of 
taxation and customs duties, FZs, DSEZ and KOM. 
4.3.2 The incentives of taxation and customs duties  
Hurtado maintains that the financial policy of the host state is the most influential factor 
affecting decisions to invest in one state rather than in another.750 In order to attract 
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foreign investment, it is the policy of developing countries to provide various tax 
incentives for foreign investors, including exemption from income tax, tax credits or 
investment allowances, free economic zones, reduced tax rates or tax holidays for 
certain activities or for investment in specific areas considered vital to the national 
economy of the host state.751 Other financial incentives may come from granting full or 
partial exemption from customs duties for raw materials, building materials, plant and 
machinery.752 Tax and customs duties incentives in the Omani laws and whether Oman 
applies discriminatory measures in tax and customs will be examined in the following 
section. 
4.3.2.1 Tax incentives  
It can be argued that the approach taken by Oman to use tax as an incentive to attract 
foreign investment is based on two features; first, the equality of tax rates for Omani 
and foreign companies, aiming to reduce the chances to apply any discriminatory 
measures; and second, a low tax rate. The Omani tax regime is governed by the Income 
Tax Law issued by the Royal Decree 28/2009, and followed by the Executive 
Regulation 30/2012 issued in January 2012 by the Ministry of Finance. 753 According to 
this Law, foreign companies in Oman will be subject to three types of tax rate. The first 
applies, regardless of the percentage of foreign ownership, if a company’s income 
exceeds OMR 30,000; it is taxed at a single rate of 12%. The second applies to a foreign 
company that establishes a branch in Oman. In this case, tax is payable at a single rate 
ranging from 5% to 30% on the basis of the entire amount of the branch's taxable 
income. Finally, there is a flat rate tax of 10% of gross income on certain types of 
income for foreign companies that do not have a “permanent establishment in Oman”. 
These include rent for equipment, transfer of technical know-how, royalties, and 
management fees.754 
In addition to the equality in the tax rate, guarantees of non-discriminatory treatment 
offered under Omani law with regard to tax incentives can be found in different areas of 
legislation. Firstly, Article 11 of the Basic Law defines three standards that should be 
respected with regard to levying of taxes: they should be just, lawful and without 
retrospective effect. It states that: 
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-Taxes and general charges are based on justice and the development of the national 
economy.  
-Imposition of public taxes, amending and cancelling the same shall be by virtue of a 
law and no person is exempted from paying all taxes or part thereof except in the cases 
specified in the Law.  
-It is not permitted to impose a new tax, fee or any right with retrospective effect, 
whatever its type might be. 
With regard to the first paragraph, on the principle of justice, as previously discussed, 
the idea of what is “just” is extremely complex and it may be difficult to be agreed upon 
because there are always two sides to every argument. However, the article accords 
foreign investors the right to take action if unfair taxes are applied on them. In the 
second paragraph, concerning the principle of due process in establishing laws related to 
taxes should be fully implemented by the Omani governmental bodies applying taxes; 
otherwise, it will be a breach of the Basic Law. The third standard will prevent any 
foreign investors from being victims, as a new law can be issued, but it cannot be 
backdated to a period when no such law existed. To do so would be unfair because it 
would impose liabilities that the company could not have anticipated and might have 
chosen not to incur. 
Oman also offers foreign investors two other attractive taxation features. Oman does not 
impose any personal income, sales, inheritance, gift, or value added taxes.755 In 
addition, Article 8.2 of FCIL grants foreign investors a tax exemption for five years 
from the date of either commencing production or carrying out the activity. This date 
can be extended for five more years in necessary cases.756 However, if the net profits of 
any company are equivalent to more than 50 per cent of the capital paid up at the 
beginning of the exemption period, a renewal will not be available according to the 
executive regulations.757 The term "necessary cases" in the article is vague and needs to 
be clarified, by setting out the basis, conditions or standards that allow for the five-year 
expansion. This is important to avoid any contradiction or inconsistency that may lead 
to discriminatory treatment amongst foreign investors in the application of the 
extension.  
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Importantly, tax exemptions are accorded to entities engaged in mining, manufacturing, 
tourism, fishing, fish processing, fish farming, agriculture, animal breeding, public 
utilities, private sector schools, higher education institutes, private hospitals, training 
institutes, and export of manufactured and processed products.758 Other activities, such 
as foreign shipping companies and airlines, are exempted from taxation on the ground 
of reciprocal treatment. Moreover, some activities do not qualify for any tax exemption, 
such as management agreements and construction.759 According to Article 8.3 of the 
FCIL, application of tax exemptions falls under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Finance. However, after the promulgation of DNFIL this exemption will be abolished as 
all taxes issues will be under the Income Tax Law. According to a foreign investor 
interviewee, tax incentives are one of the major strengths a within the investment legal 
system and work well for foreign investment.760  
However, it can be argued that the taxation incentive in Oman represents some 
challenges which may cause discriminatory treatment; The Tax Authority’s view 
regarding tax holidays discriminates among foreign investors, as the Authority believes 
that the activities of Integrated Tourism Complexes (ITCs) are not covered by the term 
“promotion of tourism”, which was used in the old tax law. The current Income Tax 
Law excludes “promotion of tourism” from the tax exemption provisions specified 
under Article 118.761 Therefore, foreign investors in ITCs will not benefit from a tax 
holiday. However, this may be argued that there is no discrimination in this case since 
all foregn investors in ITCs treated equally.  
Another challenge which may cause discrimination among foreign investors is that both 
“profits” and “gains” are vaguely defined. 762 Therefore, this may lead to inconsistency 
in application. For example, in most jurisdictions, things such as capital income 
resulting from the sale of a capital or fixed asset, such as machinery or goodwill, are not 
regarded as income, profits, or gains for tax purposes.763 Thus, "the Tax Authority may 
consider the proceeds received by a company from the sale of any company asset as 
taxable income".764 In 2012, the Omani Supreme Court decided that "dividends received 
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from foreign shareholding companies in tax years 2002-2004 were not taxable".765 
However, the situation is changed under the new Income Tax Law. According to Article 
115, dividends are only exempted from taxable income for Omani companies. 
Examining the guarantees and challenges addressed in this section, do any of these 
measures have the potential to be considered as discriminatory against foreign 
companies? The State has the right to apply incentives, as nothing in international law 
prevents countries from doing so. Nevertheless, the application of such incentives 
should be in a fair manner as the state may be accused of discriminatory treatment if it 
grants an incentive to desirable investors but not to others. Problems may arise mainly 
because of the vague definitions and ambiguity of some terms related to taxes and 
failure to consider some foreign investment areas such as ITCs with regard to taxes. 
While Sornarajah argues that if the discrimination is based completely on economic 
factors, there can be no legal objection to discriminatory treatment, legislation or 
practices that lead to discriminatory treatment between foreign investors could be 
challenged on the basis that they may distort international trade.766  
4.3.2.2 The real role of tax incentives in attracting foreign investment to Oman 
The World Bank Group has argued that the incentives included in FCIL are generous, 
but it is unclear how effective they are in attracting foreign investment.767 Sornarajah 
has made the general point that views are divided on the usefulness of the incentive of 
tax holidays in attracting foreign investment.768 Hurtado also notes that there are a 
number of studies questioning the relation between tax policies and FDI, and argues that 
multinational companies consider three principal elements when deciding where to 
invest: advantages of location, ownership, and internalization.769 Recent studies 
conclude that although the tax issue is not relevant when investors decide whether to 
invest in their own country, taxes can influence the investor's choice of location of 
investment abroad.770 Griffith and Devereux's study on taxation within the European 
Union concluded that tax rate has an effect on where multinational companies invest.771  
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Nwogugu argues that incentives such as the five-year exemption from tax are less 
effective at attracting foreign investment because no profits are expected during this 
period of time.772 In addition, Hurtado maintains that tax reduction and incentives to 
attract foreign investment may have negative consequences; there is no evidence, for 
example, that the benefits countries may gain from increased FDI due to low tax rates 
exceed the costs resulting from loss of tax revenues. He pointed out that most writers 
believe that this has not proved to be an effective factor in increasing FDI.773 According 
to the World Bank, developing countries that reduce taxes to attract foreign investment 
may face a costly "race to the bottom",774 as this tax burden is transferred onto 
consumption and labour, and there is "a net reduction in total revenue available to invest 
in social and physical infrastructure".775 Both consequences would be harmful to the 
host state.  
While up to date there are no specific studies defining the impact of the tax incentives in 
attracting foreign investment to Oman, Omani tax policy should try to strike a 
reasonable balance between not discouraging FDI and preventing creating “economic 
distortion”.776 Therefore, Oman needs to take this into consideration when it grants 
taxation incentives, calculating whether the foreign investment revenues it will bring in 
are greater than the money lost by reducing taxation or offering exemptions. Recent 
studies demonstrate that when combined with other factors viewed as attractive, tax 
elimination may play an important role in increasing foreign investment.777 Therefore, it 
is likely that tax incentives alone will not attract foreign investment to the Sultanate 
unless these are combined with other factors.  
4.3.2.3 Customs duties incentives 
A further financial incentive offered to foreign investors under Article 9.1 of FCIL is 
that they can be exempted for five years from customs duties on plant, machinery and 
necessary raw materials,778 although Oman imposes a 5 per cent customs duty on most 
imported goods.779 This exemption can also be extended for a further five years. 
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However, according to a US Department of State report, this exemption provided on 
customs duties on "imports of equipment and raw materials required for production 
purposes” has been legally challenged by US and foreign competitors.780 Nevertheless, 
it is not clear on what ground. 
4.3.3 Activities in which investors cannot invest 
FCIL did not exclude specific activities from the scope of investment. However, the 
MoCI issued a list of 25 commercial activities that foreign investors are not allowed to 
pursue in Oman. These activities are as follows: photocopying and typing services, 
translation services, transactions clearance, tailoring of non-Arab menswear, tailoring of 
Arab and non-Arab ladies' apparel, tailoring of sports clothing, tailoring of military 
uniforms, motor vehicle electrical repair and recharging of batteries, repairing and 
cleaning motor vehicle radiators, repairing punctured tyres, wheel balance, replacement 
of motor vehicle oils, repairing car air- conditioning repairing motor vehicle exhaust 
pipes, car cleaning and polishing, transport and sale of drinking water, labour provision 
offices, employment offices, other activities related to labour recruitment and provisions 
personnel, driving schools, washing of clothing, ironing of clothing, hair trimming and 
cutting for men, hairdressing, facial massage and other beauty treatment for women, 
hair trimming and cutting for children.781 
Although Article 5.1 provided that the CFCI shall be responsible to "make 
recommendations in respect of [t]he identification of the investment fields", the legal 
basis for excluding such activities is not clear. However, Bolivar argues that the State 
can legally reserve certain sectors for local investors or for its own development.782 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider whether such restrictions have negative effects 
on attracting foreign investment or whether they are important as means of protecting 
the national interest of the Sultanate. This consideration should be based on the size of 
these activities and the potential they have in the Omani market. Since such studies are 
not available to date it can be argued that this restriction is a way of protecting the 
Omani national market interest from being dominated and controlled by foreigners 
because of two reasons. First, these are generally small businesses that would provide 
opportunities for Omanis who are not highly qualified to establish enterprises. Second, 
Oman lies close to a number of highly populated countries such as India, Pakistan and 
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Bangladesh, where such small businesses would be attracted, and lifting these 
restrictions would attract numerous small businesses operating in these areas.  
4.3.4 Free zones, Duqm Special Economic Zone and Knowledge Oasis Muscat  
Oman established FZs, DSEZ and KOM, a free zone for technology companies, with 
the aim of attracting foreign investment and achieving Oman's Vision 2020, a national 
development plan to eliminate dependence on the contribution of the oil sector to the 
country’s GDP.783 Today, Oman has three FZs: Sohar, Salalah and AlMazunah.784 To 
provide a general legal framework for developing FZs, Oman promulgated Royal 
Decree 56/2002.785 In addition, Royal Decree 119/2011 established DSEZ Authority, 
whilst Royal Decree 79/2013 issued the regulations for this SEZ. The DSEZ, 
strategically located by the Arabian Sea, is intended to be the key hub and gateway for 
the region.786 As for KOM, which opened in 2003, this is under the supervision of the 
Public Establishment for Industrial Estates (PEIE) and has its own incentives to attract 
foreign investment but no special law has been issued to organise its work.787  
It can be argued that the establishment of the FZs, the DSEZ and KOM in the Sultanate, 
together with their regulations, is a significant step forward in providing a better 
environment for foreign investment with non-discriminatory measures, since they 
provide a number of these features. First, both FZs and SEZ allow full foreign 
ownership (100%) and there are no minimum share capital requirements, as detailed 
under Article 4 of Royal Decree 56/2002, and under Articles 3/2 and 3/3 of Royal 
Decree 79/2013. Allowing full foreign ownership is an exception to the Commercial 
Companies Law (CCL) and FCIL. However, although KOM provides 100% foreign 
ownership it does specify the minimum capital investment required to establish an 
entity.788 
Second, the FZs of Salalah and AlMazunah require a 10% Omanisation rate;789  for 
Sohar Free Zone this rises to 15%.790 It has been argued that even this minimum 
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percentage of Omani staff in foreign companies operating in FZs may still be viewed as 
a challenge by foreign investors.791 However, it can be argued to the contrary that these 
percentages will help to solve the challenge posed by the Omanisation requirement 
facing foreign investors. This is for two reasons; these percentages are easily achievable 
as they are relatively low and importantly, they are much lower than the usual rate 
(15%-100%). In addition, this small percentage is important for the national interest in 
that while these zones must operate on a significantly different basis, they must not 
irritate Omani nationals who can get access to them. However, the issue of Omanisation 
will be examined in the following sections in this chapter.  
Thirdly, another important incentive is the scope of jurisdiction and powers provided to 
DSEZ Authority by the Royal Decree 79/2013.792 For example, under Articles 13, 14, 
15, 16 and 17 of the Decree the Authority has the functions of MoCI, the MECA and 
the MoT in related matters. These significant powers are thought to be important in 
encouraging the establishment of foreign investment in the DSEZ by smoothing the 
bureaucratic procedures.  
Finally, there are three kinds of financial incentives: tax exemption, free customs duties 
and unrestricted money transfer. Exemption from taxes and from submitting 
declarations of income set out in income tax provisions are accorded to the operating 
party and the working company in the FZs, as detailed in Article 3 of Royal Decree 
56/2002 for the issue of FZs. Moreover, a 30-year exemption from taxes is provided in 
the SEZ under Articles 3/1 and 4 of the Royal Decree 79/2013. However, this article 
also excludes some sectors from this exemption on condition that they should be 
registered with the Authority and operate permanently within the borders of the zone. 
These are: banks, financial institutions, insurance and reinsurance companies, 
companies working in the field of telecommunications services, and those in the field of 
road transport, except road transport companies. Such conditions and exceptions seem 
                                                                                                                                                                          
790 Sohar Port and free zone, ‘Setting up bubsiness’ <www.soharportandfreezone.com/en/setting-up-
business/incentives> accessed 13 June 2015  
791 Healy Consultants, ‘Oman Free Zones’, <www.healyconsultants.com/oman-company-
registration/free-zones/> accessed 12 June 2015  
792This includes the jurisdiction of the Secretariat General of the Commercial Registration with relation to 
implementing the commercial Registration Law for registering projects, the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Tourism in implementing the Tourism Law for issuing licenses for tourism projects, the jurisdiction of the 
MoCI for implementing the GCC Standard Industrial Regularization for Industrial registration and license 
granting for industrial projects, the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Manpower for applying the Labour 
Law, determining fees for expatriate recruitment and Omanisation rates for different projects, the 
jurisdiction of the Public Authority for Mining for enforcement of the Mining Law, and the jurisdictions 
of related authorities for implementing laws and regulations regarding environmental protection and food 
safety. See Sultanate of Oman, Investment in Duqm, Special Economic Zones Authority (Awareness and 
Media Department 2015) 10  
162 
unnecessary since companies cannot operate in the DSEZ without registration with the 
Authority and it cannot assure their permanence. The three FZs and the DSEZ are also 
exempt from customs duties, as detailed in Article 17 of Royal Decree 56/ 2002 and 
Article 5 of Royal Decree 119/2011. Furthermore, foreign investment in FZs and the 
DSEZ is exempted from restrictions on money repatriation, as provided by Article 13 of 
Royal Decree 56/2002, and Article 10 of Royal Decree 79/2013. 
The main challenge with regard to the attraction of foreign investment currently is that 
this large number of independent entities, (DSEZ, FZs, Industrial Estates and other 
investment entities) are administered by different authorities and boards and this has 
produced a lack of coherent strategy for attracting investment.793 For example, the 
OBFA found a lack of clarity concerning what the FZs and PEIE offer, and what is 
available generally if a project is of national importance.794 It has also been observed 
that there is a lack of understanding between the MoCI and KOM about certain 
incentives for foreign investment795 and that responsibilities for these areas are split 
among too many Ministries and Ministers.796 A World Bank Group study concluded 
that foreign investors believe Oman lacks a clear strategic vision.797 This will be 
addressed in further depth in Chapter Six. 
FZs also pose some specific challenges, such as that it is obligatory to rent a site in the 
FZs to be able to invest798 and that foreign companies must renew their licences 
annually when submitting their annual financial statements to the FZ authority.799 In 
addition, since the FZs are still under construction, they lack many facilities and 
customer services are poor.800 As these zones were only established relatively recently, 
it is hoped that this development problem will be solved over time. 
4.3.5 Guarantees of freedom to transfer money 
The guarantee of freedom of money transfer from the host state is vital to the creation 
and enhancement of foreign investors' companies, as without this guarantee the 
investment would be useless for them.801 This section examines whether there are 
restrictions on transferring money into or out of Oman. It also determines whether this 
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is on a non-discriminatory basis and is in accordance with internationally accepted 
criteria. 
The free economy policy applied in Oman and declared in the Basic Law802 enables 
foreign investors to remit abroad, in any convertible foreign currency, foreign capital 
invested.803 FCIL ensures protection for the transfer of all payments related to 
investments. However, it is argued that this existing right under Article 11 of FCIL is 
addressed inadequately. Nevertheless, Articles 16 and 17 of the DNFIL increase the 
protection of the right to repatriation of funds to international standards.804 Compared 
with the current law, the DNFIL contains more guarantees with regard to reducing 
financial obstacles. For example, Article 16 of the DNFIL ensures the right of foreign 
investors and the investment to "convert currency of the Sultanate into a freely 
convertible currency in order to make payment relating to the investment project".  
Despite this difference in the guarantee between FCIL and the DNFIL, the inefficiency 
mentioned above under FCIL is not clear in practice; rather Oman places no reporting 
requirements or restrictions on private capital movements into or out of the Sultanate, 
including money transfer abroad of interest, branch profits, dividends, equity or debt 
capital, royalties, service and management fees, and personal savings. In addition, there 
is no plan to change money transfer policies in the Sultanate. 805 A bank account can be 
opened by anybody holding a residence visa or an investor visa, then funds can be 
exported or imported.806 Oman does not require a currency declaration, so currencies 
can move in or out of the country without restrictions.807 However, before approving a 
transaction involving foreign bank transfers, Omani banks require complete 
documentation of the source of funds.808 Omani financial institutions, governed by the 
Central Bank of Oman, constitute a strong and effective supervisory system that is well 
capitalized.809  
However, generally, it seems that there are two cases when a host country can apply 
restrictions on money transfer. First, Dolzer and Schreuer have argued that in order to 
protect national policies of the host state is it necessary to monitor large currency 
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transfers into the state and out of it, in order to control its currency and its foreign 
capital. Sudden short-term capital inflows, especially capital flight, may cause 
instability in domestic financial markets, as experience has shown.810 Therefore, in 
some cases the right to transfer is restricted to specific types of transfers. The main rules 
ensure the right of free transfer of money resulting from investment, or allowing all 
transfers “in connection with an investment” or “related to an investment”.811  
Second, according to Sornarajah, the host state commitments to freedom of money 
transfer cannot be obligatory in a country at times of financial crises.812 States have the 
right to exercise their sovereignty by controlling economic sources and property within 
their territory to ensure the development of their economic, political and other goals.813 
Sornarajah maintains that the rise of different situations of financial crisis makes the 
provision of absolute rights of repatriation defeasible and calls for the application of the 
doctrine of clausula rebus sic stantibus. In his opinion, until the difficult situation 
improves, a host state has the right to apply the general doctrine of necessity and 
suspend treaty obligations to permit repatriation. He notes that the treaties of some 
countries, such as the UK, provide that in exceptional economic or financial 
circumstances the right of repatriation of profits may be restricted.814 Consequently, 
although the liberalization of financial markets is beneficial for both host states and 
foreign investors, during times of economic crisis states may apply restrictions on the 
right to transfer.815  
Nevertheless, apart from the eligible restrictions under Oman's international agreements, 
Omani laws particularly Omani Basic Law, FCIL and the Omani Banking Law issued 
by Royal Decree 114/2000,816 did not introduce any restrictions on money transfer, 
whether in an economic crisis or on the basis of national interest. Article 11 of Omani 
Basic Law provides that: "Private property is protected. No-one shall be prevented from 
disposing of his property within the limits of the Law". In addition, Article 11 of FCIL 
states clearly that: “The investors in the investment projects shall be free […] to transfer 
abroad the imported capital along with the profits accrued from the project.”  
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4.4 Law Relating to Industrial Regulations  
4.4.1 The regulation of trade unions in Oman 
The legal basis for the establishment of trade unions in the Sultanate is Article 108 of 
Royal Decree 74/2006 amending the Labour Law issued by Royal Decree 35/2003. This 
article allows workers to establish labour unions to defend their rights, protect their 
interests, represent them in all matters relating to their work affairs and improve their 
material and social status.817 This development is important to safeguard workers' 
economic rights and ensure that a safe working environment is provided for them.818 In 
addition, Article 12 of the Basic Law of the State emphasises that the aim of issuing the 
related laws is to protect workers and employers and manage the relationship between 
them. For instance, this article prohibits imposition of compulsory work on anyone 
unless it is specified by law.819 Nevertheless, the clause “unless it is specified by law” 
may be controversial as it may weaken the protection under this article. This is because 
there is no guarantee that domestic regulation will not impose certain compulsory 
works.  
Article 109 of the Labour Law urges trade unions in the Sultanate to establish an 
organisation to act as their representative in national, regional and international 
events820 and the creation of the General Federation of Oman Trade Unions (GFOTU) 
in the Sultanate was a significant step toward ensuring greater respect for labour 
rights.821 The Labour Law ensures the independence of trade unions and the GFOTU by 
prohibiting any means of interference in their work, as emphasized by Article 110.822 
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More specifically, it prohibits employers from dismissing or punishing workers because 
of their union activities823 as stated clearly in Article (110 Bis):  
It shall not be allowed to apply the dismissal penalty or any other penalty on the 
workers' representatives in the Labour Unions or Labour Associations or the General 
Federation of the Sultanate of Oman's workers for the activities they practice in their 
Labour Unions in accordance with this law and the ministerial decisions implementing 
it.  
The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) has claimed that the Omani 
government maintains control over union activities, arguing that the Omani authorities 
can refuse the constitution of a union on the basis of arbitrary reasons and that 
compulsory requirements effectively limit their ability to exercise the right to strike. For 
example, the MoM may refuse to register a trade union if it is not persuaded that the 
requirements for registration have been met. 824  
While it could be argued that the way of objecting to the establishment of trade unions 
is clearly defined under Article 8 of Ministerial Decision 570/2012 issued by the 
Minister of Manpower and this should help to reduce the interference of the authority in 
the establishment of trade unions, it would be more protective to grant supervision of 
ministerial decisions to the judiciary.  Nevertheless, as part of Oman's commitments 
under international treaties, new amendments in the Labour Law remove the 
requirements that union leaders must be able to speak and write Arabic and that unions 
must inform the MoM at least one month in advance of union meetings.825  
It can be said that the provisions on establishing trade unions represent progress in 
improving the protection of workers' rights in Oman, reflected in Omani laws and court 
practice. For example, the Omani High Court ruled in 2006 that foreign employees 
could change employers without first receiving the consent of their original sponsor.826 
This is a positive progress, as previously foreign employees had to get the consent of 
their original Omani employer. However, it is argued that if trade unions are very active 
within a country, this is likely to impact negatively on foreign investment because of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of registration at the Ministry and they shall have the right to freely practice their activity without 
interference in their affairs or influencing them”. 
823 ITUC, Internationally-recognised core labour standards in the Sultanate of Oman 3 <www.ituc-
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concerns among multinational enterprises that certain union activities may reduce the 
profitability of their investments.827 This will be discussed further later. 
4.4.2 Guarantees provided regarding bringing employees to Oman 
Permission to bring foreign workers to Oman is important to enable foreign investors to 
run their business with well-qualified and cheap labour. The Labour Law and its 
subsequent amendments were reformed in line with market liberalisation and to deal 
with all aspects of the employee-employer relationship. However, it is believed that 
employment issues in the Sultanate are a major concern for foreign investors and unless 
the country can provide clear, well-targeted legislation to create a business-friendly 
environment, particularly with respect to labour laws, foreign investors will choose to 
go elsewhere.828 For example, if the MoM is blocking the process of bringing 
employees, it will negatively affect foreign investment, no matter how good the other 
guarantees are. 
It can be argued that the Omani government opted to ease the process of bringing 
employees to the Sultanate, so that foreign investors could benefit from guarantees 
provided under its legal provisions on the matter. According to Article 18 of the Labour 
Law, companies or employers wishing to use non-Omani workers must seek permission 
from the MoM. In addition, before permission is granted, specific conditions must be 
met, namely, that Omanis are not available who can be employed for the required 
positions or professions, that the employer has achieved the prescribed percentage of 
Omanisation; and that the specified fee has been paid.829 The MoM must apply the same 
standard procedure for both foreign and local investors.  
Regulations in the DSEZ offer a better guarantee of the freedom to employ foreign 
workers. Article 19 of the Royal Decree 79/2013 obliges the MoM to issue the 
necessary permits for foreign labour within five working days from the date on which 
the applications were submitted. According to this article, if no decision has been made 
within this period, the application "shall be deemed as approved".830 This means that the 
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relevant Omani authorities should not hinder the completion of the process of bringing 
foreign labourers because of the approval of MoM. Moreover, the DSEZ Authority and 
the MoM signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 29/06/2015,831 in order to 
implement this Article. A policy maker interviewee declared that this provision is now 
being applied effectively832 which should help to solve what was a difficulty for foreign 
investors.  
Articles 47 and 48 of the Labour Law grant employers the right to re-organise and 
restructure their business and the workforce for technical, economic and structural 
purposes.833 The Omani High Court held that:  
[A]n employer has the absolute power and authority to reorganise its business, be 
responsible for the management of the same for the realisation of profits therefrom and 
to assume responsibility for any failure of its business.834 
Undoubtedly, under the Omani legal system, if employers decide to “restructure” and 
drop their workforce to cut costs, the rights and responsibilities of both employers and 
employees including foreign workers, will be dealt with according to their work 
contracts provisions in the Omani Labour Law. However, no formal criteria have been 
introduced by the Oman Labour Law to be followed regarding the restructuring and 
reorganization of a business. Accordingly, if the shareholders of different entities, for 
example, A and B, decide to restructure their ownership to incorporate a new entity, 
employees of A and B may be transferred to the new entity. Nevertheless, it is 
recommended that the employers in entities A and B seek the consent of each employee 
to be transferred in order to avoid any legal claims and safeguard the employer's future 
interests. Article 47 of the Labour Law states that: 
With the exception of the cases of liquidation, bankruptcy and the final authorized 
closure, the contract of work shall remain existing and the successor shall be jointly 
liable with the previous employer for discharging all the obligations prescribed by law 
subject to the established priority of the worker's rights. 
Therefore, in the case of merger of firms, the employment contract remains in force and 
both firms share joint responsibility for safeguarding the workers’ existing rights.835  
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One challenge that may be faced by foreign investors is the obligation regarding Omani 
workers. According to Article 48 bis of the Labour Law, Omani employees must be 
automatically transferred to the new contractor on the same terms and conditions as 
with the previous contractor, when there is a transfer of an employment contract on a 
project from one contractor to another, and the work to be carried out remains the 
same.836 Therefore, in this situation, if an employment contract is transferred to a 
foreign investor, then that company will be obliged to employ Omani workers under the 
same conditions and terms as the previous contractors, whereas the article does not 
oblige foreign employees to be transferred in the same manner as Omani employees.  
A lawyer interviewee observed that in practice, there are difficulties in transferring 
workers from one contract to another837 and these mostly concern foreign employees. 
Therefore, foreign investors who intend to use expatriate labour should take into 
consideration two things: the necessary approval from the MoM prior to the transfer, 
and that this does not negatively affect the Omanisation percentage, either with the 
previous or the new employer.838 However, the first is more challenging than the second 
for foreign investors, as elaborated above. Article 18 of the Labour Law specifies the 
conditions that must be met in order for labour cards to be issued to employees. These 
include: 
 Omanis are not available for employment for the required positions or 
professions for which the labour clearance is sought; 
 The Employer has achieved the prescribed percentage of Omanisation 
Given that there are two conditions, this raises the issue of whether both conditions 
must be met at the same time by a foreign company in order to obtain labour clearance. 
While in practice it is not clear how strict the MoM in applying this article,839 it seems 
that companies must meet both conditions, which may be difficult for foreign 
companies in some cases, especially from a business perspective.  
Despite the protection afforded, there are three challenges to bringing foreign workers 
to the Sultanate. The first is the quota of Omanis who must be employed; this point will 
be examined in detail later. Second, under Article 11 of the Foreigners' Residence Law 
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issued by Royal Decree 61/95, an employment visa will not be issued to any expatriate 
who has previously worked in Oman but has not completed two years from the date of 
their last departure.840 This article is controversial and it is believed it may have a 
negative effect on the Omani labour market because it deprives companies of workers 
who have acquired much-needed local knowledge, experience and skills. For example, 
new middle-level and senior level workers need at least six months to obtain a driving 
licence.841 The law also affects expatriate workers since it may effectively force them to 
work with the same employer, even if the working conditions are not good because if 
they wish to leave a company to work elsewhere, once the employer has released them, 
they will not be able to return to Oman for two years. In addition, the regulation may 
reduce company expansion, since the only way of interviewing most overseas labour is 
by telephone, which means companies cannot know their actual skills and may find 
themselves forced to fire employees who fail to meet expectations.842 In contrast, 
companies are in a better situation to know their prospective employees if they are 
already working within the country.843  Therefore, opponents of this policy argue that it 
impacts negatively on Oman’s image with the international business community.844  
Others argue conversely, that the two-year ban will help to reduce hidden businesses in 
the Sultanate.845 In addition, it will help companies to maintain a more stable workforce, 
since previously workers frequently moved between companies and there was a great 
deal of poaching. The current legislation means companies wanting experienced 
workers must now hire them from outside the country. Another view trying to balance 
between the mentioned views saying that the ban should be based on criminal offences; 
a professional who has committed no such offences should have full rights to use his 
experience.846  
There are two exceptions to the two-year ban: if workers either re-join their previous 
employer or obtain a no objection certificate from their current employer. In the latter 
case, the foreign worker is allowed to work in another company even if the initial 
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contract is not completed. However, in this case the challenge which may be faced by 
the employer who issues a no objection certificate is that this will result in them losing 
an expatriate visa from the company quota, presumably meaning that they can only 
replace the departing employee with an Omani. On the contrary, if they refuse to issue 
the no objection certificate, then the company can hire another expatriate or retain the 
same employee. 847  
The third challenge relates to decisions prohibiting transfer of foreign workers into 
certain sectors and jobs. The MoM issued three Ministerial Decisions in one year 
(550/2013, 617/2013 and 618/2013) that prohibited temporarily bringing foreign labour 
to Oman in various sectors and jobs. This was viewed as a response to significant 
increases in foreign labour in the Sultanate and as an attempt to create employment for 
Omanis.848 However, these decisions may impact negatively on the foreign investment 
environment in Oman. Although Ministerial Decisions 550/2013 and 617/2013 do not 
apply to international companies, they may negatively affect the performance of other 
foreign investors as they will be unable to bring in foreign workers but Omani labour 
will be unavailable for certain jobs.849 Another difficulty caused by these decisions is 
that they do not exclude well-qualified and skilled workers, only those who are 
unqualified.850 Moreover, issuing three decisions in one year is an indication of the 
quick changes in regulation, which need to be considered carefully to keep the 
regulations related to foreign investment more stable.  
Some foreign investors have raised concerns about the difficulties in obtaining labour 
clearances from the MoM851 and it has been said that this practice is intended to make 
foreign investors recruit from local job seekers.852 Notably, the MoM has been accused 
by policymaker, lawyer, and foreign investor interviewees of not being conducive to 
foreign investment, by failing to provide approval for expatriate labour clearances.853  
However, it can be argued that notwithstanding the mentioned challenges, official 
statistics show that the Omani market has attracted a large number of foreign workers, 
which may be evidence of how easy it is to bring in foreign labour. According to the 
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Omani Centre for Statistics and Information (OCSI), on 20 of May 2016 the number of 
foreigners in the Sultanate was 2,024,460, including 1,763,710 foreign workers until 
April 2016, although there are only 2,418,931 Omani nationals.854 This means that 
foreigners constitute about 45% and foreign workers about 40% of Oman’s total 
population. Therefore, these statistics are real proof of the ease of bringing foreign 
labour into the country and that it is encouraging foreign investment. 
4.4.3 Challenges posed by the Omanisation policy  
While hiring a specific percentage of Omani citizens in companies may be a challenge 
for foreign investors, it has become a high priority for the Omani government.855 
Pursuant to Article 11 of the Labour Law and the Ministerial Decision 321/2009 by the 
MoM, companies working in Oman are subject to “Omanisation” requirements. 
According to the Decision, the Omani government established targets for Omanisation 
of the private sector in six fields as follows: information technology, transport, travel 
and tourism, oil and gas, consultancy offices and contracting. The Omanisation quotas 
vary from one job to another, between 15- 100%.856 It is the responsibility of the MoM 
to specify the percentage of Omanisation needed in each sector of economic activity.857 
The percentages of Omanisation are reorganized from time to time according to national 
development and economic needs.858 However, a lawyer interviewee highlighted the 
challenges faced by foreign investors wishing to obtain labour clearances as a result of 
the Omanisation policy.859 One foreign investor also complained that the MoM had 
rejected his applications for expatriate labour clearances unless he employed Omanis 
from the MoM's list of job seekers.860  
The changing rate of the Omanisation requirement is a challenge.861 However, it can be 
argued that the problems is not in the changing rate is per se, but the way of changing 
the rate. This is a real challenge when the change of quotas is quick because there is a 
need to make it consistent and not conflicting with the stability and consistency of the 
regulation. For example, due to the Arab Spring protests in 2011, this percentage was 
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increased as the Omani government aims to employ more Omanis every year.862 In 
addition, in 2014, the Omanisation quotas in certain occupations were increased by a 
MoM Ministerial Decision.863 The affected areas included construction, carpentry, 
cashiering, metalworking, brick making, debt collection, shop-keeping, and janitorial 
services.864 Therefore, it is argued that quotas cause uncertainty among foreign 
investors, as they are likely to be increased.865 This has occurred already in Salalah, in 
the South region of Oman.866  
Although the MoM has a scheme for rewarding or punishing companies according to 
whether or not they achieve the Omanisation quota,867 it is observed that in practice, it is 
rare for fines to be enforced if the company shows good faith in attempting to achieve 
the target.868 However, the most challenging measure that may be taken by the MoM 
against companies that fail to hire qualified Omanis to meet the Omanisation targets, is 
refusal to issue expatriate labour clearances, unless qualified Omanis are not 
available.869 According to the Omani High Court, it is fair and acceptable if a company 
has dismissed an expatriate employee in order to replace him or her with an Omani 
national.870 Allowing only one fixed term contract per worker is the approach hold by 
Omani Courts.871 The positions to be filled and the industry in question determine the 
percentage of Omanis to be employed.872 While the position of the Omani courts may 
be based on the Labour Law, much consideration is needed to the application of these 
provisions, especially when the foreign worker is already employed and his or her right 
should be protected according to the contract with the company.   
It is argued that the quota of Omanisation, even with a small percentage of 30%, is still 
difficult for foreign companies to meet, especially where there is a lack of the 
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qualifications and productivity needed among Omani workers.873 Therefore, it is 
claimed that the government policy of Omanisation has hindered investment in Oman 
and it is a real challenge for foreign investors.874 A policymaker interviewee suggested 
that a better approach to Omanisation would be through a one-year holiday from 
Omanisation,875 or through a transitional plan. For example, foreign investors should be 
required to show within a specific number of years that they have recruited Omanis and 
participated in training them. It is believed that it is difficult to expect foreign investors' 
companies to achieve the Omanisation rate from the first days. The difficulty is shown 
by some cases when jobs have been announced for 8 months and the company has 
received very few applications.876 
One may argue that the Omanisation policy is an important national security 
programme, especially as unemployment is one of the main concerns that may cause 
instability in the country.877 The actual problem with attraction of foreign investment 
might be not with the quota of Omanisation, which varies, but with the availability of 
qualified and skilled Omani workers. For example, one foreign investor claimed that he 
was unable to recruit Omanis because half of the Omani candidates did not attend the 
interviews and the majority of applicants were not suitable for the jobs.878 According to 
a survey conducted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 2011, 66% of 
respondents believed that the current labour legislation is a challenge to enterprise 
growth. The survey showed that only 13% of respondents felt that the national 
workforce had the needed skills. In addition, in 2012 a survey by Oman American 
Business Council reached a similar conclusion, that the quality of the workforce is the 
biggest challenge in doing business in Oman.879  
Human resources, including availability of labour with training and technical skills, are 
important in the investment decision.880 Therefore, it is argued rightly that Omanisation 
can only be achieved without discouraging investment if the government takes actions 
needed to ensure Omanis are well prepared to enter the workforce.881 It also needs to 
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amend its Omanisation scheme in accordance with best international practice by using 
work permits, visas and positive incentives to achieve Omanisation targets.882  
4.4.4 The challenge of the minimum salary for Omanis  
The increased cost of Omani labour is another challenge that was raised by some 
interviewees.883 According to the Ministerial decision 222/2013, the minimum wage for 
an Omani worker is OMR 325.884 This development of obliging companies to apply 
minimum wages for Omanis is combined with the Omanisation requirement.885 It is 
found that the factor of availability of labour supply has a strong effect on the location 
of foreign direct investment.886  
However, the link between low wages and the attraction of foreign investment is 
controversial. Some argue that the lower the cost of labour, the more attractive the 
country, whereas, the higher the cost of labour, the weaker the country's ability to attract 
foreign investment.887 It is believed that low wage costs in developing countries and 
high production standards are significant in attracting foreign investors searching for 
cost efficiency.888 Therefore, there is a clear link between stronger worker rights and 
higher labour costs, which are expected to have a negative effect on attracting FDI.889 
Nevertheless, it is argued that there is no evidence that countries with low labour 
standards have attracted more FDI; instead, the opposite is the case.890  
It can be argued that, as has been seen with the challenge of Omanisation, the decision 
to impose a minimum salary is not a problem by itself. However, the combination of 
three elements, the minimum wage condition, the Omanisation rate requirement, and the 
lack of well-qualified workers in some sectors, would be a real challenge. This is 
because foreign companies find themselves obliged to achieve a certain rate of Omani 
workers, drawn from a specific list, and at the same time are not allowed to pay them 
less than a specified salary. The challenge for companies caused by this combination of 
the two requirements may lead foreign investors to seek places with cheaper labour. 
However, it is argued that the negative effect of the wages increase on FDI is likely to 
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be offset by other positive effects of stronger freedom of association and collective 
bargaining (FACB) rights to attract FDI to the country.891 
4.5 Guarantees of Political Stability in Oman 
Political stability is mainly an internal issue that plays an important role in attracting 
foreign investment. If a country lacks political stability, it will significantly decrease the 
inflow of FDI.892 Political risk is ranked as the second most important constraint to FDI 
in developing countries after the challenge of macroeconomic instability.893 The World 
Bank Group's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Fund (MIGA) defines political risks to 
include "war, revolutions, government seizure of property and actions to restrict the 
movement of profits or other revenues from within a country".894 Some of these issues 
have already been examined earlier in this chapter and this section addresses them from 
a legal perspective.  
Political stability in Oman may become a controversial issue. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that Oman has a number of strong elements for political stability. It is a member 
in many international organisations and a signatory of significant number of multilateral 
and bilateral treaties, as has been discussed earlier. Clearly, this has its effect on Oman's 
commitments internationally and in the development of its domestic legislation, in 
addition to the guarantees provided by the agreements themselves, especially the 
significant number of BITs signed by Oman. In addition, experience shows that Oman 
has the ability to respond wisely to public needs and internal challenges by amending 
the related domestic laws. For example, in response to the Arab Spring in 2011, 
significant changes were made in the government’s membership and amendments of 
laws necessary to maintain stability including the Basic Law.895 
 
On the other hand, the handover of power in Oman may become a challenge for 
attracting foreign investment. It is argued that Oman has an uncertain future.896 This is 
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because it is the only monarchy in the world that does not have a known successor.897 It 
is argued that the death of the Sultan could lead to political instability and cause market 
uncertainty.898 To investigate this claim, a number of questions need to be raised; what 
are the scenarios for transfer of power? What would be the effect of those scenarios on 
the protection of foreign investment in the Sultanate?  
Article 5 of the Basic Law specifies the conditions of eligibility for the succession. A 
successor must be male, a descendant of Sayyid Turki bin Said bin Sultan, Muslim, 
mature, rational and the legitimate son of Omani Muslim parents.899 Article 6 of the 
Basic Law states that: 
The Royal Family Council shall, within three days of the throne falling vacant, 
determine the successor to the throne.  
If the Royal Family Council does not agree on a choice of a Sultan for the Country, the 
Defence Council together with the Chairman of Majlis Al Dawla, the Chairman of 
Majlis Al Shura, and the Chairman of the High Court along with two of his most senior 
deputies, shall instate the person designated by His Majesty the Sultan in his letter to the 
Royal Family Council. 
According to this article, there are three possible scenarios: first, the Royal Family 
Council would agree on choosing the individual named in the Sultan’s letter, within 
three days after the Sultan's death. The second scenario is that the Royal Family Council 
will disagree on choosing the successor nominated by the Sultan in his letter. Therefore, 
this assumes that the Royal Family Council may agree or not within three days in 
choosing a successor. The question which may be raised by this article is, who are the 
members of the Royal Family Council? The membership of the Royal Family Council is 
not known publicly. Another question is, is it possible for the Royal Family Council to 
agree on a successor different from the one named in the Sultan’s letter? Although the 
Basic Law does not express it, it seems that in practice it is impossible for the Royal 
Family Council to agree on a successor not specified in the Sultan’s letter, as its role 
specified by Article 6 is merely to agree or not on the person designated by the Sultan in 
his letter.   
The third scenario, according to this article, is that if the Royal Family Council does not 
agree in choosing the Sultan, then the Defence Council together with the Chairmen of 
State Council and Alshura Council and the Chairman of the High Court along with two 
                                                           
897 Disadvantages of Oman company registration (n 873) 
898 Ibid 
899 Basic Law, art 5 states that: “The system of governance is Sultani, hereditary in the male descendants 
of Sayyid Turki bin Said bin Sultan, provided that whomever is to be chosen from amongst them as 
successor shall be a Muslim, mature, rational and the legitimate son of Omani Muslim parents”.  
178 
of his most senior deputies shall appoint the one chosen by the Sultan in his letter to the 
Royal Family Council. It is clear that this scenario is a fallback position to avoid any 
disagreement or clashes on the successor. It is obvious that this article assumes that the 
Sultan has written a letter, naming the designated person.  
It can be argued that there are two challenges for foreign investors with all of these three 
scenarios. The Sultan possesses exclusive power according to the Omani Basic Law, but 
because of the mechanism specified under Article 6, the successor and his approach 
toward foreign investment will not be known to foreign investors until the death of the 
Sultan. Another challenge is that the country may be left for about three days without 
knowing who is to be Sultan, which may become a challenging situation for foreign 
investment. It is important for the stability of the country and better attraction of foreign 
investment that the successor be known in advance and before the death of the Sultan.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Basic Law through the handover of power has 
established a new approach compared with what is generally applied in the region. It is 
clear that the successor is already named in the Sultan's letter and his succession will be 
ratified either by the Royal Family Council or by the other bodies. In addition, Article 8 
makes it clear that the Government should perform its functions as usual until the power 
is shifted to the new successor.900 Importantly, it is obliged to adhere to the international 
and regional charters and treaties by Article 10 of the Basic Law.  
4.6 Conclusion  
While the guarantee against expropriation under Omani Basic Law is relatively better 
than the FCIL, both laws provide weak protection, mostly because of the absence of the 
right of referring to international tribunal. However, the DNFIL is expected to address 
this challenge, as it contains such a right. Compensation for expropriation seems not a 
challenge in Oman, as long as foreign investor is able to prove the expropriation.  
It is clear that the prohibition of landed property for foreign investors out of ITCs except 
for GCC citizens and the limited ITCs areas affected negatively the attraction of foreign 
investment to Oman. It is argued that Oman's obligations under the TRIPs Agreement 
(WTO) are applied consistently in all Oman's national intellectual property rights laws. 
However, the exceptions accorded to the WTO's Member States need to be balanced 
carefully between safeguarding the Omani national interests and at the same time 
                                                           
900 Basic Law, art 8 states that: "The Government shall continue to perform its functions as usual until the 
Sultan is chosen and exercises his authority". 
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protecting the core intellectual property rights of the owner in order to attract foreign 
investment.  
It is further argued that to provide better intellectual property rights for foreign 
investors, Oman needs to do three things, first, to allow intellectual property owners to 
appeal against the administrative decisions before the national courts. Second, to 
improve the enforcement mechanism for protecting intellectual property rights, 
benefiting from the experience of some countries. For example, Singapore has 
strengthened the enforcement of intellectual property rights by establishing a specialised 
crime division devoted to the investigation and suppression of intellectual property 
rights violation in Singapore within its Police Force, known as the Intellectual Property 
Rights Branch.901 Third, to eliminate the vagueness in some areas, such as has been 
analysed with the word “similar”.  
While money transfer by foreign investors is guaranteed by Omani laws, there is a lack 
of clarity as to the legal basis in national laws for any restrictions which may be applied 
by Oman in cases of transferring large amount of money or in a national financial crisis. 
It is argued that to balance between protecting foreign investment and national interests 
it is important to facilitate entry for skilled and qualified foreign workers.  
Three further shortcomings to foreign investment caused by Omani regulations have 
been examined this including, the Consumer Law and policy, the Omanisation scheme 
and the minimum wage condition. It is believed strongly that certain amendments may 
help to establish a balanced approach in the Consumer Law provisions, between 
protecting consumers' rights and fully applying the policy of free market economy to 
eliminate unnecessary measures against companies. In addition, it is believed that to 
address the challenges of the Omanisation scheme and the minimum wage condition, it 
is important to look at the issues in a broader way by linking them with other factors 
such as the lack of well-qualified workers rather than dealing with each issue separately. 
Furthermore, although ignorance as to the successor may worry foreign investors, it is 
clear that the successor is already named in the Sultan's letter and his succession will be 
ratified either by the Family Council or by the other bodies.  
With regard to the guarantee of non-discrimination, the World Bank Group 
recommended that a possible solution for the requirements relating to national 
ownership specified by Article 2 of the FCIL, would be to eliminate or reduce the local 
                                                           
901 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010 
<http://ww3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2009-10.pdf> accessed June 26 
2014 
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ownership requirement, as is already the case for GCC and US nationals who have 
100% ownership rights.902 In addition, Omani national ownership could be maintained 
through a short negative list for certain sensitive sectors.903  
It is recommended as well that the issue of incentives in the Sultanate needs to be 
tackled in two ways. The short-term priority is to conduct an inventory of Oman’s 
investment incentives, identify which kinds of incentives are effective and refocus on 
these to achieve the country’s goals. The medium-term priority involves incentive 
reform.904 This can be achieved through consultation and coordination among many 
governmental bodies, including the MoCI, Ministry of Finance and its Directorate for 
Taxation, the Ministry of Tourism (MoT), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
Council of Ministers.905 This will be analysed further in Chapter Six. Nevertheless, 
there is no doubt that the establishment of FZs and the DSEZ in the Sultanate, with their 
regulations, is a significant step forward to providing the protection and guarantees 
needed to foreign investment.   
Overall, the evaluation in this chapter suggests that the NDFIL will go a long way 
towards remedying existing weaknesses in Oman's treatment of foreign investors, 
bringing it into line with the best international standards. Even this, however, is not 
sufficient in itself; much will depend on the quality, consistency and effectiveness of the 
new law's implementation and enforcement. Moreover, under any FDI rules, it is 
possible that disputes will arise from time to time. In the next chapter, therefore, the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of Oman's dispute settlement system for issues related 
to foreign investment will be analysed. 
 
                                                           
902 World Bank Group (n 665) 6, 11  
903 Ibid 11  
904 Ibid 9, 10 
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Chapter 5. Guarantees and Weaknesses in the Omani Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism with regard to Foreign Investment 
Disputes  
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter evaluates the extent to which the judiciary and arbitration in Oman provide 
appropriate vehicles for settling investment disputes by analysing the challenges and 
guarantees available in both these mechanisms in Oman. The host state needs an 
effective national dispute settlement mechanism since this serves as the means by which 
its obligations under BITs and international conventions and treaties are enforced.  
With regard to litigation, investment related disputes within Oman are resolved through 
Oman’s Administrative Court, and through the commercial and labour circuits of the 
Omani courts. These courts have jurisdiction over the decisions made by the Omani 
authorities, and commercial, tax and labour cases. This chapter begins, therefore, by 
examining the Omani litigation system covering foreign investment. It will analyse the 
reform of the Omani judiciary, the basis for its independence, Omani court practice, and 
the levels of confidence in the Omani national court system. 
With regard to arbitration, Oman has modernised its laws by adopting the UNCITRAL 
Model Law of Arbitration.906 As mentioned earlier, Article 14 of FCIL allows for 
referral of any dispute between foreign investors and third parties to a national or 
international tribunal, by mutual agreement. Arbitration is also recognised as a way to 
settle investment disputes in all Oman’s BITs907 and the Oman-USA FTA.908 Oman’s 
legal framework, including the Arbitration Law and related laws, provides for the 
enforcement of arbitral awards in the Sultanate. In addition, it is a party to the UN New 
York Convention and the ICSID.  
The second part of the chapter will focus on whether the Arbitration Law and 
mechanism in Oman provide an appropriate environment for the resolution of disputes 
concerning foreign investment. Therefore, it will analyse the following issues: the 
                                                           
906 M I M Aboul-Enein, ‘The development of international commercial arbitration laws in the Arab 
World’ (1999) Arbitration 1, 3  
907 For example, according to Oman-Germany BIT 2007, art 10/2 (b) if a dispute arises between a foreign 
investor and a state and it cannot be settled within a period of three months, international arbitration may 
be sought alternatively or consecutively when requested by the investor. Oman-Sweden BIT 1995, art 8/2 
refers the dispute between a signatory state and a citizen of the other signatory state to ICSID. 
908 Oman-USA FTA 2009, art 10 15 states that: “1 In the event that a disputing party considers that an 
investment dispute cannot be settled by consultation and negotiation: 
(a) the claimant, on its own behalf, may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim” 
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extent to which arbitration is supported by the Omani courts, how arbitral awards are 
enforced in Oman, and finally, whether the public policy element of arbitration adopted 
by Omani courts is in accordance with international standards, in other words, is it in 
broad or narrow interpretation.  
5.2 The Omani Litigation System regarding Foreign Investment 
5.2.1 The reform of the Omani judiciary  
In order to provide a reliable legal environment for foreign investment, the reform of the 
judiciary since 1970 in the Sultanate has attempted to strike a balance between 
modernizing the system whilst at the same time recognising the cultural heritage of 
Omani society. Oman is different from other countries in the region, in that the Sultan is 
the head of a hierarchy that relies “upon Shari’a of the Ibadhi School”909 and this 
Islamic school of law was traditionally reflected in Oman’s legal system.910  
Legal reforms in Oman went through three main developments. The first, beginning in 
1970, involved establishing three judicial bodies; the Shari’a Courts, the Committee for 
the Settlement of Commercial Disputes (CSCD), and the criminal courts. The Shari’a 
Courts, which are under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), dealt with 
civil and family cases, and handled the majority of judicial activity in Oman. 911 The 
CSCD was established in 1974 by Royal Decree 4 /1974 to deal with commercial 
disputes. It was replaced in 1981 by the Authority for the Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes (ASCD), a judicial body with a separate legal personality, and a greater degree 
of administrative independence from the MoCI. In 1984, a countrywide system of 
criminal courts was established, with a special administration for criminal justice.912 
Secondly, in late 1999 a fundamental reform of Oman’s judicial system was carried out 
by four Royal Decrees.913 This was a significant legislative event that was a crucial step 
in establishing a unified and comprehensive legal system in Oman.914 These brought the 
                                                           
909 Ibadhi is a “distinct school of thought of Islam, neither Sunni nor Shi'ite, that emerged in the early 
Islamic period and remains today in small pockets of Africa and is dominant in Oman”. See Islam in 
Oman www.islam-in-oman.com, accessed 26/05/2016; W M Ballantyne ‘The states of the GCC: Sources 
of law, the Shari'a and the extent to which it applies’ in W M Ballantyne, Essays and addresses on Arab 
law (reprint, Routledge 2000) 58. 
910 Ibadhi is the dominating community crowned by the Royal family with a Sunni community and shi'a 
minority, See Hirst (n 235) 8; Carnegie Endowment/FRIDE, Arab Political Systems: Baseline 
Information and Reforms: Oman (2008) <www.carnegieendowment.org/arabpoliticalsystems> 6  
911 Hirst (n 235) 8 
912  Ibid 11 
913 A A Khan and C S Laubach, ‘Oman: Further development of Oman's legal system’ (2000) 15 Arab LQ 
112, 112  
914 The judiciary power <www.caaj.gov.om/word_sultaneng aspx accessed 19 November 2015 
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responsibility for all the courts under the umbrella of the MoJ, in order to harmonise the 
courts and determine their jurisdiction and hierarchy.915 These regulations were issued 
after the promulgation of the Basic Law 1996 in order to codify all laws in line with its 
provisions.916 Royal Decree 90/1999 issued the Judicial Authority Law and this sets out 
the different levels of courts in Oman as follows: (1) The High Court; (2) The Appellate 
Courts; (3) The Primary Courts. 
In addition, Royal Decree 91/1999 established the Administrative Court and issued its 
law. This Court plays an important role as an independent judicial body with the 
exclusive power to review decisions issued by government bodies. These include issues 
relating to foreign investors' rights in cases of violation of laws or regulations together 
with misapplication, misinterpretation or misuse of Omani authority.917 However, 
according to Article 7 of the Administrative Court Law the Court does not have 
jurisdiction over Royal Decrees or Orders, and sovereign matters. The latter expression, 
"sovereign matters", is vague and has the potential to cause difficulties in relation to the 
court’s jurisdiction in certain areas, is due to the absence of a definite definition. The 
concerns is the risk to foreign investors from broad interpretation of “sovereign 
matters”.    
Royal Decree 92/1999 established the Public Prosecution Authority as an independent 
body and issued its law whilst Royal Decree 93/1999 formulated the High Judicial 
Council. Its aims are to set up the general policy of the judiciary and to ensure its 
independence and continued development.918 
It is believed that these four Royal Decrees ensure both a high degree of consistency in 
applying and interpreting the law, and a commitment to attaining and maintaining the 
independence of the judiciary.919 Therefore, their enactment was seen as an encouraging 
development for foreign investors because they represent a progressive approach toward 
the development and maintenance of a reliable and modern legal system.920 Moreover, 
under the new court system established in 2001,921 the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts has 
been restricted to family matters only, rather than dealing also with civil cases as 
occurred previously.  
                                                           
915 Khan and Laubach (n 913) 112  
916 Carnegie Endowment/FRIDE (n 910) 6 
917 Khan and Laubach (n 913) 113  
918 Ibid  
919 Ibid  
920 Ibid 113-114  
921Carnegie Endowment/FRIDE (n 910) 6  
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The final phase of the reforms consisted of amendments in 2011 and 2012 in the Basic 
Law and the Judiciary Power Law, to ensure greater independence of the judiciary. 
Royal Decree 25/2011 determined complete independence for the Public Prosecution, 
which is a part of the judicial authority in the Sultanate.922 One of the most important 
reforms took place as a result of Royal Decree 10/2012, as this separated the judiciary 
from the executive power by reconstituting the High Judicial Council and excluding any 
role for the Minister of Justice, who was replaced by the Chief Justice.923 The aim is to 
enable the different powers to function independently of each other and with maximum 
efficiency.924 This will be analysed in the following section. 
5.2.2 The basis for independence of Omani judiciary 
Two conditions need to be met to ensure that national courts are suitable for dealing 
with foreign investment disputes. The first is that the national legal system of the 
country concerned should be “up to international standards”. The second is that the 
judicial system in the country should be fully independent, not only in the regulations 
but also in practice as well.925 The legal system in Oman has been analysed in the 
previous chapter but here it is important to establish the extent to which Oman’s judges 
are independent and have the authority to make, review and correct administrative 
decisions, particularly with regard to the violation of foreign investors’ rights.  
The fact is that the independence of the judiciary in Oman is a debatable issue. It can be 
argued that the elements necessary for the independence of the judiciary system in 
Oman can be found in a series of provisions and features. Regulations regarding the 
independence of judicial authority are set out clearly under Omani laws. In addition to 
acknowledging the rule of law in Oman, Article 59 of the Basic Law states that “The 
dignity, integrity and impartiality of the judges are the guarantee for the preservation of 
rights and freedoms" in the State.926 Article 60 emphasises that the judiciary in Oman is 
independent.  
Further important provisions highlighting the independence of the judiciary are to be 
found in Article 61 of the Basic Law, including “Judges are subject only to the Law”, 
and “No party can interfere in law suits or matters of justice; such interference shall be 
                                                           
922 Bader Al Kiyumi, ‘Report’ Oman Daily Observer (Muscat, 7 May 2012) 
923 See Sunil K Vaidya, ‘Oman makes judiciary independent of executive Council reconstituted to 
eliminate interference’, Gulf News (Dubai, 2 March 2012) 
924 See Oman News Agency http://omannews.gov.om, accessed 26/05/2016 
925 Subedi (n 7) 267  
926 Basic Law, art 59 states that: “The supremacy of the Law shall be the basis of governance in the 
State”. 
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considered a crime punishable by law”. This wording makes it clear that interference by 
anyone in the judicial process is a crime and the affected party has the right to take 
action against any party that interferes in this process. This article is a real guarantee 
that the judiciary will not be subjected to interference. Nevertheless, it may be difficult 
to invoke this article, as it may be difficult to prove interference in the judicial process.   
To ensure the transparency of the courts' process, Article 63 of the Basic Law provides 
that Court sessions are open to the general public, the only exceptions being “in the 
interest of public order or morals”.  Even in these cases, “the pronouncement of 
judgment must be in open session”. Another strength of the judiciary in Oman is that if 
public officials reject the courts' judgements or impede its enforcement, this is 
considered a crime punishable by law and the party affected has the right to file a 
criminal case under Article 71 of the Basic Law. This strengthens the enforcement 
mechanism and the rule of law in the country. 
However, it is argued that although in principle the independence of the judiciary in 
Oman is guaranteed by the Basic Law and the dismantling of the State Security Court in 
2010, the executive branch still strongly influences the judiciary.927 Subedi notes that 
fear of executive influence and intervention in court proceedings, or a kind of loyalty to 
the state, may mean that in many countries an independent judiciary cannot be taken for 
granted.928 It has been suggested that the Omani national courts may discriminate 
against foreign investors.929 Moreover, Newton Martin maintains that although laws in 
Oman are intrinsic in nature and applied effectively, there is a yawning chasm in the 
interpretation of these laws.930 On 26 July 2016 Azamn, an Omani newspaper in the 
front page reported the interference of highly influential people in a inheritance case.931 
However, the newspaper did not provide any evidence to support its claim.  
In addition, according to BTI, one of Oman’s key weaknesses is its lack of a system of 
checks and balances; since the Sultan is the head of the Legislature, the Executive and 
the Judiciary, there is no separation of powers.932 Indeed, this principle is not declared 
                                                           
927Carnegie Endowment /FRIDE (n 910) 6; BTI Project, BTI 2014 Oman Country Report, 9 <www.bti-
project.org/reports/country-reports/mena/omn/index nc#chap3> accessed 24 November 2015 
928 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 91) 214  
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186 
in the Basic Law, except with regard to the independence of the judiciary.933 According 
to Article 42 of the Basic Law, among the functions discharged by the Sultan is 
“appointing senior judges and and relieving them of their posts” and he is the head of 
the Supreme Judicial Council. Nevertheless, the membership of the Judiciary Council 
was amended by Royal Decree 9/2012 and the Minister of Justice and the Inspector 
General of Police and Customs were replaced, reducing the credibility of allegations of 
influence upon judiciary power. Such accusations are not supported by clear evidence, 
except that the Sultan is the head of the Council and at the same time, he is the prime 
minister.934  
Overall, although there has been significant progress in the independence of the Omani 
judiciary there are some areas that need to be addressed, such as having a strong and 
effective system of checks and balances and clear separation between powers. Subedi 
argues that currently the role and the aim of international law should be to encourage 
countries to improve their own national legal systems so that these are in accordance 
with international legal standards.935 This will prevent a country being subject to 
international investment tribunals functioning under an “unpredictable set of rules and 
awarding excessive amounts of compensation to foreign investors for alleged breaches 
of the rules of foreign investment.”936 
5.2.3 The practice of the Omani courts  
A clear and comprehensive view of the Omani judiciary can be gained by exploring the 
practice of the Omani courts. It is vital to examine the extent to which Oman's judges 
will exercise review and correct the government's administrative decisions. Traditional 
international law requires foreign investors to seek legal remedies offered by the host 
state’s domestic courts, before an international claim can be taken to international 
proceedings, except when there is a prior agreement to make use of investor-state 
arbitration. According to Article 26 of the ICSID Convention, a state may “require the 
exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies as a condition of its consent to 
                                                           
933 In contrast, Singapore establishes its checks and balances within the Government; there are several 
layers of checks, including the Auditor-General's Office. In addition, its Constitution is based on the 
separation of the three powers, obliging each of these to act within their own sphere of constitutional 
power. See K Shanmugam, ‘The rule of law in Singapore’ (2012) Sing J Legal Stud 357, 360. And Chan 
Sek Keong, ‘The courts and the 'rule of law' in Singapore, a lecture delivered at the rule of law 
symposium’ (2012) Sing J Legal Stud 209, 216 
934 According to the Basic Law, art 42 the Sultan discharges the function of presiding the Council of 
Ministers. 
935 Subedi (n 7) 267  
936 Ibid  267-268 
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arbitration” but that option is “hardly ever used”.937 It is argued that the function of the 
principle of sovereign immunity is to reduce the possibility of actions being taken 
against the host state before national courts.938 Foreign investors should be allowed to 
access the judiciary system and benefit freely from national courts in order to seek the 
available remedies.939  
It can be said that the practice shows that generally the Omani courts can be a reliable 
tool in protecting foreign investment, as evidenced by a number of cases of this kind 
that they have dealt with. Case No. 301/2013 issued by the Omani Administrative Court 
of Appeal 940 provides a significant example in which foreign investment rights were 
protected, highlighting Oman’s commitment to enforcing the need for a clear and 
consistent rule of law. The MoCI had refused to grant clearance for a foreign investor to 
establish market and bakery activity on the basis that this kind of commercial activity 
requires premises to be not less than 1000m2. The foreign investor argued that he had 
received a previous clearance for the same commercial activities in another area of 
Oman in premises smaller than 1000m2. The court voided the MoCI’s decision, ruling 
that the legal regulations and provisions lacked clear rules which covered foreign 
investors’ activities in such cases in this sector.941  
Case No. 164/2005 addressed the residential rights of a foreign investor in Oman after 
the immigration authority at the Omani Royal Police refused to renew the foreign 
investor’s residential visa on the basis of security concerns. The court voided the 
decision on the grounds that Royal Police were unable to substantiate their claim. The 
court justified its ruling on the basis that a foreign investor and his investment in the 
Sultanate should be protected. The court added that such refusals must be supported by 
true evidence and the courts should review and have oversight of the authority’s 
decision. This must follow the due process of law and be based on reasons that are 
undoubtedly serious and critical to national security.942  
In addition, the previously discussed case of Alqudra Holding Company shows that a 
foreign investor can challenge an Omani government body before Omani courts and 
protect his or her trademarks right.943 Furthermore, two judges interviewed observed 
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940 Case 301/2013 Administrative Court (Appeal Circuit - Muscat) Judgment, 30 April 2013 Oman 
941  Ibid 
942 Case 164/2005 Administrative Court (Primary Court First Circuit) Judgment, 27 December 2005 
Oman 
943 Alqudra Holding Company (n 712) 
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that regardless of the conclusion of the High Court in the case of the Blue City,944 the 
verdict of the Muscat Court of First Instance was in favour of the foreign investors 
against the Omani government, which demonstrates the efficiency and fairness of the 
Omani courts.945 Moreover, in Al-Tamimi the Tribunal referred to Omani national courts 
in dealing with criminal aspects of Mr Al-Tamimi's case before Omani courts stating 
that: "Ibri Court of Appeal of 6 June 2010, […] acquitted Mr Al-Tamimi of the two 
misdemeanour criminal charges on which he had previously been convicted by the 
Mahda Court of First Instance".946 All these cases are evidence that with regard to 
foreign investors’ rights, the Omani judiciary have oversight of the government's 
actions and will check actions that they consider to be unjustifiable in legal terms.947 
However, two foreign investors interviewees raised two challenges in the practice of the 
Omani courts; the first, challenge is that if there is any case against foreign investor, the 
court will freeze everything belonging to the foreign investors.948 It is clear that what is 
meant here is in the stage of enforcement of courts' verdicts. According to Article 361 
of the Omani Civil and Commercial Procedural Law “execution shall be affected on the 
judgment debtor's properties by attaching the said properties with third parties and 
under his possession and sell the same by auction within the portion that settles his 
subject dept”. Actually, there is a need to clarify two issues with regard to this Article, 
aiming for a quick and effective enforcement of courts' verdicts. First, it is a general 
article addressing all cases of judgment execution, regardless who is ruled against. 
Second, with regard to foreign investors, this article is a two-edged sword. It can be a 
challenge to foreign investors when the judgment is against them. However, it can 
benefit them if the judgement is in their favour, since the court will use these means of 
enforcement and consequently they can achieve their right easily. 
Another challenge in Omani courts' practice, pointed out by another foreign investor 
interviewee, is the large number of cases which judges see in a day, about 60 cases.949 
This is a real challenge in the Omani practice, due to the limited number of judges 
                                                           
944 A well known foreign investment case in Oman in 2010, in which the planned investment was $15 
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945 Interview with judges 1 and 2 (Muscat, Oman 17 August 2014) 
946 Al-Tamimi (n 11) para 355 
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compared with the increased number of cases.950 No doubt this will negatively affect the 
quality of judges' work.  However, Oman has realised this challenge and it is on its way 
to solving it as the number of judges increases every year.    
Nevertheless, there is evidence that in certain cases the outcome may not be favourable 
for foreign investment. An example is Case No. 510/14 before the Administrative Court 
of Appeal, which concerned ownership of property by a foreign investor who had 
established a company with an Omani partner. In 1987 the company rented a plot of 
industrial land of 9640m2 from the Omani Government. In 1998 the Omani partner sold 
his shareholding in the company to another Omani citizen. The company then applied to 
the MoH for ownership of the land in the name of the new Omani partner. In 2008 the 
Omani government issued the title deeds to the Omani partner following a special Royal 
Order agreeing to grant this request made in his application. After the issue of Royal 
Decree 96/2010, which allowed companies to own land, the company applied to transfer 
ownership of the land to its name, asking the court to issue an order to prevent the 
Omani partner from free use of the land. The court refused the company’s application 
on the basis that the Royal Order that had granted ownership of the land specified free 
ownership for the Omani citizen.951 Regardless of whether the court reached the right 
conclusion or not, the challenge in this case is that this judgement would put the foreign 
investor in a difficult situation if the owner of the land decided to sell the disputed land. 
However, a foreign investor still has the right to take action for compensation if any 
action by the Omani partner causes damage to the foreign investment. 
In certain cases, tribunals have required evidence that an effort has been made to obtain 
reparation through domestic courts, not as a matter of jurisdiction of admissibility but as 
part of the evidence that the relevant standard of international law had been breached.952 
In the Waste Management v Mexico case the tribunal stated that: “in this context the 
notion of exhaustion of local remedies is incorporated into the substantive standard and 
is not only a procedural prerequisite to an international claim”.953 In a similar manner, 
the tribunal in Generation Ukraine v Ukraine noted: 
[T]he failure to seek redress from national authorities disqualifies the international 
claim, not because there is a requirement of exhaustion of local remedies but because 
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the very reality of conduct tantamount to expropriation is doubtful in the absence of a 
reasonable –not necessarily exhaustive– effort by the investor to obtain correction.954 
5.2.5 Confidence in the Omani national court system 
The extent of confidence in the Omani national court system is important, because the 
host state’s courts usually have to settle an investment dispute between a state and a 
foreign investor in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.955 For example, Article 
10/2 (a) of the Oman-Germany BIT provides that in a case of dispute between a foreign 
investor and a state, if the dispute cannot be settled within a period of three months and 
upon a request of the investor, the dispute may be referred alternatively or consecutively 
to a competent court in the state where the investment is made.956 However, seeking 
domestic courts in the first place to settle investment disputes would raise issues such as 
the, legitimacy, transparency, and accountability of the system.957   
The OBFA has highlighted a number of difficulties faced by foreign investors using the 
Omani judicial system, including significant delays and uncertainty about the 
implementation of the law by judges on issues such as employment and construction. 
Consequently, foreign investors lack confidence in the Omani court system and prefer 
their investment contracts to be governed by foreign law, settling disputes outside 
Oman.958 In addition, one foreign investor interviewee pointed out that there is always a 
worry among foreign investors, about the process in Omani courts and on the dispute 
resolution process generally.959 
Indeed, some believe that the judiciary in Oman more accurately act “only as the 
interpreters of law, aiding and delivering verdicts of what they perceive as justice”.960 
Regardless of the usual suspicions and fears of foreign investors, it can be said that the 
cases examined in the previous subsection show that the Omani court system has 
displayed its strengths and can prove its ability to be trusted, but its weaknesses still 
need to be addressed. This will be tackled in Chapter Six. 
To put the challenge of the confedence on Omani courts in a fair scale, it must be 
admitted that such concerns are not unique to Oman. International experience shows 
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that, for a variety of reasons, foreign investors fear a lack of fairness in the courts of the 
host state. In addition, domestic courts may be obliged to apply national law even in 
cases where it conflicts with the international legal rules protecting foreign investor 
rights and some countries may not be signatories to the relevant treaties.961 
Subedi maintains that countries with democratic systems and an independent judiciary 
are more likely to want their investment disputes to be adjudicated by their own courts 
and notes that this preference is reflected in the fact, for example, that the USA-
Australia FTA does not contain a separate international dispute settlement mechanism. 
In contrast, most BITs between developing and developed countries contain provision 
for settlement of investment disputes by international tribunals, suggesting a lack of 
confidence in the judiciary systems of developing countries.962  
Although Oman’s policy of using Omani nationals as judges may be understandable, as 
OFBA’s report highlighted, there is a need for better training before they are promoted 
to higher courts.963 Interviews for this study conducted with two judges and a high level 
policymaker, suggested that with regard to foreign investment cases in Oman, the lack 
of training poses a significant challenge to the judiciary.964  
In order to address this challenge in the Omani judiciary, there are two 
recommendations. The first is that it is important to establish special divisions in Omani 
courts dealing with foreign investment cases, in order to improve specialist judicial 
expertise. Two interviewees, both Omani judges, suggested that it would be helpful to 
have a special department in courts for foreign investment cases, similar to those 
established for financial crimes.965 Subedi recommends that in order to achieve the 
confidence of foreign investors and ensure swift dispensation of justice, countries 
should establish separate foreign investment courts or chambers within the Supreme 
Court, with a speedy mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes.966 The 
second recommendation is that rulings made by Omani courts on foreign investment 
cases need to be published more quickly.967 This is important to enable close measuring 
and evaluation of how Omani courts are dealing with foreign investment cases. 
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However, as mentioned above, Chapter Six will discuss further related 
recommendations for the Omani Judiciary. 
5.3 Arbitration of Foreign Investment Disputes in Oman  
5.3.1 Support for arbitration in Omani courts  
The support needed for arbitration by the Omani national judiciary system is significant 
in providing a healthy environment for arbitration of foreign investment disputes. 
Irrespective of the nature of the disputing parties and whether public or private law is 
applied to the contract, both Article 1 of the Arbitration Law issued by Royal Decree 
47/97 and Article 14 of FCIL emphasize that arbitration clauses in any contract are 
valid.968  
In addition, due to the sensitivity of international trade issues, more experienced judges 
are needed in such cases; therefore, Article 9 of the Arbitration Law differentiates 
between whether the arbitration concerns international commercial cases or not. The 
law makes the Court of Appeal competent in the former case and the commercial circuit 
of the Primary court in the latter. Importantly, another aspect supportive of foreign 
investment in Oman and consequently important for foreign companies is that even 
when the arbitration proceedings take place outside Oman, the Omani courts still have 
jurisdiction over cases that arise out of it. Article 9 states that: 
The Commercial Court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain the issues of arbitration 
referred to Oman judiciary as per this Law. However, in case of arbitration concerning 
international trade and commerce, the Appellate Circuit of the said Court shall have the 
jurisdiction to look into it, irrespective of whether the proceedings take place either in 
Oman or abroad.  
However, the role that Omani courts play in arbitration is controversial. On the one 
hand, both the Arbitration Law and the practice of the Omani courts suggest that the 
intervention by Omani courts can be seen as a supportive tool of arbitration of foreign 
investment cases. Article 13/1 of the Arbitration Law clearly signals this intention, 
obliging the Omani courts to decline to hear a case when there is a valid agreement to 
arbitrate.969 Abdallah notes that the Administrative Court dismissed a suit concerning a 
dispute between the Ministry of Oil and Gas and a construction company on 25 June 
2006, on the grounds that there was an arbitration clause between the parties.970 In fact, 
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it seems this is the approach taken by Omani courts generally.971 According to Al-
Siyabi, the Arbitration Law was intended to strengthen the contractual features of 
arbitration in order to make this an independent dispute settlement mechanism that 
provided an alternative to the Omani judicial system.972  
Abdallah observes that there was formerly a contradiction in Omani legislation 
concerning the validity of arbitral clauses in administrative contracts concluded with 
governmental entities between Article 1 of the Arbitration Law and Article 6 of the 
Administrative Court Law issued by Royal Decree 91/1999.973 The latter provided that 
the Administrative Court had conclusive jurisdiction in disputes involving such 
contracts,974 whereas the former made provision for all disputes to be settled regardless 
of the subject or the basis of the dispute.975 However, concerns raised by this 
inconsistency was one of the reasons that led legislators to amend the Law by Royal 
Decree in 2009, thus broadening the application of the Arbitration Law to include 
disputes arising out of administrative contracts.976 At the same time, this increased the 
possibility of intervention by the judiciary in the arbitration process. Therefore, as long 
as an arbitral clause in an administrative contract complies with the provisions of the 
Arbitration Law, the clause will be valid.977 
As a result of this amendment, The Court of Appeal at the Omani Administrative Court 
confirmed that an arbitral clause in a contract between the Omani Public Authority of 
Electricity and Water and a private company was valid. 978 The court declared that the 
meaning of “the conclusive jurisdiction of Administrative Courts, in disputes related to 
administrative contracts,” stated under Article 6 of the Administrative Law, was 
intended to differentiate between the “scope of jurisdiction of administrative courts and 
                                                           
971 Such verdicts have experienced by the author in both Sohar and Nizwa primary courts in Oman (2008 
and 2011)  
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of civil courts” but did not stop disputing parties in administrative contracts from using 
arbitration to settle their disputes.979  
The most significant support is by the Omani High Court, which issued a decision that 
minutes of the arbitral tribunal should be considered as official records that have a res 
judicata effect.980 In addition, it is argued that the Omani judiciary provides support for 
arbitration at three stages of the proceedings: prior to commencement of arbitration, 
during arbitration and finally in enforcing the arbitral award.981 The latter will be 
examined in the next section.  
Prior to commencement of arbitration, under Article 14 of Arbitration Law, the Court of 
First Instance or the Court of Appeal in Muscat has the right to issue interim measures 
to prevent any change in facts on the ground that might lead to the loss of rights of the 
other party. This means that the judiciary can address one of the weaknesses of the 
arbitration system, namely, that it is not able to issue and enforce orders.982 This was 
emphasised by the decision of the Omani High Court in November 2003 that:  
The existence of an arbitration agreement should not preclude the judiciary from using its 
authority to render the appropriate conservatory and interim measures under the procedural 
law that is applicable pursuant to the request of the parties.983 
The importance of Article 14 here is that it defines the jurisdiction of the interim 
measures upon the Omani courts and solves the issue of division of powers between 
tribunals and courts, as the absence of this may cause a challenge of uncertainty.984 For 
example, the lack of a clear division of powers between courts and tribunals led to 
vagueness in the case of Channel Tunnel Group v. Balfour Beatty.985 In addition, 
although the issue of the interim measures may appear to constitute a challenge, since 
there is no clear definition of them in the law, it is clear that such measures should not 
affect the objective rights (the disputed rights) or change the legal position of the 
parties. Furthermore, the parties to the arbitration have the right to seek the competent 
court’s assistance in case of disagreement on the composition of the arbitral tribunal, as 
provided by Article 17 of the Arbitration Law. 
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Omani courts may also intervene in a number of ways during the arbitration to rescue 
the arbitration process.  According to Article 20 of the Arbitration Law, the president of 
the competent Court of Appeal has the power to force a member of the arbitration 
tribunal to be removed under certain conditions: 
In the event an arbitrator is unable to carry out his responsibility, fails or causes 
unjustified delay in the arbitration proceedings and is unwilling to resign from his office 
and the parties are not agreed upon his removal, the President of the Commercial Court 
may issue orders terminating his assignment on the basis of a request made by any of the 
parties. 
The court may also intervene during the arbitration process by imposing a fine on any 
witnesses who fail to appear or to render their depositions, as provided by Article 37/1 
of the Arbitration Law, which states:  
The President of the Commercial Court on the basis of a request from the arbitration 
board shall have the following authorities: 
 
1 to impose a fine ranging from five to twenty Rials Omani against the witnesses who 
fail to appear or abstain from rendering their depositions. The said decision shall not be 
subject to appeal and shall be enforceable like any other final judgement.   
However, this form of intervention by the President of the Court of Appeal must be 
initiated by the arbitration tribunal. Interestingly, although according to this article, the 
fine imposed by the court is final and will be enforced in the same manner as the court’s 
decisions, the more important issue here is whether a fine of this amount would actually 
make any difference, as it is very low.986  
In addition, under conditions specified in Article 45, the President of the competent 
Court of Appeal has the right to determine a time limit for the rendering of awards.987 
These conditions include it should be upon a request of one party, if the parties have not 
agreed on issuing the award within a specific period, and if the award is not rendered 
within 18 months.  
Whilst some view this possibility of intervention positively, Al-Siyabi argues that it 
could be seen as evidence of judicialisation of the arbitration process in Oman and 
consequently may negatively affect the confidence of foreign parties.988 The powers 
given to the head of the Court of Appeal under Article 45 (2) may be seen as 
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problematic in this context. This article grants this individual the right to terminate 
arbitral proceedings upon a request of one of the parties in dispute if the tribunal is 
unable to issue an award after 18 months.989  
5.3.2 Enforcement of arbitral awards in Oman 
Writing in the mid-1980s, Lane and Morton argued that it was generally believed it 
would be difficult to enforce foreign tribunal arbitral awards in Oman unless both the 
substantive and procedural law applied in the arbitration followed shari'a principles. 
However, they noted that this was not the case since arbitral awards obtained in foreign 
tribunals could be enforced in Oman.990 They based this opinion on their analysis of a 
case involving a UK company (the claimant) that had submitted a request for arbitration 
against an Omani company (the respondent) to the ICC in May 1981.991 The claimant 
was asking the Tribunal inter alia to order the release of funds “representing the 
proceeds of the promissory notes” that were being held in Oman. The Tribunal ruled 
that most of this amount, plus interest due, should be awarded to the claimant. The 
claimant then started proceedings in Oman to enforce the award before the ASCD. The 
Omani respondent challenged the claimant’s request on the basis that the ICC had 
exceeded its jurisdiction and called on the ASCD to declare that vital parts of the award 
were void. However, following the hearing, it ruled that the award should be 
enforced.992  
Oman is under international obligations to enforce arbitral awards, as a member of the 
WTO, a signatory to the New York Convention,993 and to many bilateral treaties and the 
FTA with the USA, which allow the disputing party to seek enforcement of an 
arbitration provided by an international arbitration centre.994 Oman is obliged to enforce 
arbitral awards issued within the GCC, since this is one of its membership 
commitments.995  
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Although the arbitral award may be subject to an internal annulment procedure through 
an ad hoc ICSID Committee,996 arbitration awards are not subject to judicial review by 
national courts.997 According to Article 54 of ICSID, both arbitral award parties are 
under obligation to recognize and enforce the arbitral award in their territories as though 
it were a final court judgment issued in the country in question.998 Notably, the Omani 
Arbitration Law does not allow parties to challenge the enforcement decision made by 
the competent court.999 Article 57 of the Arbitration Law states clearly that “the filing of 
a suit for nullification of an award shall not suspend/cease the enforcement of the 
arbitration award”. Therefore, the filing of a suit for nullification of an award does not 
automatically lead to stay of enforcement of that award.1000 However, it is permissible 
to appeal against a court decision that refuses enforcement of an arbitral award, as 
provided in Article 58/3: 
It is not be permissible to make an appeal/petition against the order passed for the 
enforcement of an arbitration award. However, it may be permissible to appeal against 
the order issued rejecting the application for enforcement before the Commercial Court 
referred to in Article 9 of this Law, within 30 days from the date of its issue. 
It is clear that the aim of this provision is to ensure the effectiveness of arbitration and 
to prevent courts from not enforcing arbitral awards. 
The conditions for enforcement of awards set out by Omani laws are limited in 
comparison with those of the UNCITRAL Model Law. Conditions in the latter cover 
whether the agreement is valid according to the law of the state where the award was 
rendered, if none of the parties to the arbitration agreement lack capacity, or if the 
formation of the tribunal is contrary to the agreement of the parties or the law of the 
state where the arbitration is held.1001  
It can be said, regardless of the issues that parties should consider, that arbitral awards 
are enforced in Oman and it is likely that the Omani Courts will not refuse to enforce 
arbitration agreements.1002 For example, in April 2010, the Muscat Court of Appeal 
emphasised that an arbitral award issued in Denmark against an Omani company was 
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enforceable in Oman on the basis of the New York Convention.1003 According to a 
study undertaken in 2014 in which 37 attorneys, arbitrators, and legal consultants were 
interviewed about foreign arbitration, Oman was judged to be the third most friendly 
state towards foreign arbitral award enforcement among the GCC countries (6.25) 
behind Bahrain (7.44) and UAE (7.43).1004 It was considered to be better than Kuwait 
(5.78), Qatar (5.74) and Saudi Arabia (3.44).1005  
However, foreign investors seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement must consider a 
number of issues. The arbitration agreement should be clear about whether the parties 
intend to seek arbitration or not, since this may affect its chances of being enforced in 
Omani courts. In Case No. 197/2010, the Omani High Court refused to enforce an 
arbitration agreement on the basis that the parties’ intention to arbitrate was not clear. 
The arbitration clause stated that: 
This pay order is irrevocable and shall be governed by Omani laws. All possible 
disputes between the parties in this particular irrevocable fee protection agreement will 
be settled at the tribunals in Oman, in the event of dispute the arbitration laws of the 
International Chamber of Commerce will apply […]1006 
In addition, parties must consider the signing of the arbitral award as specified by 
Article 43 (1) of the Arbitration Law. Therefore, in Case No. 57/2005, an arbitral award 
was nullified by the Omani High Court because the award was only signed by the 
chairman of the three-member arbitral tribunal and its secretary. The court ruled that, 
according to “Article 43(1) of the Arbitration Law, the majority of members of the 
tribunal must sign and reasons why the minority did not sign must be shown in the 
award.” 1007 
Parties should consider as well cases of annulment specified by the Arbitration Law. In 
order to ensure that the arbitral award is enforced, the law identifies issues that cause 
extreme damage.1008 The Omani High Court has emphasised that "the grounds provided 
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under Article 53 of Arbitration Law are exclusive and should not be expanded by 
analogy".1009 The High Court has refused to annul arbitral awards on grounds not 
included under Article 53, such as, if the award did not mention the nationality, 
addresses and titles of arbitrators, or if the arbitrators had not appointed experts,1010 
because such matters are not considered as grounds for nullification under Article 
53.1011 However, the right to decide on the annulment of an award depends totally on 
the competent court, as the law grants this right to the court only.1012 The Omani High 
Court emphasised this by stating clearly that "whether the ground of annulment is 
available or not it depends merely on the competent court, not the will of parties".1013  
Although in practice arbitral awards cannot be enforced until a competent court issues 
an exequatur, Article 55 of the Arbitration Law makes it clear that the awards have a res 
judicata effect and should be enforced.1014 However, the party that seeks to enforce the 
arbitral award has to verify the fulfilment of the following three conditions: 
1. The award is not contrary to previous decisions rendered by the Omani 
Courts.  
2. The award does not violate the public policy of Oman.  
3. There has been valid notification of the award. 1015 
The High Court has emphasised the last condition by stating that “the period for filing a 
request for annulment of an award begins only after the award is notified to the other 
party”1016. According to Articles 252 and 253 of the Law of Commercial and Civil 
Procedure two more conditions should be taken into consideration by the parties if the 
arbitral award is rendered in a foreign state. These conditions are that: “the award must 
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not violate Omani law and the State where the award was rendered must accept the 
enforcement of Omani awards in its territory”.  
5.3.3 Public policy and international standards  
Oman’s approach to setting public policy is important since this may be viewed as a 
barrier by foreign investors, since it may be used to justify the annulment or refusal to 
recognise and enforce an arbitral award.1017 This country's rights of refusal can be found 
under Articles 34 (2) (b) (ii)1018 and 36 (1) (b) (ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law,1019 
and Article V (2) (b) of the New York Convention.1020 The tribunal in Radio 
Corporation of America v. China emphasised this clearly by stating that:  
It is a correct rule known and recognised in common law as in international law, that 
any restriction of a contracting government's right must be effected in a clear and 
distinct manner. Contracts affecting the public interest are to be construed liberally in 
favour of the public. 1021 
In Al-Tamimi, although OMCO argued that its suspension of the contract with Emork 
and SFOH was on the basis of the latter's violation of the contract, as mentioned ealier, 
the Tribunal found the measures taken by the Omani Government, especially MECA, to 
protect the national interest as justifiable. According to a survey carried out by 
Almutawa and Maniruzzaman, an overly broad interpretation of public policy was 
found to be the most frequent reason for non-enforcement of arbitral awards in the GCC 
states.1022 
However, according to the UNCITRAL Model Law every jurisdiction has the right to 
define and give effect to its own public policy.1023 These differences among states in 
interpreting public policy may prove to be a barrier to recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards, especially when Omani courts can challenge an award on the basis of 
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public policy on their own initiative, without this issue having been raised by any 
party.1024 According to Article 22 of the Law on Civil and Commercial Procedures,1025 
“Except in the cases where the annulment is relating to the public policy, no other than 
the person in whose favour the annulment is raised for can use it…”. Therefore, if a 
contractual stipulation is seen to run contrary to public order, then it must be set aside 
by the judge, even if the point is not raised by either party.1026  
Article 11 of the Omani Arbitration Law is vague in relation to public policy. It states 
that: “It shall not be permissible to have arbitration in respect of the issues, which are 
not subject to reconciliation/compromise.” It is known in Omani regulations that issues 
which violate public policy are not matters of reconciliation or compromise, and 
therefore, they exceptions from being subject to arbitration. Although most disputes 
concerning foreign investment are assumed to be arbitral in Oman, the lack of a clear 
definition of public policy means that how the arbitral decision is implemented may 
depend on the court's understanding of this concept.  
Ayad notes that the difficulty posed by public policy generally is that it has no clear 
definition, with every state defining its scope differently.1027 Therefore, under no 
circumstances can the concept of public order contradict with international public 
order.1028 Ayad urges MENA countries to establish a definitive understanding of public 
order to eliminate ambiguity. It is believed that a lex petrolea could be improved to 
establish a harmonized code of law on the doctrine of public order and consequently 
facilitate better enforcement of law.1029 
Parties need to take into consideration that courts generally have three approaches when 
applying public policy.1030 The first approach involves adopting a narrow interpretation 
of public policy, according to which courts are obliged to address the arbitral agreement 
in the same way as the arbitrator, by enforcing it unless it is against the law. The second 
approach adopts a broad interpretation of public policy, arguing that the role of the 
courts is to protect the public interest beyond the positive law. The third approach 
                                                           
1024The Omani High Court made it clear that an annulment related to public policy can be raised by the 
court itself without needing to be raised by the party. See Case 177/2013, High Court, Commercial 
Circuit (Decision) 2 January 2013 Oman 
1025 Promulgated by Royal Decree 29/2002  
1026 ‘Arbitration in Oman’ (n 993) 
1027 A G Tweeddale, ‘Enforcing Arbitration Awards Contrary to Public Policy in England’ (2000) 17 Intl 
Construction LRev 159, 160  
1028 Ayad (n 1021) 749  
1029 Ibid 
1030 Moosa Al-Azri, ‘Prevention of Non-Compliance with Arbitral Awards: Some Proposals for Efficient 
Enforcement' (2005) 12 Tilburg LR 348, 360 
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differentiates between foreign and domestic awards by applying the narrow 
interpretation of public policy to the former and a broad interpretation to the latter.  
Whilst there is no provision in Omani law that defines the term ‘public order’, a 
judgment issued on 8 December 1993 defined this concept in the following way: 
Laws which relate to public order are those whereby it is intended to accomplish a 
public interest – political, social or economic – which relates to the higher order of 
society and which transcends the interest of individuals. All individuals must respect 
such interest and the accomplishing of it, and they may not negate it by agreements 
entered into between themselves even where such agreements accomplish interest for 
them, because private interests cannot prevail over the public interest.1031 
A similarly clear definition of public policy can be found in Parsons & Whittemore 
Overseas Inc. v RAKTA, where it is stated that:  
[T]he Convention's public policy defence should be construed narrowly. Enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on this basis only where enforcement would 
violate the State's most basic notions of morality and justice.1032  
On the basis of Article 53 (2) of the Arbitration Law, the Omani High Court concluded 
that the court might nullify an arbitral award only if its outcome contradicts with basic 
principles of Omani law.1033 However, it should not be assumed that Omani courts 
would apply a specific approach of public policy, as currently this will depend on the 
individual judge's broad or narrow understanding of public policy. Although such 
definition by national courts' practice may become guidance for judges' practice and 
reduce the vagueness, it seems that different judges' understandings of public policy will 
continue due to the absence of a clear definition in Omani laws. Therefore, it is vital to 
apply a definitive and narrow approach to public policy. The narrower the approach 
taken by the Omani judiciary, the more it will be perceived as providing a business-
friendly environment for foreign investment. 
5. 4 Conclusion  
This chapter argued that significant progress has been made with respect to the 
independence of the Omani judiciary and the reliability of the Omani courts as means to 
settle investment disputes, aiming ultimately to create a reliable dispute settlement 
mechanism for foreign investment in Oman. However, it is argued that weaknesses in 
some areas such as the lack of a clear and effective system of checks and balances and 
                                                           
1031 Arbitration in Oman (n 993) 
1032 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co Inc v Societe General de l’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 
(Judgment) 508 F 2d 969 The United States Court of Appeals (2d Cir 1974)  
1033 Case 127/2000 High Court Decision, on Appeal 10/2000 Oman 
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shortage of well-trained Omani judges, negatively affected the confidence of foreign 
investment in the Omani judiciary system. It would be desirable to have special 
divisions in courts dealing with foreign investment cases or investment chambers within 
the High Court, together with a speedy mechanism for the settlement of investment 
disputes.  
Notwithstanding the argument on the Omani courts' role toward arbitration, it is argued 
that the role given to and experienced by the Omani judiciary is supportive of the 
arbitration process. In addition, it is clear that arbitral awards are generally enforced in 
Oman, regardless of the issues that those who are parties to arbitration should consider. 
Although the practice and Al-Tamimi show there is no broad approach to public policy 
in Oman, the lack of a clearly defined approach of public policy in the Sultanate raises a 
concern with regard to the approach that might be adopted by individual judges.  
While the investigation in this chapter shows some weaknesses in the dispute settlement 
system in Oman, the next chapter tries to complete the whole picture which this thesis 
aims to draw. Therefore, the following chapter will analyse the findings and the 
significant recommendations to protect and attract foreign investment in order to 
achieve better guarantees in the Sultanate.  
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Chapter 6 Findings, Recommendations and Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
It is argued in this chapter that by identifying the main legal weaknesses of foreign 
investment in Oman, it is possible to improve the level of protection that can be 
provided for foreign investment. Importantly, it examines the steps that Oman should 
take in order to ensure that it both safeguards its national interest and at the same time 
attracts foreign investment.  
This chapter begins by exploring the findings of the main arguments that underpin this 
thesis. These relate to the increasing steadiness and consistency in foreign investment 
protection, the contribution of Omani law and practice to the development of 
international investment law, particularly the need for Oman to take a balanced 
approach, and the importance of the efficiency of national regulations and practice.  
The chapter concludes with specific recommendations aimed at providing a better 
regulatory environment that will enhance levels of protection for foreign investment and 
increase the attractiveness of Oman to foreign investors. The recommendations include 
a specialised investment council with a unified policy, making it easy to do business in 
Oman, the need for training and a national arbitration centre in Oman.  
The recommendations draw on comparisons between the experiences of Oman, 
Singapore and the UAE, especially the Emirate of Dubai. These two countries were 
chosen because Singapore is considered to be one of the most successful developing 
countries in terms of attracting foreign investment, while the UAE is a neighbouring 
member state of the GCC and was able to attract about 10 times more foreign 
investment than Oman in 2014.  
In 2013, UNCTAD’s Global Investment Report nominated Singapore as the eighth 
largest recipient of FDI in the world and third largest in Asia.1034 The investment inflow 
to the UAE in 2014 was $10.1 billion1035 whilst that of Oman for the same year was 
only $1.180 billion.1036 However, according to the World Bank, the inflow of foreign 
                                                           
1034 Open Company Singapore. Com, ‘Why Is Singapore Attractive for Foreign Investors?’, Updated on 1 
September 2015 <www.opencompanysingapore.com/why-is-singapore-attractive-for-foreign-investors> 
accessed 17 February 2016 
1035 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, 52 
<http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf> accessed 3 March 2016 
1036 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Country Fact Sheet Oman 
http://unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2015/wir15_fs_om_en.pdf, accessed 3 March 2016 
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investment to Oman in 2014 was $739 million1037 whereas for Singapore this was more 
than $67.522 billion1038 and for the UAE $10.066 billion.1039  
6.2 Findings 
6.2.1 Toward a greater protection in Oman 
It can be argued that there are evidences that Oman has begun to move towards a greater 
protection for foreign investment. First, the significant number of BITs that Oman has 
signed, its FTA with the USA and the DNFIL, together with the FTA between the GCC 
and Singapore, all of which were evaluated in Chapters Three and Four. Although 
investors from the GCC and USA can enjoy broader, more inclusive application of the 
principle of national treatment in Oman, the lack of such a guarantee for other WTO and 
BITs members still represents a challenge for investors from those countries.  
It can be said that Oman has taken a steady and consistent policy toward improving the 
guarantees provided for foreign investors. This development of protection trends has 
been applied in both Oman's international agreements and its own national legal system. 
This is clear in the developments seen in BITs, culminating with the FTA with the USA 
and the GCC FTA with Singapore. Significant developments in Omani FDI laws have 
been identified, starting from the 1974 law, then the FCIL, and finally the DNFIL 
expected to be enacted soon, which contains standards of protection similar to those 
provided under Oman's BITs and FTA. Although it does not meet the purpose, this 
policy has kept Oman in a relatively successful situation with regard to the ability to 
attract foreign investment, as shown by the FDI inflows in the period 2008-2013. 
Table 6.1: Oman FDI inflows, 2008-2013 (Millions of US dollars) 
 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
1626 1040 1563 1782 1485 2952 
 
Source: World Bank Group, Investment Reform Map- Sultanate of Oman (unpublished paper, 
Muscat, 25 April 2015) 4 
                                                           
1037 World Bank, ‘FDI: net inflows’, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator> accessed 14 April 2016 
1038 At the time of writing, the 2016 report was not available. See World Bank (n 1037) 
1039 World Bank (n 1037) 
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Further evidence of this approach by Oman is that from 1970 onwards, Oman has never 
voided a foreign investment treaty or taken any backwards step in its policy toward the 
protection of foreign investment. Moreover, the dispute settlement provisions under 
Oman's BITs, Oman's USA FTA, and in addition, Oman’s membership of ICSID, 
unquestionably strengthen the protection of foreign investors' rights by enabling 
claimants from other signatories to sue Oman, as is clear in the Al-Tamimi case.  
It can be argued that the in-depth analysis offered of the Al-Tamimi case, especially in 
Chapter Three, reveals aspects of the protection of foreign investment within several 
Omani bodies. For example, the tribunal in the Al-Tamimi case inspected parts of the 
Omani foreign investment regime, particularly the areas of the rule of law of the Omani 
judiciary, the legal system and executive branch. The outcome of this investigation by 
the tribunal, particularly to the proceedings taken by Mahdha Primary Court and Ibri 
Court of Appeal show the predictability of the Omani judiciary system.  
6.2.2 The contribution of Omani law and practice to the development of 
international investment law  
Following the above argument, how can a small country like Oman be expected to 
contribute to the development of international investment law? It can be said that the 
significant contribution of Omani law and practice to the development of international 
investment law is in supporting the trend of the need for a balanced approach. In other 
words, this thesis argues that BITs, FTAs and IIAs are not full guarantees without pain 
for Oman. Tanzi argues that although the purpose of BITs is to protect foreign 
investment, the approach to protection of foreign investment taken by arbitral tribunals 
is not only against the public interest of the host states, but also counter to the scope and 
aim of the body of international investment law itself.1040 Regardless of the accuracy of 
this statement, Oman should strike a balance between protecting foreign investment and 
safeguarding its sovereign rights.  
Oman needs to rethink how far it should go in the issue of defending its sovereignty and 
national interests. Thus, there is a need to take into consideration the argued changes in 
the landscape of international investment law by paying attention to the emergence of a 
protective approach to foreign investment. The simple way is to take the approach of 
increasing the gain of attracting foreign investment to Oman and at the same time 
                                                           
1040 Attila Tanzi,’On Balancing Foreign Investment Interests with Public Interests in Recent Arbitration 
Case Law in the Public Utilities Sector’ (2012) 11 Law & Prac Intl Cts. & Tribunals, 47, 73 
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minimising the pain which may accrue, especially by considering provisions related to 
the absolute right of international dispute settlement of other parties included in these 
BITs or FTAs.  
Although the award in Al-Tamimi was in favour of Oman, this case should awaken 
Omani policymakers to some issues related to the appropriate approach toward 
providing protection for foreign investment. A clear example of the issues that Oman 
needs to consider under these international agreements is that the tribunals have the 
advantage and the power to interpret not only contracts and agreements, but also the 
Oman national laws. The tribunal in the Al-Tamimi case stated that: 
The provisions of the CCL1041 cited above indicate that a company has no legal presence 
in Oman unless registered. Article 2 of the CCL, it will be recalled, provides that a 
company is “null and void” unless it “adopts one of the types listed”. Article 4 of the 
CCL, moreover, provides […]. The Tribunal accepts the Respondent’s submission that 
the effect of Article 4 is to “require an Omani registration number to meet the threshold 
requirement of having a legal presence in the jurisdiction. Accordingly, registration is a 
condition precedent for any agreement entered into by the company to become 
effective.1042  
 
The Tribunal in this case even interpreted other states' national laws. For example, it 
decided in the Jurisdiction ratione personae, that the ICSID tribunal interpreted the 
national laws of the USA and UAE regarding its application to the claimant's 
nationality.1043   
Oman's sovereignty was another issue tackled by the Tribunal. Did the claimant have 
the right of access to conduct a site inspection on Omani land?1044 The claimant applied 
to the Tribunal on 25 September 2012 for an order directing the respondent to grant the 
claimant’s industry and damages experts’ immediate access to the site of the former 
quarry that was the subject of this arbitration, for the purposes of conducting a site 
inspection. After a debate between both parties on this issue, the Tribunal ruled that:  
Having carefully considered both parties’ positions, the Tribunal finds that the 
Claimant’s request to conduct a site visit is, in general terms, justified and should be 
allowed. In particular, the Tribunal accepts the need for a site visit for the reasons given 
by the Claimant.1045 
This ruling by the Tribunal shows the extent of the protection which can be provided by 
international tribunals for foreign investors, granting a foreign investor the full right to 
                                                           
1041 Commercial Companies Law issued by Royal Decree 4/1974 
1042 Al-Tamimi (n 11) para 109 
1043 Ibid para 95 
1044 Ibid Procedural Order No 2 (28 September 2012) 
1045 Ibid para 4 
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gather information needed to defend his case, regardless of the sovereignty of the 
country. The argument concerning state sovereignty is weakened when it is set against 
the protection of the other party's right to defend his or her case. 
The Al-Tamimi case sounded a warning to the Omani government, taking into 
consideration that the amount of money the claimant claimed was more than half a 
billion US dollars. Another instance is the case brought by investors from Italy and 
Luxembourg against South Africa in 2007, claiming that their mineral rights had 
effectively been expropriated by provisions included in South Africa’s Mining and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 2002.1046 This claim led South Africa to launch 
a process of review of its BITs that resulted in the termination of its BIT with Germany, 
despite their important trading relationship.1047 On 23 June 2013, South Africa also 
served a notice of termination of its BIT with Spain.1048 
Despite the common approach taken by international tribunals in interpreting and 
applying BITs in favour of foreign investors and containing the host state's regulatory 
power, especially in investment disputes related to public services sector,1049 Tanzi 
argues that such an approach may be gradually mitigated, due to the increased criticism 
from international legal literature and State practice.1050 In addition, Subedi notes that 
while the main aim of BITs is to protect foreign investment, this aim should be in 
harmony with promoting "economic development cooperation between the States 
Parties" as stated in 1965 ICSID Convention.1051 Therefore, provisions designed to 
admit non-compensable regulatory expropriation have been included in an increasing 
number of BITs and IIAs, such as the 2012 US Model BIT.1052   
Although it may be argued that granting such a right to individual investors is 
important, because they do not have access to the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism,1053 the Al-Tamimi case provides support to the existing trend in 
international arena for striking a balance between protecting foreign investors' rights 
and its own sovereign right. Therefore, Oman needs to consider the approach of the 
                                                           
1046 Subedi (n 7) 26, 27 
1047 Ibid 27 
1048 Herbert Smith Freehills, ‘South Africa terminates its bilateral investment treaty with Spain: Second 
BIT terminated, as part of South Africa’s planned review of its investment treaties’, 21 August 2013, 
<http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/> accessed 15 April 2016 
1049 Tanzi (n 1040) 73 
1050 Ibid 
1051 The Preamble of the ICSID emphasised the: "need for international cooperation for economic 
development", See Tanzi (n 1040) 73-74 
1052 Subedi (n 7) 23 
1053 Ibid 31 
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greater right to refer to an international arbitral as it is applied even by developed 
countries. The UK’s general practice in negotiating BITs is to restrict the protections 
provided for foreign investors "to the post phase of the investment".1054 For example, 
Article 2(1) of the UK-Mexico BIT in 2006 provides that “each Contracting Party shall 
admit investments in accordance with its laws and regulations”.1055 Harrison maintains 
that this article does not create any right of entry for foreign investors, apart from those 
rights provided in the national laws in each party, despite the fact that this provision is 
drafted as an obligation.1056  
The lack of clarity in international investment law is caused mainly by the fact that there 
is no single global treaty. This gives arbitrators in investment tribunals the freedom to 
decide what the law is, on the basis of their understanding, even though many of them 
may not possess the requisite qualifications.1057 For example, in Al-Tamimi, if the 
tribunal had decided that the OMCO's conduct was attributable to the Omani 
Government, the verdict may have gone against Oman.1058  
Vadi argues that the constitutional balance needed between foreign investors' rights and 
legitimate state concerns must take into consideration the implications of international 
human rights treaties and concerns about exploitation of resources.1059 According to 
Malkawi, although striking the right balance between the benefits of foreign investment 
and national security concerns can be challenging for host governments, this is 
necessary.1060 Sornarajah argues that there is a space for balancing the rights between 
the need for protection and the treatment granted to foreign investors and the right of 
regulation by the host state.1061 In this context, it can be argued that the need for an 
efficient and attractive national legal system for foreign investment should not prevent 
Oman from the consideration needed to its BITs and FTAs. In other words, it does not 
conflict with a cautious approach in international agreements. 
                                                           
1054 Agreement between the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 
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In addition, the Al-Tamimi case is expected to be of special interest for international law 
lawyers, both practitioners and scholars, for a number of reasons; first, it took narrow 
and strict approach in the attribution of the governmental company action, particularly 
the attribution of the OMCO contract termination. The Tribunal states: 
There is no evidence that in making the decision to terminate the OMCO–Emrock Lease 
Agreement, OMCO was exercising, or indeed would have been authorised to exercise, 
any regulatory, administrative or governmental authority. There is, furthermore, no 
evidence that OMCO acted under direction from MECA, and the Tribunal is not 
satisfied in any event that this would meet the narrow test for attribution under the US–
Oman FTA1062 
Saleem argues that the Tribunal did not rely on the international law rules but on Omani 
national laws, especially the Royal Decree 11/81 establishing OMCO. He points out 
that the Tribunal, considering that the main point on which Mr Al-Tamimi relied, 
claiming the termination of the two lease agreements by OMCO, to be expropriation, 
concluded that it could not be regarded as expropriation according to the Oman-USA 
FTA and international law. Rather it was merely a commercial dispute related to the 
contract between parties.1063  Therefore, the Tribunal in Al-Tamimi took a different 
approach compared with similar cases, such as Maffezini.1064 Therefore, this precedent 
may open the door for following cases to take a similar approach. 
It can be argued that Tribunal based its conclusion on the words of the Oman-USA FTA 
particularly Article 10.1.2 which states:  
A Party's obligations under this Section shall apply to a state enterprise or other person 
when it exercises any regulatory, administrative, or other governmental authority 
delegated to it by that Party.  
The ruling of the Tribunal and its interpretation of all parties' action should be based on 
the FTA, since the Claimant raised his dispute on the basis of the Oman-USA FTA. 
Therefore, ignoring the FTA's words where they should apply is incorrect. The Oman-
USA FTA sets out a narrow specification of the circumstances under which the actions 
of a state company may be attributed to the State.1065 
Furthermore, the Tribunal has addressed a number of hot topics in customary 
international law, for example, the strict interpretation of the principle of fair and 
                                                           
1062 Al-Tamimi (n 11) para 316 
1063 Saleem (n 414) 816 
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equitable treatment. This has been examined in Chapter Three. This case as well 
confirms that customary international law remains central to the application and 
interpretation of international investment treaties (FTAs or BITs). The Award 
particularly with its interpretation of the principle of minimum standard of treatment is 
an important contribution to the consolidation of established customary rules and to the 
clarification of the complex interplay between customary international law and 
international investment treaties.1066 
6.2.3 The importance of efficient national regulation and practice 
This thesis argues that the development of foreign investment-related laws in Oman is 
merely the first step in protecting foreign investment; these laws must also be supported 
by the necessary policies and practice.1067 This point was illustrated in Chapter Four, 
which pointed out that restrictions on foreign investors can be found in the practices of a 
number of governmental bodies involved in issuing necessary permits. In addition, a 
lack of clarity, and consistency, and sudden changes in issues related to foreign 
investment, were noted. This, together with regulations imposed by some governmental 
entities, was shown to affect negatively the guarantees needed for foreign investment 
and to weaken the attractiveness of Oman for foreign investors.  
Weaver maintains that the legal and judicial systems in developing countries usually lag 
behind their business development.1068 Nonetheless, it seems that due to the early 
promulgation of FCIL (1994), compared with Oman's later commitments under the 
WTO (2000) and the Oman-USA FTA (2009), FCIL is behind Oman's international 
commitments, especially the FTA and the WTO  
The significant decline in oil prices by a two thirds during 2015 and 2016, from $100 
per barrel in June 2014 to below $30 by early 2016,1069 is expected to push 
policymakers in Oman to expedite the issue of the new law (DNFIL) and enhance the 
efficiency of foreign investment instruments, as a further move to minimise the state's 
dependence on oil. To date, in collaboration with the World Bank, the MoCI has 
completed the third draft of the DNFIL and the revision of the foreign investment 
                                                           
1066 See Al-Tamimi (n 11)  para 374. 
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map.1070. On 25 January 2016, the MoCI presented the final stage of drafting the 
law.1071  
Overall, it can be argued that to attract foreign investment and to provide better 
guarantees of protection, Oman will not be able to take restrictive steps in its 
international agreements to safeguard its own national interests, unless it has an efficient 
national system to gain the confidence of foreign investors in all related areas, including 
a dispute settlement mechanism. Having its own efficient national system is the only 
way Oman could reduce referral to international dispute settlement bodies in its 
agreements, by offering foreign investors a suitable alternative to seeking redress 
elsewhere. Undoubtedly, foreign investors will avoid countries where their money is not 
protected. Therefore, the functionality of Omani legal and judicial systems and the 
efficiency of Omani policy will play a significant role in foreign investors' decisions.  
6.3 Recommendations 
Although Oman has been able to attract a relatively reasonable amount of foreign 
investment, there is much more that can be done, taking into consideration its potential, 
as discussed earlier. These recommendations need to consider three factors together, 
namely, the need to attract foreign investment, the need to improve Oman’s economic 
development and at the same time to protect its sovereignty, and they should not 
conflict with any of these factors. Therefore, based on the findings of this research, 
some guidelines are suggested for Omani policy that would enhance guarantees of legal 
protection for foreign investment and eliminate the weaknesses that it faces. 
It is proposed that Oman should establish a specialised Investment Council with a 
unified policy, should make it easier to do business in Oman, and should train in order 
to gain. Finally, it is argued that Oman needs to establish a national arbitration centre. 
6.3.1 Establishing an Investment Council with a unified policy 
Analysis shows that currently Oman has 12 governmental investment-related entities 
with different responsibilities but no organisation that has oversight of them all.1072 
Oman will not be able to maximise the performance of these entities unless it adopts a 
coherent strategy. Although many of these entities are under the responsibility of the 
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Minister of the MoCI,1073 other key entities such as DSEZ, Ithraa, Salalah FZ and 
Salalah Port, are overseen by different ministers and do not even report to the MoCI.1074 
Consequently, one of Oman's barriers to providing an attractive investment environment 
is that it does not have a comprehensive investment vision and strategic policy to attract 
FDI; due to this weak inter-agency coordination.1075  
Singapore created the Economic Development Board (EDB) to manage its economy and 
promote the country to foreign investors.1076 Although the EDB came under the purview 
of the then newly established Ministry of Trade and Industry,1077 it continued its role of 
running the foreign investment system in Singapore.1078 The government of Singapore 
has been able to influence almost all its national bodies in its pursuit of economic 
development.1079 Although Singapore’s small size helped it to protect the operation of 
foreign investment from executive or legislative decentralisation,1080 it is vital to have a 
centralised, coherent and unified policy.  
In the UAE it seems that the role of the Federal Ministry of Economy is limited mainly 
to promoting the investment climate,1081 whereas each Emirate has its own investment 
policy, operation and promotion bodies, belonging to the local governments.1082 In 
Dubai, the Dubai Economic Council is only an advisory body to the government of 
Dubai, advocating sound economic strategies and policies,1083 and does not act as an 
umbrella organisation for other investment bodies. In Dubai there are more than 20 FZs 
in 10 different main sectors,1084 all of them operating as self-contained 'offshore' areas, 
where investors deal exclusively with the free zone authorities, handle with almost all 
aspects of business set-up and management. Even employee visas are obtained through 
these authorities. All these FZs are coordinated by the Dubai Freezone Council 
established by Dubai government to propose rules and policies for registration, 
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licensing and observing activities within the FZs whilst at the same time aligning their 
activities and progress with the Dubai Strategic Plan.1085  
There is no similar body coordinating FZs in Oman, with some under the MoCI, others 
under the Supreme Council for Planning (SCP), the Ministry of Tourism and the PEIE. 
Therefore, it is argued that the establishment of one umbrella organisation would enable 
the Omani government to gain a broader view of the policy needed in these zones. 
Malkawi argues that the existence of the FZs in the UAE has established two separate 
economies within the UAE, the FZ economy and the regular UAE economy.1086 Dubai 
has proven the effectiveness of FZs, especially Jebel Ali FZ (manufacturing businesses) 
and the Internet City FZ (internet companies).1087 It is believed the Dubai FZs were one 
important reason why the economic recession in 2009 was short-lived in Dubai.1088 
The lessons derived from these experiences suggest there are a number of steps to be 
taken by Oman to address this challenge: first, to establish an agreed government 
strategy on the basis of Oman's FDI objectives.1089 Second, an inter-governmental body 
(a fully specialised investment council) should be established to administer 
development, implementation, monitoring and review of a national investment 
policy.1090 Third, in order to chart progress towards achieving the FDI strategy there is a 
need to establish a monitoring mechanism using Key Performance Indicators (KPIs).1091  
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1086 Malkawi (n 1060) 188 
1087 Weaver (n 1068) 70 
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1089 World Bank Group (n 665) 6 
1090 Ibid 
1091 These indicators should be under the responsibility of the investment council. World Bank Group (n 
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Figure 6.1: Proposed structure for Investment Council 
 
The recommended council needs to be chaired by the president or the vice president of 
the Ministerial Council1092 and should consist of three main bodies; the first one would 
supervise all FZs and SEZs, including DSEZ, the FZs of Sohar, Salalah and Al 
Mazunah. The second body would be for foreign investment generally, excluding FZs 
and SEZs, such as PEIE Sohar Port, Salalah Port, and the One-Stop Shop. The third 
body would be PAIPED as a promoting body. All these three main bodies should report 
to the Investment Council, which would work as a policymaker.  
It is important to mention that the Ministerial Council is not a suitable umbrella for 
policy or decision-making on foreign investment because it will slow the development 
and the progress of the policy of all issues related to foreign investment due to the 
burden upon the Ministerial Council.1093 For example, there was a complaint that the 
Ministerial Council should not be the body responsible for approving the set-up of 
100% foreign-owned companies because of the long time needed to get approval and 
the difficulty of access to investors.1094 Although the SCP1095 is better able than the 
Ministerial Council to address foreign investment policy, it is still not a suitable tool. 
This is because, although the role of the SCP is to develop the strategies and policies 
                                                           
1092 To be able to influence the Ministerial Council decisions regarding foreign investment issues.  
1093 For example, this was one difficulty regarding the approval of 100% ownership as will be discussed 
later. Diwan of Royal Court (n 722) 3 
1094 Ibid 
1095 Established by Royal Decree 30/2012 on 26 May 2012 see Supreme Council for Planning 
<https://www.scp.gov.om/en/Page.aspx?I=6> accessed 24 March 2016 
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that are required to achieve sustainable development in Oman, this includes many areas 
such as education, health, and transport.1096  
This thesis disagrees with the recommendation of the World Bank that PAIPED should 
report to MoCI and the SEZ, the FZs, Industrial Estates (IEs) and other investment 
entities be brought under the umbrella of one Ministry (MoCI).1097 This may create 
problems. First, PAIPED should report to the policymaker, which is the proposed 
Investment Council; second, the World Bank's proposal would be impractical due to the 
large number of FZs, complexity and huge responsibility under these entities. For 
example, DSEZ is bigger than Singapore.1098 Third, the MoCI already has huge 
responsibilities, having 15 jurisdictions according to Royal Decree 102/2005.1099 
Therefore, Oman should reform and strengthen the function of the FZs and SEZs 
because of regional competition.1100 Although each FZ should have its own 
independence and complete power to decide its affairs, all FZs should have one 
coherent policy. 
Another important issue to be recommended in this regard is the need for a unified 
policy among all government bodies. Other Omani government bodies' policies and 
regulations should not conflict with the central foreign investment policy. This 
challenge of conflict with the protection needed for foreign investment was seen in 
Chapter Four in relation to certain regulations and policies of the MoM, PACP and 
Oman Royal Police. Although the regulations of other government bodies exist to 
maintain national security and ensure social development, it is clear that there must be 
coherence between maintaining these goals and the goal of attracting foreign 
investment. Therefore, it is likely that the proposed council will help to establish the 
needed coordination and a bridge between foreign investment policymakers and the 
policies of other government's entities, in order to create harmonisation among them. 
6.3.2 Making it easy to do business in Oman 
Oman should make it easy for foreign investors to do business in order to improve its 
foreign investment environment. This because it is a key element in attracting foreign 
                                                           
1096 Supreme Council for Planning (n 1095) 
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2016 
1099 The Jurisdictions of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry were promulgated under Royal Decree 
102/2005 MoCI <https://www.moci.gov.om> accessed 3 April 2016 
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investment. Administrative measures including approval requirements and screening for 
foreign investments should be reduced.1101 Although Oman has made some progress in 
ease of doing business, moving from 77 in 2015 to 70 in 2016 in the ranking of 189 
economies, it is still far behind.1102 Despite progress in some areas such as getting 
electricity, trading across borders and resolving insolvency, Oman fell back in other 
areas such as starting business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, 
getting credit, and protecting minority investors.1103  
The factor of ease of doing business is one of the elements that makes Singapore 
successful in attracting investment to the country.1104 According to the World Bank 
2016 report on ease of doing business, internationally, the UAE ranks as No. 31, and 
Singapore is No.1.1105 Within this global context, Oman is ranked at 149 from 189 
economies in terms of ease of starting business, whereas the UAE in the same year 
ranked 60, and Singapore was 10. 1106  
Keong maintains that the problems caused by ineffectual bureaucracy in Singapore have 
been eliminated by the strong rule of law, one of a number of elements contributing to 
the success of business there.1107 Foreign investors in Singapore must register their 
business according to the Business Registration Act (BRA) and the only reason for 
which registration may be refused is if the proposed business is unlawful or harmful to 
public welfare or national security.1108 Importantly, foreign investors can apply directly 
to the Registrar of the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA), or else 
online at the business service portal run by ACRA, introduced to facilitate and secure 
online transactions.1109 Foreign business owners can benefit from a one-stop service 
maintained by the Singapore government which helps investors with obtaining licences, 
and approvals, employment and all the requirements necessary for starting up 
business.1110.  
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However, there are some similarities between Oman and the UAE, especially when it 
comes to federal level regulations. For example, to establish a firm in the UAE, the firm 
and its resident employee must find a local sponsor, either a UAE citizen or a local 
institution such as a FZ.1111 In addition, a firm cannot begin business activities until it is 
licensed by the emirate of domicile.1112 However, Dubai established a plan to provide 
1000 government services including services to business by smart phone in partnership 
with Google and Apple.1113 In addition, it allows the establishment of Offshore 
Companies with no need to even set up an actual office facility.1114 As noted in Chapter 
Four, one of the difficulties in Oman FZs is that companies must rent a site in order to 
be able invest. Another feature in Dubai is that it has issued Regulation 3/2006 
determining areas for absolute ownership of land without restrictions, which specifies 
an exhaustive list of all 23 areas in the Emirate of Dubai in which foreign investors can 
hold real estate outright.1115 As discussed in Chapter Four, although Oman has issued a 
regulation granting ownership for foreign investors in such areas, numbers are relatively 
low and there is no comprehensive list of these.    
Oman has taken steps to address this challenge by  establishing 'Invest Easy' in 2015, an 
e-service portal for the business community in Oman, intended to minimise paperwork 
and save costs and time by offering e-services to facilitate setting up and managing 
companies in Oman.1116 Such services will benefit USA and GCC investors; however, 
services for other foreign investors will vary according to the description of each 
business entity.1117 It is anticipated that this service will be extended to other 
nationalities after the promulgation of the new law, if the guarantees in the current draft 
are maintained. Although the government claims that since the establishment of the 
online service in 2015 the number of registered companies has risen from 4,000 to 
22,000 per year,1118 the efficiency of the service and its impact on foreign investment 
need to be examined further. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the increase in the 
number of companies that have registered for online services is remarkable. 
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To address the issue of easing foreign investment establishment and entry in Oman, 
Oman needs to consider the following steps: First; to reduce investor approval 
requirements, local ownership requirements, minimum capital requirement, 
Government discretion in all investment-related activities including Omanisation1119 
and minimum capital requirements by using visas and work permits.1120 Second, to use 
modern technologies to issue the necessary permissions and licences, eliminating the 
need for labour to issue licences, by facilitating all procedures necessary on the 
governmental body websites.1121 Finally, minimizing the procedures needed to achieve 
the licence and permissions. 1122 This can be done in three ways: fully implement the 
One Stop Shop (OSS), fully integrate the notion of OSS with related ministries such as 
MECA and MoM, and establish a list of sectoral restrictions.1123 Overall, while the 
establishment of the 'Invest Easy' service is the first step on a long road, intended to 
facilitate doing business in Oman, there is still a need to consider the application of 
these steps. 
6.3.3 Training to gain  
It was argued in Chapter Four that the lack of training for some jobs important to 
foreign investment in Oman, particularly judges and employees, is a challenge. 
Therefore, providing the necessary training for these jobs is expected to enhance the 
guarantees of legal protection, making Oman more attractive to foreign investment. It is 
believed that establishing efficiency, accountability and predictability of the judicial 
system is one of key the factors to attract foreign investors to any country.1124 Clearly, 
the only way to achieve the efficiency and predictability of the Omani judiciary is by 
ensuring that judges dealing with foreign investment-related cases are well qualified and 
trained.  
However, Weaver argues that the most important element in attracting FDI is not an 
efficient, transparent, and developed judicial or legal system but real business 
opportunities, as is the case in Dubai.1125 He maintains that establishing business 
opportunities through FZs will bring the needed initial FDI for creating a legal 
framework for long-term FDI, arguing that if the state has promising business 
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opportunities even if it has a poor judicial or legal system, this will not discourage 
investors from investing in the country.1126 Weaver cites Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and 
Kuwait as examples of states with poor legal systems that are leading the Middle East in 
attracting foreign investment.1127 As another example, it is said that the recognition and 
enforcement of ICSID awards in the UAE are not guaranteed because, although it has 
signed and ratified the ICSID Convention, it has so far failed to meet its obligation to 
enact national provisions dealing with recognition and enforcement of ICSID awards, or 
“to designate a competent Court or authority for that purpose”.1128  
Nonetheless, Weaver acknowledges that although foreign investors deciding whether to 
invest in a specific country may not be interested in abstract reforms, they are interested 
in those specific areas of the legal and judicial system that may impact on their 
investment.1129 For example, their whole investment might be at risk if judges interpret 
legislation inconsistently or if bribes are required to obtain permits.1130 Training for 
judges would deal with the first but not the second point as it relates to other factors, but 
ensuring the first is significant for Oman. 
In addition, the efficiency of the legal and judicial systems of the countries mentioned 
needs to be examined more closely. It can be argued that one reason for Dubai’s success 
was its establishment of DIFC Courts modelled on the English commercial court 
system, which operate independently from those of Dubai and the UAE.1131 Judges are 
well qualified and typically have experience in insurance, commercial, and banking 
matters, for example, in 2015, the Deputy Chief Justice of the DIFC Courts is a former 
High Court Judge from the UK, while the Chief Justice formerly held the same position 
in Singapore.1132 The DIFC Courts are based on the common law legal system and 
consist of two levels: a Court of First Instance, and a Court of Appeal.1133 Carballo 
argues that the provision of the DIFC Law Courts seeks to persuade foreign investors 
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that DIFC legislation will be applied effectively and independently by neutral foreign 
judges, without fear of domestic dependence or protectionism.1134 
Singapore is another example of the significant role the judiciary may play in attracting 
foreign investment. The judiciary in Singapore is influenced by the People's Action 
Party's (PAP) vision for economic growth since Lee Kuan Yew1135 believed that a 
dependable judiciary is vital to economic development and the government's economic 
strategy.1136 In 1995, he stated: 
But when the government, including me, takes a matter to court or when the 
government is taken by private individuals to court, then the court must adjudicate upon 
the issues strictly on their merits and in accordance with the law. To have it otherwise is 
to lose [...] our standing and [...] our status as an investment and financial centre. [...] 
Our reputation for the rule of law has been and is a valuable economic asset, part of our 
capital, although an intangible one. It has brought to Singapore good returns from the 
MNCs, OHQs, the banks, the financial institutions, and the flood of capital to buy up 
properties in Singapore.1137  
Accordingly, the vision of well-qualified judges meeting Singapore’s needs as an 
investment and financial centre was a target of Singapore’s ruler from the outset. 
Murugesan describes the judiciary in Singapore as part of a corporatist state where 
everything functions “like a precision Swiss watch, with all parts working efficiently, 
effectively and collaboratively” to maintain the country’s status.1138 Hence, Omani 
courts and judges should be prepared to be part of national economic development, 
helping the state to achieve its goals. 
Another area that Oman needs to improve to enhance the guarantees of foreign 
investment is the provision of well-qualified Omani employees. As argued earlier, in 
Chapter Four, the real challenge for Omani employment is not Omanisation or 
minimum wage regulations; rather, it is the lack of skilled Omani labour. In 
comparison, one of Singapore's strengths is its well-educated and skilled employers, 
who must meet the national requirement.1139 If there is any evidence of breaching 
domestic employment requirements, employers may face sanctions from the 
Singaporean Ministry of Manpower, benefiting from its sophisticated website.1140  The 
emphasis in Singapore seems to be on the skills of foreign employees; it also requires 
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employers to apply for a work permit or employment pass, under the terms of the 
Employment of Foreign Workers Act (Chapter 91A) and the Immigration Act (Chapter 
133).   
However, one challenge that the Omani Government needs to consider these days is that 
cutbacks due to the decline in oil prices in 2015 and 2016, are expected to lead to a 
reduction in the training budget or in cancellation of training in many governmental 
bodies.1141 Therefore, cutbacks need to be carefully targeted to avoid negatively 
affecting training programmes, as the competence of the national employment market is 
necessary to attract foreign investment.1142  
6.3.4 The need for a national arbitration centre in Oman  
The availability of arbitration in a country is one of the factors included in 2016 in the 
World Bank’s index for Doing Business under the quality of judicial processes 
indicators on enforcing contracts.1143 Although Oman is a member of the GCC 
Commercial Arbitration Centre, due to developments in the commercial and industrial 
sectors in Oman, the country has realised that it needs its own arbitration centre.1144 
Therefore, it is widely believed that in order to encourage greater investor confidence in 
the Omani legal system and to build a healthy business environment, Oman has made 
promising progress towards establishing a national arbitration centre.1145 However, 
nothing has been done up to date, but if things go well, it is expected that after the 
establishment of the national arbitration centre, companies will be encouraged to settle 
their disputes before the centre, and will be free to choose their arbitrator from Oman or 
from outside the country.1146  
As an example of such a measure, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre 
(SIAC) was established in 1991 to provide neutral arbitration services to the global 
business community.1147 Although like Singapore and Dubai, Oman has generally 
adopted the Model Law, Singapore issued two separate pieces of legislation, an 
International Arbitration Act what contains minor modifications from the Model Law 
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and an Arbitration Act, the latter being provided for domestic arbitration.1148 Pryles 
observes that the significance of the International Arbitration Centre in Singapore is 
mainly due to the support it receives from the country’s Supreme Court1149 as this offers 
the assistance needed for international arbitration, and also supervises and occasionally 
intervenes in these processes.1150 Therefore, the establishment of a national arbitration 
centre in Oman afterward would require support from the Omani courts. 
To take another example, Dubai first established the Centre for Commercial 
Conciliation and Arbitration in 1994, and then the name was changed to Dubai 
International Arbitration Centre (DIAC).1151 In 2008, in conjunction with the London 
Court of International Arbitration, Dubai established another new arbitration institution 
called the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre.1152 The 2008 amendment to Dubai 
Arbitration Law provided the DIFC Arbitration Centre with a broad jurisdiction, 
allowing parties to arbitrate regardless of their location once they expressly agree to the 
jurisdiction of the DIFC Arbitration Tribunals.1153 For example, in Al Khorafi v. Bank 
Sarasin & Co. the DIFC Court provided that “the Tribunal might claim jurisdiction 
notwithstanding the parties having a prior agreement to an unambiguous foreign 
selection clause”.1154 Consequently, as mentioned earlier, it is believed that the 
establishment of the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre has contributed in increasing the 
FDI in Dubai and was a key factor in Dubai's ability to overcome the 2008 financial 
crises quickly. This is because the Arbitration Centre gives foreign investors the added 
confidence needed to invest in Dubai and as a result, arbitrations in the Emirate have 
increased.1155   
Therefore, Oman could benefit from the experiences of both Singapore and Dubai. This 
could be done by providing the judiciary support needed for arbitration, especially from 
the Omani High Court. This matter is also connected with the training needed for 
judges, discussed above. In addition, establishing conjunction with one of the most 
well-known international arbitration bodies in developed countries will help the Omani 
arbitration centre to gain the experience and the recognition needed. It can be argued 
that the FZs and DSEZ in Oman will not achieve their aim of attracting foreign 
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investors unless Oman establishes its own national arbitration centre, close to where 
foreign companies are based. Thus, it is strongly recommended that the cheap option for 
Middle East countries wishing to move to the next stage of development and ensure 
their economic health, is to set up independent arbitration centres within the FZs.1156  
6.5 Conclusion  
As a basis of the recommendations for enhancing legal protection for foreign 
investment in Oman, this chapter summarised the main findings of the arguments put 
forward in this thesis. Thus, it is argued that Oman has taken a greater protection 
approach towards foreign investment on two levels; in its national legislation and in its 
international agreements. Nevertheless, due to the potential risks involved in this 
approach, illustrated particularly by the experience of the Al-Tamimi case, the 
contribution of Omani law and practice to the development of international investment 
law can draw attention to the need to consider a balanced approach between protecting 
its sovereignty and attracting foreign investment. On the above basis, it was also 
highlighted that if Oman uses restrictions in its international agreements to safeguard its 
own national interests, without having efficient national system in foreign investment-
related issues, this will negatively affect Oman's ability to attract foreign investment.  
While the recommendations focus mainly on national policies, amendment may be 
required in the relevant Omani regulations to implement the recommended policies. 
These recommendations further emphasise the need to improve the efficiency of the 
national investment system, including the need for a specialised foreign investment 
council with a unified policy, the need to facilitate doing business in Oman, the need for 
well-qualified judges and employees and the need to establish a national arbitration 
centre in Oman. All these would be supported by Oman's unique characteristics of 
external peaceful policy in the region and peaceful coexistence that is expected to 
enhance foreign investors' trust and maximise Oman's ability to attract foreign 
investment.  
After ensuring the improvement of the efficiency of its national legal and policy system, 
Oman needs to consider and investigate two issues in depth. First, older treaties need to 
be revisited and reviewed in order to see whether they need specific amendments to be 
made that would serve the balanced approach. Second, consideration needs to be given 
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to whether Oman should establish its own model for BITs, following the experience of 
some of the countries mentioned above. 
Although this thesis was able to examine in depth a number of key aspects of the 
current legal system in relation to foreign investment in Oman, these areas will need to 
be re-visited following the promulgation of the DNFIL since the new legislation 
provides improved guarantees for foreign investment and its effect needs to be 
evaluated after its implementation.  
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Appendix A: Oman’s BITs 
 
COUNTRY SIGNED ENTERED INTO FORCE 
Algeria 9 April 2000 22 June 2002 
Austria  1 April 2001 1 February 2003 
Belarus 10 May 2004 18 January 2005 
Belgium and Luxembourg 16 December 2008  
Brunei Darussalam 8 June 1998   
Bulgaria 2 February 2007   
China 18 March 1995   1 August 1995 
Croatia   4 May 2004  
Egypt   25 March 1998 3 May 2000 
Finland   27 September 1997 20 February 1999 
France    17 October 94 4 July 1996 
Germany   30 May 2007 4 April 2010 
India  2 April 1997 13 October 2000 
Iran 2 December 2001 8 April 2003 
Italy   23 June 1993 23 January1997 
Jordan  9 April 2007  
Korea   8 October 2003 10 February 2004 
Lebanon    11 April 2006 20 October 2008 
Morocco  8 May 2001 30 March 2003 
Netherlands   17 January 2009  
Pakistan   9 November 1997 14 May 1998 
Singapore   10 December 2007 12 October 2008 
Sweden  13 July 1995                               6 June 1996 
Switzerland  17 August 2004 18 January 2005 
Syria  14 September 2005  
Tanzania  16 October 2012  
Tunisia  19 October 1991 1 March 1992 
Turkey    4 February 2007   15 March 2010 
Ukraine   1 January 2002  
United Kingdom  25 November 1995         21 May 1996 
Uzbekistan  30 March 2009 20 August 2009 
Vietnam  10 January 2011  
Yemen  20 September 1998 1 April 2000 
 
Source:  UNCTAD <http: //unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_oman.pdf> Accessed on 
28/09/2014 
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Appendix B: Sultanate of Oman Investment Reform Map 
 
GOVERNMENT ENTITY AUTHORITY/BOARD 
Supreme Council for Planning (SCP)  
Chaired by the Sultan; Deputy Chair is Minister 
of MoCI 
Foreign Investment Committee MoCI 
One Stop Shop MoCI 
Free Zones Committee Chaired by Minister of MoCI 
Public Establishment for Industrial Estates 
(PEIE) 
CEO but Board chaired by Minister of MoCI 
Ithraa Board chaired by a Minister/Salim Al Ismaily  
Sohar Free Zone Board chaired by Secretary General of SCP 
Sohar Port Board chaired by Secretary General of SCP 
Salalah Free Zone Board chaired by the Minister of Tourism  
Salalah Port Board chaired by the Minister of Tourism 
Al Mazunah Free Zone Board chaired by CEO of PEIE 
Duqm Special Economic Zone 
Chairman (Ministerial rank) reports to 
Ministerial Council  
 
Source: World Bank Group, ‘Investment Reform Map- Sultanate of Oman’ (unpublished paper, 
April 25 2015) 8 
 
 
